

# **EXERCISE OF UPWARD INFLUENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS**

## **Abstract**

A Dissertation  
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF  
Doctor of Philosophy  
(IN PSYCHOLOGY)

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF  
Prof. Rama Charan Tripathi



BY  
Girja Shanker Dwivedi

Department of Psychology  
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## ABSTRACT

The present study focused on the exercise of upward influence, more specifically the use of influence tactics in upward direction. For this purpose, a theoretical model was developed and examined. The model incorporated individual characteristics, interpersonal relations, organizational processes, organizational structure and bases of power as determinants of the use of upward influence tactics and the expectancy of success of a tactic as intervening between tactic use and antecedent variables.

Several hypotheses were developed and tested. It was predicted that persuasion and ingratiation tactics will be used more frequently and strong coercive tactics less frequently. It was also predicted that, among the individual characteristics, low self esteem and higher relative power will lead to more frequent use of coercive tactics. Personal values, such as, greater commitment and team orientation were expected to have negative association with use of manipulative and coercive tactics. Whereas, other personal values, namely, aram, dependence-proneness and personalised relations were hypothesized to have positive association with the use of manipulative tactics and negative association with the use of coercive tactics. It was hypothesized that interpersonal liking and trust between superior and subordinate will be negatively associated with the use of manipulative and coercive influence tactics. Organisational process variables,

such as, supportive leadership, supportive organizational climate, better union-management relations and less politicization of rewards were hypothesized to lessen the use of manipulative and coercive influence tactics. For the structural variables, greater centralization, formalization, total amount of control, slope of control and less control of employee unions, it was predicted that they will be associated with less frequent use of coercive tactics. In case of expert, reward and referent bases of power, it was hypothesized that they will discourage the use of coercive tactics by subordinates, whereas, coercive base of power would encourage it. Lastly, expectancy of success of tactic was hypothesized to intervene between its use and the individual, interpersonal and organizational variables.

Data were collected, primarily, through a self-administered questionnaire from 344 respondents from five Engineering and five Textile Organizations. Of these, 188 respondents belonged to the Engineering Organizations and 156 to the Textile Organizations. 278 respondents came from eight Public Sector Organizations and 66 respondents from two Private Sector Organizations. Out of the total of 344 respondents, 196 were workers, 31 supervisors and 117 managers.

Results showed that the tactics of persuasion and ingratiation were the most frequently used influence tactics, whereas threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing were less frequently used by the subordinates in exercising upward influence. The use of influence tactics was not found to differ significantly

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across workers, supervisors and managers, except that workers were found to exercise a little more overall upward influence. They also made significantly more use of ingratiation tactics. The use of upward influence tactics, however, differed significantly across organizations. Employees in the Public Sector Organizations, in comparison to the employees of the Private Sector Organizations, made significantly more use of all the eight upward influence tactics. Similarly, employees in the Textile Organizations made significantly more frequent use of manipulative and weak coercive tactics as compared to the employees of the Engineering Organizations.

The use of manipulative tactics was found associated more frequently with such individual characteristics as, aran, team orientation, job level, showing off, committment, number of promotions received and interpersonal attraction. Some organizational process variables, namely, political basis of reward and punishments and union-management relations were also correlated with the use of manipulative tactics. The use of strong and weak coercive tactics was found more frequently correlated with organizational structure and process variables, such as, political basis of rewards and punishments, union-management relations, total amount of control, slope of control and control of unions. Certain individual characteristics, such as, global self-esteem, perception of self-power, committment and number of promotions were also found correlated with the use of coercive tactics, particularly, with strong coercive tactics. The relationship

of individual, interpersonal and organizational variables with the use of influence tactics were generally negative, except in case of political basis of rewards and punishments, control of unions, perception of self power, aram and showing off.

Regression analyses showed that political basis of rewards, team orientation and union-management relations were significant predictors of manipulative tactics. Political basis of rewards was also a significant predictor of the use of strong and weak coercive tactics. Slope of control, total amount of control and number of promotions were the other significant predictors of the use of both strong and weak coercive tactics. Global self esteem predicted the use of strong coercive tactics but did not predict the use of weak coercive tactics.

Expectancy of success of a tactic, in general, intervened between tactic use and interpersonal variables, tactic use and organizational processes and also in case of some of the individual characteristics, such as, team orientation, job level and number of promotions, but did not in case of global self esteem, commitment, bases of power and organizational structure variables. In sum, the proposed theoretical model which incorporated the determinants of the use of upward influence tactics, and expectancy of success as intervening the relationship of use of tactic with antecedent variables was corroborated to a large extent.

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BY  
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**Department of Psychology  
University of Allahabad  
1988**

This is to certify that the dissertation  
entitled "EXERCISE OF UPWARD INFLUENCE IN  
ORGANIZATIONS", submitted by Sri Girja Shanker  
Dwivedi was done under my supervision, and  
constitutes his own work.



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
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**Chapter I : INTRODUCTION**

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## INTRODUCTION

Power and influence are ubiquitous phenomena of social and organizational life. They are central concepts for any attempt to understand social behaviour (Cartwright, 1959a; Clark, 1965; Dahl, 1957). As long as we need the others, we are never far from the world of power. This is true in our day to day exchanges with our loved ones, friends, as well as between employer and employees, subordinates and supervisors and between political leaders. At times we are the target of power based influence, and at others times we are the source trying to influence others to do something they normally would prefer not to do (Korda, 1979). Reasons for these influence attempts may be very many; from seeking money, prestige, security, control over valued resources to seeking power itself.

Social psychology, in general, and organizational psychology in particular have, still, very little to say about how power and influence are exercised in organizations. A growing interest in the influence agent or power holder has recently prompted some researchers to study testable propositions about the exercise of influence, especially the factors affecting the use of various methods of influence. Research concerning the factors affecting the use of various methods of influence has focused on situational factors (Goodstadt & Kipnis, 1970; Kipnis & Cosentino, 1969; Mowday, 1978; Schmidt, 1976; Wilkinson & Kipnis, 1978) and to a lesser extent on personal characteristics

of the power holder (Falbo, 1977; Goodstadt & Kipnis, 1970; Goodstadt & Hjelle, 1973; Kipnis & Cosentino, 1969; Kipnis & Lane, 1962, Mowday, 1978). While these studies have provided valuable insights into the choice of influence methods, they have been limited to downward influence in supervisor subordinate relationship, except for Mowday (1978). Organizational influence process, such as, the management of upward influence has remained a neglected area of organizational research (Porter, 1976).

The study of upward influence processes, however, is as important as the study of downward influence processes. Mowday (1978) felt that focusing on upward influence situations would contribute to our knowledge by examining influence relations in a fundamentally different context. Porter (1976) emphasized its importance for organizational communication, motivation and development. According to Porter, Allen and Angle (1981), if attention is turned to upward influence and political behaviours our views of organizational behaviours will be necessarily broadend. For example, they suggest that if widely quoted frame works of classifying organizations according to the prominent methods used in gaining compliance from organizational members were elaborated to include the possibility of upward influence, rather than only downward, the classification schemes, for example, that of Etizioni (1975) might be altered considerably.

More than thirty years ago March (1955) had made a statement regarding the necessity to broaden our understanding of the study of influence processes. We, still, have not achieved the required generality in the study of influence processes. Our understanding of upward influence processes may lead us toward that direction.

A few research papers, directly related to some or other aspects of upward influence, have recently appeared in journals. But most of these articles, except Mowday's (1978, 1979), have either been primarily concerned with the classification of upward influence tactics (Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson, 1980; Schileit & Locke, 1982) or with providing a theoretical model for the study of upward influence (Porter, et al., 1981). Mowday (1978, 1979) has attempted in detail to examine the process of exercising upward influence, especially, the factors affecting the choice of influence methods. His studies have focussed primarily on the effect of personal and situational factors only. Organizational factors, such as, organizational processes, centralization, formalization and bases of power have not been paid any attention.

Researches on social manipulation done in India (Bohra & Pandey, 1979; Pandey, 1981; Tripathi, 1981) and abroad (Jones, 1964; Kipnis & Vanderveer, 1971; Michener, Plazewski & Vaske, 1979) have provided valuable insight into the social psychology of the influence behaviour of less powerful, and how personal, situational and organizational factors affect the use of

manipulative tactics. We need to further improve our understanding, as to, in a given multiple tactical choice situation, what kinds of influence tactics are used by subordinates to influence superiors and what factors -- personal, situational and organizational -- determine this choice.

#### The concept of upward Influence

The concepts of social power and influence, in general, have been used to account for changes which occur in the course of interaction sequence. These concepts and controversies surrounding these concepts have already been reviewed by many researchers (Singh, 1983; Tedeschi, Schlenker & Lindskold, 1972; Tewari, 1984). Now the concepts of power and influence are treated synonymously and used interchangibly by social psychologists (Filley, House & Kerr, 1976; Kipnis, 1976; Mowday, 1978; Van de Ven & Ferry, 1980). They are defined as generalized ability to change the action of others in some intended fashion. But there is a growing tendency to use the concept of influence instead of power for the reason that any explicit reference to power is considered in bad taste (Kipnis, 1976);

In organizations, influence may be seen as being exercised in many directions. It is exercised by a superior to elicit behavioural compliance from his subordinate, by one department or coworker to induce behavioural change in another department or co-worker, or by a subordinate to change the decisions of his superior. These three directions in which influence is exercised are, respectively, referred to as downward, lateral and upward influence.

Porter, et al. (1981) define upward influence as 'attempt to influence some-one higher in formal hierarchy of authority in the organization (P.111)'. For example, in an organizational setting if a subordinate uses his resources (i.e. power) to get something done from his superior which he would not otherwise do or to control some action of his superior which he would otherwise do, then we speak of such influence attempt as upward influence. Upward influence, therefore, in general, refers to the exercise of influence by a person having less formal authority to change or induce behaviour in another person having more formal authority in an organization.

#### Nature of Upward Influence

Upward influence is basically competitive and political rather than cooperative. Being competitive it focusses upon the zero sum aspects of organizational resources (Porter, et al.1981) Organizational members exercise upward influence to get as much of the scarce resources as possible. Obviously, tangible resources such as money, status, power, promotions and rewards are limited. Limited resources can not satisfy the need of all individuals equally well. Who gets what, when and how much depends much upon the degree to which one can influence those who have control over the distribution of these scarce resources (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). Upward influences, therefore, are aimed at limiting the freedom of higher authorities in such a way that one is able to manage a larger share of resources and better promote one's interests as compared to other members of the

organization. The scarcity of resources, thus, leading to competition among organizational members is the motivating force behind most upward influence attempts, resulting in the fight for power and control and tactical use of power by the subordinates. Most of the influence tactics used by subordinates to influence superiors are discretionary and fall outside the norms of the organizations.

In organizational life one can see subordinate members using ingratiation, pressures, threats, blocking and informal exchange tactics to influence superiors. These tactics used by subordinates do not fall within the behavioural norms proscribed by the formal organizations and, therefore, are political.

#### Exercise of Upward Influence

The deliberate attempt by a person to elicit behavioural compliance from another person has been viewed by political scientists (Dahl, 1957; March, 1955), Sociologists (Bacharach & Aiken, 1976; Schur, 1969) and social psychologists (Tannenbaum, 1958; Tedeschi, Schlenker & Lonskold, 1972; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) as use of social power, or the exercise of influence. When a low power person uses his social powers to get something done from his superiors, it is called the exercise of upward influence.

Exercise of influence is not an isolated act rather it is a process or a sequence of acts (Cartwright, 1965). Kipnis (1976) has provided a model of this power act. According to him,

the agent of influence first experiences the power motivations. Then he requests the target person to do something and if the target person shows resistance, the agent of influence mobilizes his resources and presents them to the target person in a way that will maximize his outcomes by inducing appropriate behaviour in the target person. Thus, the possession of resources, intention or need to use them and selection of tactics are important acts preceding the exercise of influence.

### Sources of Influence

Most of the theories of social influence assert that the ability of an individual to exert influence arises from the possession of or control over valued resources. Dahl (1957) referred to these as the bases of an agents' power, which consist of "all the resources-opportunities, acts, objects - that he can exploit in order to affect the behaviour of another (P.203)". The list of resources usually contains such items as wealth, prestige, information, physical strength and ability to gratify 'ego needs', such as, recognition, affection, respect and accomplishments. Universally applicable list of resources, however, is not possible because any particular property of an agent of influence can serve as a source of influence only if the target person has an appropriate need. If the target person does not want what an agent of influence can give, the agent will no longer have the potential to influence the target person. But it is true that a person who has more resources can exercise more influence in comparison to a person who has no resources or less resources (Levinger, 1959).

Traditionally, possession of wealth, especially control over means of production had been emphasized in the analysis of influence in society. But this account has been revised by Berle and Means (1933) and Russell (1938) who observed that an individual gains ability to exercise influence by occupying a position which controls economic resources rather than the ownership of means. Some other social scientists (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971; Weber, 1947) conceived authority as vested in the position occupied by an individual as the source of power. However, contemporary organizational theorists tend to view one's ability to influence as resting on much broader base, rather than merely on control over economic rewards. The bases from which it originates are not only of coercive nature but they include, such bases as, remunerative and normative (Etizioni, 1975); control over persons, information and instrumentalities (Mechanic, 1962); expert, coercive, legitimate, reward and referent (French & Raven, 1959); expert, coercive, social-emotional and associational (Gold, 1958); information (Raven, 1965); discontentment (Gamson, 1968); a sense of commitment to a larger purpose served by the organization (Tannenbaum, Kavcic, Rosner, Vianello & Wieser, 1974); structural position, charisma, expertise and opportunity (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980) and group power (Likert & Likert, 1976).

The possible bases of power can be commonly put into two categories : personal and institutional. Personal resources refer to those things which reside in the individual. They are the part of the individual's make up and go where the individual goes, such as, intelligence, physical strength, beauty, affection, love,

expertise, and charisma. Institutional resources, on the otherhand, are derived from one's participation in institutional life. They detach themselves from the individual at the time when he leaves the institution (Kipnis, 1976). Institutional resources are long lasting (Berle, 1967) and more capable (Kipnis, 1976) as compared to individual resources, while individual resources, as compared to institutional resources, are more dynamic and instruments for organizational change (Mechanic, 1962).

#### Influence motivations

Though possession of resources is a prerequisite, it is not a sufficient condition for exercising influence. People having a large number of resources may not exercise influence. The answer for exercising influence lies in people's dependence on others. When this dependence is combined with the belief that others are reluctant or unwilling to provide what is wanted, the person possessing requisite resources experiences an inclination to influence. These inclinations to influence are designated as influence motivations. Minton (1972) defined influence motivation as need to obtain social compliance and, thus, achieve intended effects.

In literature various intrinsic and instrumental reasons underlying influence motivations have been reported. Philosophers like Hobbes (1968), Nietzsche (1966) and Russell (1938) attempted

to postulate a unitary and universal desire for power behind all influence attempts. Psychoanalytically oriented psychologists ascribe the origin of need to influence stemming from the absence of love in childhood (Fromm, 1959), feeling of inferiority (Adler, 1966), continued anxiety (Horney, 1950) and libidinal impulses (Freud, 1930). Some psychologists, on the otherhand, maintain that influence motivations arise out of one's position or role (Stogdill, 1959), desire to attain certain objectives and goals (Cartwright, 1965) and to change the dependence relationship (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Cohen (1959), Horowitz (1958) and Scotland (1959) felt that creation of personal threats due to lack of power and lack of structure in the situation may also motivate low power person to influence others to either maintain or restore his power.

Motivations to exercise influence, thus, arise out of a host of factors, both intrinsic and instrumental. The desire of power whether intrinsic or instrumental is, generally, recognized by organizational theorists.

### Influence Tactics

#### Types of Influence Tactics

A person who possesses the requisite resources and experiences influence motivation may perform a number of acts to influence the target person. These influence acts are referred to as tactics. Tactics, in general, mean the behaviours through which one attempts to induce desired behaviour in another person.

Dahl (1957) defined a tactic as "a mediating activity by A between A's, base and B's response". According to Jacobson(1972), a tactic is any mediating activity through which the agent of influence affects the target of influence. Bacharach and Lawler (1980) define tactics' as those behaviours that can change power relationship (P.154)'. In brief, influence tactics are behaviours performed by individuals or groups to get something done from or to change power relationship with other individuals or groups.

There are many schemes about how to classify influence tactics. These schemes are either inductive or deductive. Deductive schemes of classification are based on intuition and one's theory about human nature. Russell (1938), for example, asserted that one may exert influence over other person by direct physical power, by rewards and punishments and through education and propaganda . Gilman (1962) indentified coercion, manipulation, use of authority and persuasion as ways for accomplishing control in hierarchical organization. Similarly, Harsanyi (1962) classified influence tactics into conditional distribution of rewards, conditional distribution of punishments, unconditional distribution of rewards and unconditional distribution of punishments. Cartwright's (1965) classification includes, such categories as, physical control, control over costs, control over gains, control over information and use of attitude towards being influenced. Steger and Tedeschi (1971) classified influence tactics as threats, mediation of punishments,

promises, mediation of rewards, persuasion, manipulation, activation of commitments, interpersonal attraction, probes and non decision tactics. Mowday (1975), after reviewing existing literature, suggested five general methods of influence, i.e., threat, legitimate authority, persuasive arguments, rewards or exchange of favours and manipulation. Bacharach and Lawler (1980) integrated four major schemes of Blau (1964), Emerson (1962), Lawler and Bacharach (1976) and Michener and Suchner's (1972) into a more general scheme of classification of influence tactics. Within this general scheme they identified 'Four basic tactics'. These are (i) Improving the quality of the bargainer's alternative (This tactic has also been labelled as 'extending the power network' by Emerson (1962) and Michener and Suchner (1972); and seeking alternatives or threatening to leave the relationship by Lawler and Bacharach (1976) and Blau (1964); (ii) Decreasing the quality of the opponent's alternatives (This tactic has also been labelled as coalition formation by Emerson (1962) and outcome blockage by Michener and Suchner (1972)); (iii) Decreasing the value of what the opponent gives to the bargainer (Behaviours, such as, withdrawal and conflict avoidance have been kept in this class of general tactic by Emerson (1962)), and (iv) Increasing the extent to which the opponent values what the bargainer provides ( This tactic has been called as ingratiation, self-enhancement and status giving in other schemes of classification (Emerson, 1962; Lawler & Bacharach, 1976; Michener & Suchner, 1972)).

Schileit and Locke (1982) have grouped influence tactics reported by some researchers (Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson, 1980; Mechanic, 1962; Mowday, 1975; Porter et al. 1981; Weinstien, 1979; Wortman; Camille & Linsenmeier, 1977) into nine categories. These are : Logical or rational presentation of ideas, informal and non-performance specific exchange, formal exchange, adherence to rules, upward appeal, threats, manipulation, coalition formation, and lastly, persistence and assertiveness.

Another approach adopted in classification and analysis of influence tactics is the inductive approach. A number of researchers (Falbo, 1977; Finley & Humphreys, 1974; Kipnis, et al., 1980) collected reports directly from individuals in different contexts and analysed them for the classification of influence tactics. Falbo (1977), for example, asked undergraduates to write an essay on 'how I get my way'. His analysis of reports resulted in sixteen influence strategies which were grouped into four general classes using multidimensional scaling technique. Four configurations of influence tactics that emerged were; rational direct, rational indirect, non-rational direct and non-rational indirect. Similarly, Kipnis, et al. (1980), through critical incident method came up with a list of eight categories of influence tactics, i.e., sanctions, upward appeals, blocking, exchange, assertiveness, ingratiation, rationality and coalition formation.

Deductive approaches of classification of influence tactics have been criticized for their rationality (Jacobson, 1972) and unidimensional conceptualization of power in typical managerial or leadership situation in organization (Porter, et al., 1981). Kipnis, et al. (1980) report that when influence act are actually studied it is found that people do not exercise influence in the ways predicted by rational classification schemes. Similar assertion has also been made by Goodchild, Quadrado and Raven (1975) in their study in which college students wrote brief essays on the topic, 'How I got my way'.

#### Choice of Influence Tactics

If an organizational member (individual or group) possessing requisite resources required for any type of influence is motivated to control and regulate the behaviour of the other individual or group, he (individual or group) faces the choice of what methods of influence to use (Porter, et al., 1981) or how resources to be presented to the target person-as a promise as a threat, as a persuasion or what (Kipnis, 1976).

Historically speaking early theories of motivational analysis advanced the concept of hedonism to explain the choice of behaviour. But hedonistic doctrine as an explanation of the choice of behaviour remained an unempirical reality in the writings of early psychologists (Freud, 1930; James, 1890). Learning theories developed by Thorndike (1911) and Hull (1944) attempted to translate hedonistic doctrine into a testable

psychological theory but they were historical in the sense that they asserted a direct lawful relation between behaviour of the organism at one point of time and behaviour at earlier point of time. According to cognitive psychologists (Lewin, 1938; Tolman, 1932), theories of Hull and others are not sufficient to account for the more complex aspects of the choice of behaviour. Choice of behaviour, according to them, is a cognitive act. Past events can have an effect on behaviour in the present only by modifying cognitions (beliefs, opinions, expectations) of the individual (Lewin, 1938).

A number of cognitive models have been developed by researchers (Lawler, 1973; Pollard & Mitchell, 1972; Vroom, 1964 to explain the choice of behaviour. Pollard and Mitchell (1972 maintain that the choice of influence tactics involves a decision making process. The agent of influence is presumed to have some cognition about what value he or she places on certain outcomes and some idea of probability that a given action will lead to which outcomes. He will choose among actions those with maximum over all utility. The calculation of probability, thus, seems to be the key ingredient in the choice of influence methods (Porter, et al., 1981). Alternatively, this can be thought of as the calculation of cost and benefit ratio for various possible methods and selection of those methods which would bring the greatest benefits for the lowest cost (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).

McGregor (1960) proposed a slightly different point of view. He suggested that the choice of influence tactics is determined by agent's theory of human nature. He identified two broad orientations, which he called the Theory 'X' and the Theory 'Y'. Although, McGregor (1960) cites no evidence, his general point seems well taken. One's philosophy of human nature, indeed, affects one's expectations regarding the success of various methods and thereby the choice of methods (Cartwright 1965). Gilman (1962) accepts the view of McGregor but asserts that the general socio-cultural environment of an organization also determines the type of influence that will be employed within it. And his assertion is based upon the analysis of methods of control used from time to time by the American business organizations.

Power dependence theorists (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Emerson, 1962; Michener & Suchner, 1972) hold that parties in relationship (individuals or groups) select those influence tactics to which they attach the greatest probability of success. However the attachment of probability of success to a tactic is a function of power dependence. Thus, the dimensions of dependence, by implication, serve as major criteria in tactical decisions. The probability of success as a crucial factor in determining the choice of influence tactics is also suggested by Porter, et al.(1981). However, they state that the calculation of the probability of success is dependent on agent's assessment of self-characteristics, interpersonal

relationship and the characteristics of the situation and the method itself. A number of studies showing the relationship of personal and situational factors with influence tactics have provided strong support to their contention (Goodstadt & Hjelle, 1973; Kipnis, et al., 1980; Mowday, 1979).

Review of studies : Factors Affecting  
the Choice of Influence Tactics

As noted earlier, the growing interest in influence agent or powerholder has prompted researchers to study the relationship of personal, situational and organizational factors with the choice of influence tactics (Ansari & Kapoor, 1986; Erez & Rim, 1982; Falbo, 1977; Goodstadt & Kipnis, 1970; Instone, Major & Bunker, 1983; Kipnis, et al., 1980; Michener & Schwertfeger, 1972; Mowday, 1979; Tripathi, 1981). Important findings of these and some other studies are reported hereunder four major headings, i.e., Individual Characteristics, interpersonal factors, situational factors and organizational factors.

Individual Characteristics

Individual characteristics, such as, self-confidence, self-esteem, internal/external control, need for power, self-perception of power, relative power, gender and experience, have been found, in several studies, associated with the choice of influence tactics. Kipnis and Lane (1962) in a study with navy officers found that officers who lacked self confidence were significantly less willing to hold face to face discussions with subordinates. They significantly more often endorsed referring subordinates to a superior and relied more on

administrative rules to solve supervisory problems. Goodstadt and Kipnis (1970), similarly, reported that subjects with low self-confidence in their leadership ability relied mainly upon formally prescribed powers, such as, pay deduction, firing and warning to correct poor performance of workers. Similar results have been obtained in some other studies (Gamson, 1968; Kipnis & Lane, 1962). Instone, et al. (1983) found gender based difference in self-confidence and the choice of influence tactics. Females who, in general, were low in self-confidence than males were found to use more coercive and fewer rewarding strategies to influence their subordinates in comparison to males. Mowday (1979) found only limited support for hypothesised relationship of self-confidence with choice of upward influence tactics. In an upward influence study he found that individuals who were high on self confidence were more likely to use persuasive methods of influence than individuals low on self-confidence. But he did not find any difference between high and low self-confidence individuals in the use of impersonal methods of influence, such as, appeal to organizational policies and regulations. This later finding is contrary to results obtained in earlier studies of Gamson (1968) and Kipnis and Lane (1962).

Some investigators have related a sense of power or self-confidence to internal and external control orientation (Minton, 1972). Several studies on internally and externally controlled subjects have found that internals prefer persuasive and positive modes of influence, while externals prefer coercive and manipulative modes of influence . In an experimental study

Goodstadt and Hjelle (1973) gave their internally and externally controlled subjects different ranges of power to supervise three fictitious workers. One of the workers presented himself as problem worker to the supervisor. Results indicated that in dealing with the problem worker externally controlled subjects used significantly more coercive powers than did internally controlled subjects. In addition, internals relied more on personal persuasive powers than did the externals. Ransford (1968) studying Watt's riots found that subjective feeling of powerlessness was related to the willingness to participate in riots in future. Kerner commission's Report on Civil Disorders (1968) also stated that frustration or powerlessness had led some Negroes to believe that there was no effective alternative to violence as a means of achieving redress to their grievances. Raven and Kruglanski (1970) and Kanter (1977) also hypothesised that individuals low in self-confidence and self perception of power are more likely to use coercive methods of influence. The general explanation advanced for these findings is that low self-confidence and the feeling of powerlessness reduces one's expectations of successfully influencing others through persuasion and other gentle means of influence which, in turn, leads to a greater reliance on the use of coercive methods (Kipnis, 1976). This general explanation, however, has not been substantiated in some studies (Mowday, 1979).

Tactical decisions in dyadic influence situation often also depend on one's judgement about the power of the self and the power of the target of influence. The general finding is that as one party gains sufficient edge over the other party in relationship, the stronger party persists longer and uses more forceful tactics of influence (Kipnis, 1970). Wilkinson and Kipnis (1978) in a study of tactics used between organizations found that the organizations which were rated less powerful as compared to target organizations were reported by respondents as using less frequently strong means (threat, legal action, with holding payment, etc.) and more frequently weak means (request, compromise and discussion, etc.) to influence their target organizations. Similarly, those organizations which were rated more powerful as compared to their target organizations were reported as using more frequently strong means and less frequently weak means to influence their target organizations. Kipnis, et al. (1980) in another study, in which status difference was conceptualized as power difference, asked lower level managers to describe the extent to which they used given tactics to influence their superiors, coworkers, and subordinates. Results of the study indicated that as the status of the target person increased the respondents placed more reliance on rationality based tactics. Assertive tactics and sanctions were used more often to influence subordinates than coworkers and superiors.

Bacharach and Lawler (1976) used exchange theory dimensions (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1972a) to examine the impact of perceived relative power on multistrategy evaluation. In a role playing simulation experiment college students were asked to take the position of an employee in a situation of conflict with employer and to evaluate their likelihood of adopting four strategies i.e., self-enhancement, threat to leave, coalition formation and conflict avoidance. Relative power in terms of outcome alternative and outcome values for both employee and employer were varied through suggestions. Analysis of results revealed that in high self outcome condition subjects were more likely to adopt threat to leave and in low self-outcome condition subjects were more likely to use conflict avoidance. Similarly in high others alternative condition subjects preferred coalition, while in low others alternative condition they preferred threat. Parmerlee, Near and Jensen (1982) in a study, in which whistle blowing was conceptualised as lodging complaints of unfair employment discrimination to an outside agency, found that when whistle blower was perceived as more powerful and credible, organizations retaliated by silencing or discrediting him. Similarly, when whistle blower was perceived as less powerful, organizations retaliated by punishing him. Patterson, Littman and Bricker (1967) noticed that weakness encouraged aggression. Aggression against a child decreased if he retaliated but increased if he submitted. Falbo and Peplau (1980), however, found different kind of

results on power strategies used in intimate relations. He found that individuals who reported having relatively greater power than their partner were likely to report using bilateral power strategies, such as, bargaining, reasoning and persuasion. However, results of above studies, in general, suggest that when agents of influence have an edge over their targets they are tempted to use strong means of influence more frequently because they do not fear target's retaliation. But as the retaliation and blockage capacity of the target person increases the perceived relative power of the target person increases and that of the agent of influence decreases, which consequently decreases agents tendency to use punishing means of influence. A possible link between the perceived power of the target and his blocking and retaliation capacity has been found in many studies (Michener, Lawler & Bacharach, 1973; Tedeschi, Bonoma & Novinson, 1970).

Besides the above factors, some other individual characteristics, such as, need for achievement, need for power, machiavellianism, gender and experience have also been found associated with the choice of influence tactics. Mowday (1979) found need for achievement and need for power positively associated with the use of persuasive arguments and manipulation and negatively associated with the use of organizational policies and regulations. High need for power has also been found associated with the tendency of giving more rewards to ingratiating workers (Fodor & Ferrow, 1979) and greater assertiveness

during group discussion (Fodor & Smith, 1982). Kipnis and Cosentino (1969) found that inexperienced supervisors, relative to experienced supervisors, more frequently referred their subordinates to supervisors and relied more on coercive than persuasive tactics of influence to solve supervisory problems. Mowday (1979) found supervisory experience positively related to organizational policies and regulations and negatively related to the use of manipulations. In several other studies gender based differences in choice of influence tactics have also been reported (Instone et al., 1983; Johnson, 1978; Kipnis, 1976). The general finding of these studies is that relative to men women use more indirect strategies of influence. Falbo and Peplau (1982) found that male hetero-sexuals were more likely to report bilateral and direct influence strategies, while the female hetero-sexual were more likely to report using unilateral. In several other studies machiavellianism has been found positively associated with use of ingratiation (Tripathi & Thapa, 1977; Pandey & Rastogi, 1979) and emotional alteration, deceit, hinting and thought manipulation (Falbo, 1977).

### Interpersonal Factors

Interpersonal trust in, liking for and conflict with the target person also affect agent's choice of influence tactics. An agent who likes the target of influence will use persuasive tactics because he sees his expectancy of success using persuasive means as high (Kipnis, 1976). A growing body of research shows that coercion is an inappropriate mode of influence between

friends, especially if alternative modes of influence are available (Tornatzky & Geiwitz, 1968). However, coercion might be preferred as the only mode which could exert control over a disliked and distrusted opponent (Bank, 1974; Michener & Burt, 1974). French and Snyder (1959) in a study found that as the attraction towards the target person increases, so does the frequency of persuasive influence attempts. Krass (1966) found that low attraction subjects used gates to block their opponent more often than did high attraction subjects, in an electro-magnetic bargaining game. Michener and Schwertfeger (1972) also reported similar findings. In this study 128 subjects, who either liked or disliked the target person, responded to two hypothetical situations by indicating their preference for the use of four power tactics. Results of the study indicated that subjects favoured value change tactics such as withdrawal and demand creation more under liking, and destructive tactics, such as, blockage and extention of network more under disliking conditions. In some other simulation experiments in which appointed supervisors were given either reward or coercive power to monitor the performance of liked or disliked workers it was found that reward and coercive powers were used more with disliked than with liked workers (Banks, 1974; Goodstadt & Hjelle, 1973). However, in some studies the effect of liking and disliking was not found on the utilization of coercive power (Schlenker & Tedeschi, 1972).

Several studies on prejudices against minority groups also illustrate the effect of liking on use of power. Kipnis, Silverman and Copeland (1973) investigated whether more coercive power

would be used by white supervisors with black employees than with white employees. Investigators gathered information from supervisors about the kind of problems encountered and influence methods used to overcome those problems. Analysis of reports revealed that coercive means, such as, suspension and firing were used more often with black employees than with white employees for the same infractions. Thus, studies on the effect of attraction on the use of power, in general, suggest that in high attraction relationship an agent prefers positive and persuasive modes of influence, while in the low attraction relationship he prefers coercive modes of influence.

Besides attraction, interpersonal trust and intensity of conflicts between agent of influence and the target of influence also affect the choice of influence methods. Although social psychological literature lacks empirical studies, intense conflicts in which goals are incompatible, interdependent and vital to each party breed suspicion regarding motives and trust-worthiness and hence reduce the effectiveness of positive modes of influence, such as, promises, persuasion or moral exhortations (Tedeschi, Gaes & Rivera, 1977). Threats are easier to believe under those circumstances, and it is the tendency of each party to view himself as defending against the intrusions of the other. The more intense the conflict, the more likely threats and punishments will be used (Deutsch, Canavan & Rubin, 1971).

#### Situational Factors

Research concerning factors affecting the use of or the choice among various tactics of influence has largely focused on

situational factors surrounding the influence attempt, such as, the nature of the problem, goals of the influence attempt, timing of the influence attempt, span of control, target of the influence attempt and the situational setting (Erez & Rim, 1982; Goodstadt & Kipnis, 1970; Kipnis & Cosentino, 1969; Kipnis, Schmidt, Smith & Wilkinson, 1984; Mowday, 1978, 1979; Wilkinson & Kipnis, 1978).

Initial field studies on Naval supervisors (Kipnis & Lane, 1962; Kipnis, Lane & Frankfurt, 1961) and on industrial supervisors (Kipnis & Cosentino, 1969) demonstrated that agent's choice of tactics is associated with the nature of problem encountered. These studies found a positive relationship of poor attitude and discipline problems with diagnostic talks, official reports and warning and of work problems with increased supervision. Goodstadt and Kipnis (1970) examined these findings in an experimentally simulated organizational setting in which forty students were appointed as supervisors and were given full range of powers to supervise workers performance. Two type of problems, i.e., poor attitude and ineptness were induced experimentally. Results of the study showed that subjects in poor attitude condition significantly more often fired or threatened the problem worker, while subjects in inept condition relied more on their expert power. Wilkinson and Kipnis (1978) also found a positive relationship of proactive problems with weak means and of reactive problems with strong means of influence. O'Reilly and Weitz (1980) reported that, out of fourteen type of problems reported by supervisors, most frequent use of sanctions, warnings, and dismissals were associated with the problems of personal

conduct and poor sales.

In several studies it has also been found that as the complexity of the problem increased, supervisor's reliance on coercive power also increased. That is, supervisors dealing with complex problems, as compared to supervisors dealing with simple problems, more often transferred subordinates to a different set of duties and increased the number of corrective measures (Goodstadt & Kipnis, 1970; Kipnis & Lane, 1962; Kipnis et al., 1961). Some studies report that supervisor's larger span of control was associated with the use of more coercive than persuasive tactics of influence (Erez & Rim, 1982; Goodstadt & Kipnis, 1970; Kipnis & Lane, 1962; Kipnis et al., 1973; Miller, Boster, Roloff & Seibold, 1977). Kipnis (1976) suggests that this may be because in over burdened situations supervisors cannot afford to use diagnostic and persuasive tactics, so they are attracted to use coercive tactics of influence.

Kipnis, et al. (1980) report that agent's choice of tactics varies with his reasons for exercising influence. They found that when the reason for exercising influence was to seek personal assistance from the target person ingratiation tactics were used and when the reason for exercising influence was to assign work to the target person assertive tactics were used more frequently. Similarly for improving targets performance assertive and rationality tactics and for convincing the target person to accept new ideas rationality and exchange tactics were

used more frequently. In a cross-cultural study, Kipnis et al. (1984) found that managers, in general, varied their strategies according to their objectives. Managers seeking personal benefits from their supervisors often relied on soft words, impression management strategies and promotion of pleasant relationship, while managers persuading their supervisors to accept new ideas usually relied on the use of data, explanations and strategies of reason.

The timing of influence attempt and who is to be influenced have also been reported to make difference in agents choice of influence tactics. Kipnis, et al. (1980) found that assertive tactics and sanctions were reported to be used more often with subordinates than with coworkers and supervisors, while rationality tactics were used more often with superiors. Kipnis and Cosentino (1969) found that supervisors who were union members, while supervising union and non-union members talked less to union members, spent less time with them and reprimanded or issued official warnings more to them than non-union members. Mowday (1978) also found that target of influence and the timing of influence were related to the choice of influence methods. Timing of the influence attempt has been found associated with the method of influence in several other studies (Kipnis & Misner, 1974; Toch, 1970; Wilkinson & Kipnis, 1978). The general finding of those studies is that if persuasive means at the early stage fail to invoke favourable response from the target person, at

later stage amount of pressure is increased upon him by using strong or harsher means of influence.

Situational factors, such as, institutional setting, fear arousal, and competitiveness are also associated with the use of influence tactics. Kipnis, et al. (1980) reported that managers in an unionized organization as compared to managers in an non-unionized organization were more likely to use ingratiating tactics to influence subordinates and blocking tactics to influence superiors. Further, in some studies situations arousing fear (Mulder & Stemerdink, 1963) and competition (Deutsch, 1969) have been found positively associated with coercive and assertive tactics and negatively associated with persuasive tactics of influence. However, Pandey and Rastogi (1979) found frequent use of manipulative tactics with competition.

#### Organizational Factors

Only a few studies have been done to investigate the relationship of organizational factors with the use of influence tactics (Ansari & Kapoor, 1986; Bohra, 1980; Cheng, 1983; Erez & Rim, 1982; Gilman, 1962; Schilit & Locke, 1982). Gilman (1962) analysed the method of control used by American business organizations and found that with changing socio-cultural environment of organizations the use of economic coercion had been progressively reduced. Erez and Rim (1982) found that managers of larger organizations were more likely to use rational tactics to influence their bosses than managers from smaller organizations.

Similarly, Schilit and Locke (1982) also found that workers in small and private organizations as compared to workers in large and public organizations used more the informal tactics of upward influence, such as, trading of job related benefits. Cheng (1983) in an experimental study, in which organizational characteristics were described as positive to one group and negative to the other group, found that subjects given positive description of the organization chose more rational tactics to influence their superiors and subjects given negative description chose more political tactics, such as, ingratiation, threat and blocking.

Indian studies, although few in number, also report an association of influence tactics with organizational variables. Singh (1983) found positive relationship of the bases of power, participation, union management relations and rule-observance with use of authority, vigilance and positive and negative reinforcement tactics of control. A negative relationship of use of these control tactics was, however, found with bureaucracy and authoritarianism. Ansari and Kapoor (1986) in an experimental study found that subjects had a greater tendency to choose blocking, upward appeal, and ingratiation tactics to influence their authoritarian managers and rational persuasive tactics to influence their nurturant and participative managers. Bohra (1980) studied the effect of formalization on the use of ingratiation in real organizational setting. Fairly well

established organizations were conceived as more formalized and organizations still in the process of establishing as less formalized. Comparative results of the study indicated that ingratiation tactics were used more in less formalized organizations than in more formalized organizations.

#### Statement of the Problem

A number of studies which deal with factors affecting the choice of influence tactics have been reviewed in the earlier section. The review of these studies whereas on the one hand highlights the main findings of previous researches, it emphasizes the need for further studies to bridge various gaps in our understanding of the exercise of upward influence.

Firstly, the previous research, with a few exceptions (Mowday, 1978; 1979; Schilit & Locke, 1982), has been limited to downward influence in superior-subordinate relationships (Goodstadt & Hjelle, 1973; Goodstadt & Kipnis, 1970; Kipnis & Cosentino, 1969; Kipnis & Lane, 1962; Singh, 1983; Wilkinson & Kipnis, 1978). Influence processes, such as, the management of upward influence, have largely been neglected (Porter, 1976). A few papers on upward influence which have recently appeared have primarily concentrated either on the classification of upward influence tactics (Kipnis, et al., 1980; Schilit & Locke, 1982), or on the development of a model of upward influence (Porter, et al., 1981). Little or no emphasis has been laid on empirical verification of factors affecting subordinate's choice of influence tactics. The present study has been designed to examine the exercise of

upward influence, or more specifically to study the factors affecting the subordinate's choice of tactics of upward influence. It has been felt that focusing on this aspect of upward influence would broaden our views of organization's political behaviours (Porter, et al., 1981) which are endemic to our organizational life (Kanter, 1977; Schein, 1977). Further it should also help in developing insights into how organizational members who are in relatively power-disadvantage positions get their way in organizations (Mowday, 1978).

Secondly, early studies done either in leadership context or in upward influence context have largely focused primarily on the role of personal and situational factors. Organizational factors, such as, organizational processes, structure, climate and reward structure have been paid little or no attention. Some of these organizational variables should be included in the study design. It is argued that these organizational variables may play an important role in determining the choice of influence tactics. The rationale for this is based upon the salience of these variables emphasized by various researchers (Ansari, Kapoor & Rehana, 1984; Mowday, 1978; Schilit & Locke, 1982). It is also contended that organizational characteristics affect the relative effectiveness of various tactics of influence and thereby the choice of influence tactics (Mowday, 1978).

Thirdly, in previous upward influence researches respondents on whom data were collected and generalizations made were from managerial levels (Kipnis, et al., 1984; Mowday, 1979;

Schilit & Locke, 1982). How far these generalizations hold true on lower echelons (workers), still, remains to be verified. It is argued that because of differences in roles, expectations attached with roles, values and organizational constraints, workers and managers ought to differ in their tactics of influence. It is suggested that one should study whether differences in the choice of influence tactics are found across organizations, departments and hierarchical levels.

Fourthly, previous researches (both downward and upward) have confined themselves to studying factors from a particular level to see how they relate with the choice of influence tactics. No attempt has been made to predict the relative contribution of variables from different levels in determining this choice. It is suggested that an attempt should be made to ascertain the relative contribution of individual, interpersonal and organizational variables, separately as well as jointly, in predicting upward influence tactics.

Besides taking up the above issues for investigation the present study addresses itself to some issues which are similar to those of earlier studies. For example, two issues included in this study are with respect to commonly used upward influence tactics and the role of some individual characteristics in determining the choice of upward influence tactics. These have already been investigated by some researchers (Kipnis, et al., 1984; Kipnis, et al., 1980; Mowday, 1979). However, they have been included in the present study for investigation because they

appear important in our socio-cultural context.

The major research questions posed in the present study are as follows:

1. What are the most common upward influence tactics that are used in Indian organizations ?
2. Are there any differences in the upward influence tactics of workers and line managers, among different departments and organizations ? If so, why ?
3. What is the nature of relationship of individual characteristics, interpersonal relations, organizational processes, organizational structure and bases of powers with upward influence tactics ?
4. Does the probability of success of a tactic intervene the relationship of individual, interpersonal and organizational variables with the actual use of influence tactic ?
5. What is the relative contribution of different variables, separately as well as jointly, in predicting the use of upward influence tactics ?

#### Theoretical Model

The theoretical model used in this study has been outlined in Figure 1. The model is derived from the studies reviewed earlier. Five sets of variables are hypothesized as affecting

the choice of upward influence tactics. Individual characteristics predispose the agent of influence to choose certain types of influence tactics more than the others. This argument is based on a number of studies of studies reviewed earlier (Christie & Geis, 1970; Falbo, 1977; Istone, et al., 1983; Kipnis, 1976; Mowday, 1979). Inter personal relations between superior and subordinate are considered important in increasing or decreasing the confidence in and social desirability for certain influence tactics which, in turn, affect the use of influence tactics. Organizational structural factors are considered important in determining the context in which influence is exercised. The degree of formalization, centralization and slope of control are seen related to the perception of opportunity to engage in certain types of behaviours, the perception of norms condoning or condemning certain types of influence attempts and the perception of cost/benefits associated with different influence tactics.


Although, organizational structure and processes are intertwined, we maintain a distinction between them to see how the actual intra-organizational operations contribute to the choice and use of upward influence tactics. To the extent, organizational members are inter-dependent, organizational processes are seen as affecting the interpersonal relations between superior and subordinate and the manner in which organizational events involving influence attempts get structured. These eventually determine the choice of upward

THE THEORETICAL MODEL USED IN THIS STUDY

ANTICEDENT VARIABLES

INTERVENING VARIABLES

OUTCOME VARIABLES



Note: The relationships reported with the help of broken lines in the model have not been investigated in the present study.

Figure 1 : A theoretical model of use of upward influence tactics.

influence tactics. Bases of power have been included because it is at the interpersonal level that the influence is exercised. The bases of power are invoked to control the behaviour of subordinates. The extent to which the bases of power employed by a superior are coercive, the hostility, negative attitudes and a tendency to harm harmdoer-will increase in subordinate and his dependency on his superior will decrease. Reward, expert and referent power, on the other hand, would affect the superior and subordinate relations positively and will increase subordinate's dependence on his superior. These different sets of consequences resulting from the bases of power may differentially affect the preference for the use of a tactic by the subordinates.

The model postulates that the expectancy of success of tactics will intervene the relationship between different antecedent variables and preferred use of influence tactics. The inclusion of intervening variable, in this model, is based on the decision making theory of power (Pollard & Mitchell, 1972) and social exchange analysis of power (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). It is argued that the agent, while attempting to influence the other individual in a relationship makes a subjective expected utility analysis of various available courses of action. The most important factor in SEU is the probability of success. It is hypothesized that perceived probability of success of influence tactics will affect the relationship between the antecedent variables and the actual use of upward influence tactics.

It may also be pointed out that although the model postulates that certain variables will determine the use of influence tactics, the probability of reverse causal effect is also admitted. The nature of outcome of the use of an influence tactic is likely to influence the expectancy of success associated with its next use. Thus, for example, the use of certain influence tactics is also likely to affect the nature of the organizational processes or other variables. However, such relationships have not been investigated here because of the limitations of the research design of the present study.

### Hypotheses

A number of hypotheses are derived from the model presented in figure 1 which have been tested in this study. These are described below:

#### General Hypotheses

The following two general hypotheses are related to the use of influence tactics :

Hypotheses 1 : The preferred use of upward influence tactics will be a function of the cost associated with their use.

Prediction : Persuasion and Ingration tactics will be used more frequently than coercive tactics for upward influence because of the cost associated with their use is low.

In some of the earlier studies reason based tactics were found to be most frequently used tactics followed by

ingratiation and exchange, and coercive tactics as less frequently used tactics of influence in all types of influence situations (Kipnis, et al., 1980; Kipnis, et al., 1984). However, in other studies manipulative tactics were reported as most commonly used tactics followed by persuasive tactics of influence in an upward influence situation (Porter, et al., 1981). Mechanic (1962) and TJosvold (1974) observe that lower echelon people can and sometimes do use threats to gain high power person's agreement to their demands, yet the frequent use of coercive tactics or negative sanctions will present a number of problems and will prove ultimately costly to them. Ingratiation researches, on the other hand, suggest that ingratiation increases attraction for the source of influence and, therefore, the chances of favourable outcomes from the target person (Fodor & Smith, / Jones, 1963; Kipnis & Vander Veer, 1971; Pandey, 1981).

On the basis of these studies and observations it is predicted that in an upward influence situation the use of coercive tactics will cost more than the expected gains to the subordinates. When the cost of an influence attempt is more than the expected gains then that influence attempt will not be made (Blau, 1964; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Therefore, it is expected that subordinates will use coercive tactics less and only in those situations wherein other tactics of influence are not available. Persuasion and ingratiations tactics, on the other hand, are expected to be used more frequently by

subordinates to influence superiors because ingratiation is liked by superiors and persuasion is formally accepted tactic of influence. So one may expect no harm, if not gain, from the use of these influence tactics in the upward direction.

Hypothesis 2 : The choice of upward influence tactics will vary across hierarchies, type of organizations and type of departments such that;

- (a) Coercive and manipulative tactics will be used more often than reason based tactics (persuasion) by workers in comparision to supervisors and managers.
- (b) Coercive and manipulative tactics will be used more frequently and persuasive tactics less frequently in Public Organizations than in Private Organizations.
- (c) Coercive and manipulative tactics will be used more frequently and persuasive tactics less frequently in Textile Organizations than in Engineering Organizations.
- (d) Persuasion tactics will be used more frequently and coercive and manipulative tactics less frequently in production departments in comparision with service departments.

This hypothesis is based on certain assumptions. The literature lacks direct empirical evidences in this connection. It is argued that a person who occupies higher position in an organizational set up is expected to be more committed to the organization, to behave more decently and within norms than a person who occupies a low hierarchical position. A high position individual may be viewed as having received fairly substantial organizational rewards. So according to social

exchange theorists (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960), he may be obligated by the norms of reciprocity. Their coercive influence attempts may be seen as a violation of this norm and may be perceived more threatening to the organization. They will, therefore, receive more comprehensive retaliation from higher authorities than lower echelon people. Further their jobs too are not secure in Indian industrial organizations and can be easily terminated. However, this is not a case with workers because of the unionization, labour courts and worker oriented laws of the government. Thus, due to differences in roles, expectations attached with roles and other physical and moral constraints, supervisors and managers will differ from workers in their predisposition in selection of certain type of tactics. For example, Madision, Allen, Porter, Renwick and Mays (1980) found that political tactics were more common in staff than in line positions.

The rationales for second and third part of this hypothesis are based upon the differences in characteristics associated with different types of organizations. Public Sector Organizations are characterized by demoralization of managers (Das, 1978), lack of autonomy in managerial matters (Paranjpe, 1979), feeling of insecurity in managers (Das, 1978), frequent transfer of top executives, (Mathur, 1973), lack of emphasis on performance basis of rewards and political interference (Paranjpe, 1980). These characteristics are more associated with Public Organizations than with Private Organizations. They create permissive climate and hence, norms condoning the use of

political tactics, both coercive and manipulative. For example, Textile Organizations are characterized more by scarcity of resources, political interference and lack of clear hierarchical structure at unit level. These characteristics create intense competition and conditions for maneuvering of superiors through political means. Similarly in service departments people hold more strategic positions, have more autonomy and lack standard criteria for performance evaluation than in production departments. These characteristics enhance their self perception of power and decrease their perception of structural threats such as economic coercion which may result in greater use of political tactics both coercive and manipulative.

#### Hypotheses Related to Individual Characteristics

The following hypotheses were developed related to the role of relative power, self-esteem, need for power and personal values in the use of influence tactics.

Hypothesis 3 : Perception of Self power will be associated with the choice of upward influence tactics such that more the perception of absolute self power and greater the relative power as compared to the superior, higher the use of coercive influence tactics and less the use of persuasive and manipulative tactics by subordinates to influence superiors.

There are studies which have found positive relationship of relative power with coercive influence tactics and negative relationship with non coercive influence tactics (Kipnis, et al., 1980; Schlenker & Tedeschi, 1972; Wilkinson & Kipnis, 1978). There are also some studies which found no relationship between

the amount of power and the choice of influence tactics (Nowday 1979). Thus, it seems that the relationship between the perception of power and influence tactics is not yet conclusive. However, the above hypothesis is based on such studies that have found significant positive relationship of perception of self-power with coercive influence tactics and negative relationship with persuasive and manipulative influence tactics. It is argued that the perception of self and other's power, in a conflict situation, depends most upon one's capacity to harm, to retaliate and block others to harm. The perceived power edge over other will tempt him to use coercive tactics more frequently than non-coercive tactics (Kipnis, 1976).

Hypothesis 4 : Self esteem will be associated with the use of tactics such that higher the self-esteem, greater the use of persuasive influence tactics and less the use of coercive and manipulative influence tactics by subordinate to influence their superiors.

Support for the above hypothesis is derived from the studies which have found positive relationship of self-confidence and internal locus of control with persuasive influence tactics and negative relationship with coercive influence tactics (Gamson, 1968; Goodstadt & Hjelle, 1973; Instone, et al., 1983; Kipnis & Lane, 1962; Nowday, 1979). It is argued that individuals with low self-confidence believe themselves to be incapable, not significant, unsuccessful and unworthy (Flemming & Watt, 1980). They will, therefore, be more concerned with re-establishing in themselves a sense of worthiness and appearing before others as capable and strong.

The use of coercive influence tactics only can make them to feel that they are capable and strong (Berger, 1973; Kipnis, 1976; Kite, 1965) and also free them from ingrained feeling of inferiority (Raven & Kruglanski, 1970).

Hypothesis 5 : Higher the need for power will be positively associated with the greater choice for persuasive and manipulative influence tactics and less the choice for coercive influence tactics.

This hypothesis is based upon both direct and indirect sources of evidence. There are studies that have obtained significant positive relationship of n-power with persuasion and ingratiation and negative relationship with appeal to rules and policies in upward influence context (Mowday, 1979). Inferences for the above hypothesis have also been drawn from studies that have investigated the influence tactics of Machiavellians (Christie & Geiss, 1970; Tripathi, 1981). In these studies machiavellians have been reported to be more manipulative than non-machiavellians. Kipnis (1976) has suggested that the description of n-power person as given by Winter (1973) considerably overlaps with the description of the persons scoring high on machiavellian scale.

Hypothesis 6 : Personal values will be associated with the choice of upward influence tactics such that :-

- (a) higher the score on aram, dependence proneness and preference for personalized relations, greater the choice for manipulative tactics and less the choice for coercive influence tactics.

- (b) higher the score on commitment and team orientation, higher the choice for persuasive influence tactics and less the choice for manipulative and coercive tactics.
- (c) higher the score on showing off, greater the choice for persuasive and manipulative influence tactics and less the choice for coercive influence tactics.

These hypotheses are based on certain assumptions.

Literature lacks in empirical studies about the relationship of personal values with choice of influence tactics. It is argued that persons who give high importance to 'aram' and personalized relations and depend more on superiors for help will attempt to develop cordial and affective relations with superiors and, thus, will enhance their chances of getting larger share in organizational resources with less investment. Ingratiation and persuasion tactics would be perceived by these individuals of great help. Therefore, these tactics will be used by them more frequently than coercive tactics.

The rationales for the second and third part of the hypothesis are also based on similar assumptions. Here, it is argued that persons who are highly committed and team oriented will depend more on their performance as a method of influence. They will avoid competition among colleagues because that will destroy team spirit to which they attach great importance. Therefore, it is presumed that such persons will attempt to use coercive and manipulative tactics less and persuasive tactics more to influence their superiors. Showing off, on the other hand, would mean to appear before others as important, influential

and having a say in organizational matters. This can be attained only through getting special attention and care from superiors. So, it is argued that individuals giving more importance to showing off would try to get special attention and care from his superior through logical arguments and affect manipulation, rather than through coercion.

#### Hypotheses Related to Interpersonal Relations

Hypothesis 7 : Liking and trust will be associated with the choice of upward influence tactics such that greater the subordinate's liking for and trust in superior, less his choice of coercive influence tactics and greater his choice of persuasive influence tactics.

Several lines of evidence are suggestive of the possible effect of liking on the choice of coercive and persuasive modes of influence. For example, French and Snyder (1959) found that as the attraction increases, so does the frequency of persuasive influence attempts. The positive association of liking with persuasive influence tactics and negative association with coercive tactics has been reported in some other studies (Bank, 1974; Michener & Burt, 1974; Michener & Schwertfeger, 1972). Although, literature lacks in empirical studies about the relationship between the trust and choice of influence tactics. It has been sometimes suggested that a trusted person is positively evaluated and liked (Gamson, 1968). Therefore, similar assumptions may hold true both for liking and trust in the choice of influence tactics. It is argued that when a

subordinate likes and trusts his superior, his high concern for maintaining affectionate relations with his superior and his high expectancy of success of persuasive tactics may increase his attraction for persuasive influence tactics and may decrease his attraction for coercive influence tactics (Gamson, 1968).

#### Hypotheses Related to Organizational Variables

The hypotheses relating the role of organizational variables, such as, organizational processes, organizational structure and bases of power in use of influence tactics are as follows:

Hypothesis 8 : The subordinate's choice of upward influence tactics will be a function of organizational processes such that;

- (a) greater the supportive leadership, supportive organizational climate and better union-management relations, less the choice for coercive and manipulative influence tactics and greater the choice for persuasive influence tactics.
- (b) greater the emphasis on performance basis of rewards and punishments, less the choice for coercive and manipulative influence tactics and the greater the choice for persuasive influence tactics.
- (c) greater the emphasis on political basis of rewards and punishments, higher the choice of coercive and manipulative influence tactics and less the choice of persuasive influence tactics.

As we pointed out, there is not enough empirical evidence about the relationship between organizational processes and the choice of influence tactics. However, we argue that supportive leadership, favourable climate and better union-management relations will provide greater opportunity to subordinates to exercise influence over their superiors which in turn, will increase their self confidence and trust in and liking for superiors. Self-confidence and liking for the target of influence have been found positively associated with persuasive influence tactics and negatively associated with coercive and manipulative influence tactics (Goodstadt & Kipnis, 1970; Michener & Burt, 1974; Mowday, 1979).

The rationale for the second and the third part of the hypothesis are based on the assumption that the political distribution of rewards and punishments are seen related to the development of uncertainty, perception of injustice and norms condoning political behaviours. It is argued that under such conditions the expectancy of success of persuasive influence tactics may be lowered and the expectancy of success of manipulative and coercive influence tactics may be increased which, in turn, will affect the choice of influence tactics.

Hypothesis 9 : The choice of upward influence tactics will be a function of organizational structure such that;

- (a) greater the centralization and slope of control, less the choice of coercive tactics and greater the choice of persuasive and manipulative influence tactics.

- (b) greater the degree of formalization, less the choice for all kinds of influence tactics except persuasion.
- (c) greater the control of unions, higher the use of coercive tactics and less the use of manipulative tactics.

The first part of the above hypothesis is based on the assumption that centralization and higher slope of control, which are characterized by greater discrepancy between the power of superior and subordinate, will increase superior's capacity to issue credible threats and inflict harms to the subordinate. It will also lower down subordinates expectancy of success of coercive influence tactics due to increased credibility of counter threats from superiors. But under such conditions manipulative and other persuasive tactics will be seen as more successful and, therefore, will be used more frequently.

Second part of the hypothesis is based on the assumption that formalization reduces uncertainty and develops a sense of fairness and justice. It also increases the salience of learning norms condemning political behaviours. Therefore, it is argued that when subordinates get in the normal course what they deserve and do not get what they do not, they will be less inclined to influence superiors through coercive and manipulative tactics because their perception of the cost as compared to benefits will be high.

The rationale for the third part of the hypothesis is based on the assumption that greater control of unions will increase one's perception of self-power and decrease the chances and credibility of coercive retaliation from the superiors which, in turn, will increase the use of coercive influence tactics and decrease the use of other tactics.

Hypothesis 10 : The subordinate's choice of upward influence tactics will be a function of bases of power such that;

- (a) greater the perception of coercive and legitimate bases of power, more the choice of coercive influence tactics and less the choice of persuasive influence tactics.
- (b) greater the perception of reward, expert and referent bases of power, less the choice of coercive and manipulative influence tactics and greater the choice of persuasive influence tactics.

These hypotheses are based on certain assumptions. It is argued that to the extent the bases of power available in the organization are coercive, the feeling of hostility (Horowitz, 1958), distrust in superiors (Kipnis, 1976) and a tendency to harm the harm doer will increase (Tedeschi, 1984). This, in turn, will increase subordinate's attraction for coercive influence tactics.

The rationale for the second part of the hypothesis is based on the assumption that the expert, reward and referent bases of power will increase mutual dependence, subordinate's

liking for and trust in superiors and his expectancy of success of persuasive influence tactics. A subordinate will show more concern for maintaining his affectionate relations with superiors. Coercive influence tactics, therefore, will not be an appropriate choice because it will disturb his harmonious relations with superiors, deprive him of valuable rewards he is getting and will make him experience guilt due to violation of the norms of reciprocity. The choice of coercive influence tactics, therefore, will be less and the choice of persuasive influence tactics will be more with increasing use of reward, expert and referent bases of power in organizations.

Hypothesis Related to the Expectancy of Success of Influence Tactics.

Hypothesis 11 : The expectancy of success of an influence tactic will intervene between the relationship of its use with individual, interpersonal and organizational variables.

This hypothesis is based on the fact that the choice of upward influence tactics is a decision making process (Pollard & Metchall, 1972). The agent of influence makes a cost and benefit analysis of influence tactics. Tactics which maximize gains with low cost are used more frequently and influence tactics which incur high cost with low probability of success are used less frequently. The frequency of use of

the tactic varies with variation in its probability of success (Mowday, 1978). The probability of success of a tactic is, thus, a major determiner of the use of that tactic. However, the determination of probability of success of influence tactics is the function of individual, situational and organizational characteristics (Porter, et.al, 1981). So, we argue that individual, interpersonal and organizational variables will influence the probability of success of influence method which,in turn, will influence the frequency of use of the method.

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**Chapter II : M E T H O D**

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### METHOD

This chapter presents a description of the sample of organizations and the respondents included in this study. It also discusses the procedure of data collection and the measures used in this study.

#### Sample

##### (i) Organizations

Ten organizations were selected for this study. Out of these, five were Textile Organizations and the other five were Engineering Organizations. All of them were located in the backward districts of central and eastern Uttar Pradesh. The majority of the employees in these organizations were local people and belonged to the town or nearby villages. Table 1 provides a description of the organizations in the sample.

Table 1

Description of Organizations in Sample

| Organiza<br>-tions | Type                     | Employees<br>Strength | Structure<br>of the<br>Organiza-<br>-tions | Running in<br>Profit/Loss |
|--------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--|---------------------------|
| 01                 | Engineering<br>(Private) | 2200                  | Corporate                                  | Loss                      |
| 02                 | Engineering<br>(Public)  | 2103                  | Non-corporate                              | Profit                    |
| 03                 | Engineering<br>(Public)  | 6212                  | Corporate                                  | Loss                      |
| 04                 | Engineering<br>(Private) | 1200                  | Corporate                                  | , Profit                  |

|    |                         |      |               |      |
|----|-------------------------|------|---------------|------|
| 05 | Engineering<br>(Public) | 2125 | Non-corporate | Loss |
| 06 | Textile<br>(Public)     | 750  | Corporate     | Loss |
| 07 | Textile<br>(Public)     | 3223 | Corporate     | Loss |
| 08 | Textile<br>(Public)     | 3000 | Corporate     | Loss |
| 09 | Textile<br>(Public)     | 900  | Corporate     | Loss |
| 10 | Textile<br>(Public)     | 3000 | Corporate     | Loss |


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As given in Table 1, of the five Engineering Organizations in the sample, three Engineering Organisations ( $O_2, O_3, O_5$ ) were in the Public Sector and the remaining two ( $O_1$ , and  $O_4$ ) in the Private Sector. Two of the three Public Sector Engineering Organizations ( $O_3, O_5$ ) were running in loss and only one ( $O_2$ ) was earning moderate profit. Out of the two Private Sector Organizations one ( $O_4$ ) was earning good profit and the other one ( $O_1$ ) was running in loss. Engineering Organizations,  $O_2, O_4$  and  $O_5$  produced heavy engineering equipments, such as, Electricity Transformers, Motors, Pumps, Gas Cylinders, Radar Towers, Oxygen Storage Vessels, Single Span Bridges and T.V. Towers. The other two organizations ( $O_1$  and  $O_3$ ) manufactured light engineering equipments, e.g., Telephone equipments and Torches. Of the five, the strength of each of the three organizations ( $O_1, O_2$  and  $O_5$ ) was around 2100 and the strength of the remaining two organizations ( $O_3$  and  $O_4$ ) was 6200 and 1200, respectively.

Table 2

Organizational Chart of O<sub>1</sub>, O<sub>2</sub>, O<sub>3</sub> and O<sub>5</sub>

MD or EDR



Note : W = Worker, Sup. = Supervisors, A.M. = Assistant Manager, Dy. M. = Deputy Manager, Dy. M. = Manager, Sr.M. = Senior Manager, A.G.M. = Assistant General Manager, Dy. G.M. = Deputy General Manager, G.M. = General Manager, M.D. = Managing Director, EDR = Executive Director.


(Branching of hierarchies under other departments follow the same pattern as in the production department).

(Branching of hierarchies under other departments follow the same pattern as in the production department).

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Table 3

## Organizational Chart of 04



A = Assistants, including typists & clerks, W = Worker, Sup. = Supervisor,  
 A.O. = Assistant Officer, Engr. = Engineer, Sr. Engr. = Senior Engineer,  
 Sr.O. = Senior Officer, Dy.M. = Deputy Manager, A.M. = Assistant Manager


$O_1$ ,  $O_3$  and  $O_4$ , among the Engineering Organizations, had corporate structure. The head of these organizations was responsible to the Chairman of the Board of Directors. Two other organizations did not have corporate structure, and hence the Managing Director of the organization was all in all. Organizations  $O_1$ ,  $O_2$ ,  $O_3$  and  $O_5$  had similar hierarchical structures at the unit level. Organization  $O_4$  was some what different in its hierarchical structure as it did not include three hierarchical levels, namely, of General Manager, Deputy or Assistant General Manager and Senior Manager at the unit level. The details of the hierarchical structure are given in Table 2 and 3.

#### Textile Organizations

As seen in Table 1, all of the five Textile Organizations were in the Public Sector. They were being managed either by the N.T.C. or State Spinning Mills (UPSSM). All of the Textile Organizations were sick organizations, defined on the basis of recurring losses they had incurred and accumulated over the past three years. All of them were spinning units. The employee strength of the three units  $O_7$ ,  $O_8$  and  $O_{10}$  was around 3000, which made them medium sized and the strength of the remaining two units  $O_6$  and  $O_9$  was between 750 and 900, which made them small. The hierarchical structures of all the five organizations were similar. The unit level hierarchical structure is provided in Table 4.

Table 4

## Organizational Chart of Textile Organizations in the Sample.



Note : W = Worker, Asstt. = Assistants including typist and clerks, Sup. = Supervisor  
 S.I. = Shift Incharge, A.W.O. = Assistant Welfare Officer, A.L.O. = Assistant Labour Officer, A.M.E. = Assistant Mill Engineer, A.O. = Assistant Officer, Sr.O. = Senior Officer, Dy. S.M. = Deputy Spinning Master.

(ii) Respondents

An effort was made to systematically sample respondents from the departments engaged in procuring of the inputs, processing (throughout) and looking after the output. The ratios decided for various departments and levels could not be adhered to because of the varying sizes of different organizations and some times due to non-availability of the respondents.

Data for the study were obtained from 344 respondents. Of these, 188 respondents belonged to the Engineering Organizations and 156 to the Textile Organizations. In terms of ownership, 278 respondents came from the Public Sector Organizations and 66 respondents from the Private Organizations. Out of 344 respondents, 196 were from the workers level, 31 from the supervisory level and 117 were managers. The sample break-up in terms of the departments (functions) showed that 83 respondents were from the Personnel and Administration Department, 40 from the Finance and Accounts Department, 27 from the Purchase and Stores, 27 from the Production Maintenance and Engineering Departments, 123 from the Production and 44 from the Sales and Marketing Departments.

Procedure

Entry to various organizations was made by the investigator through the management. An indepth interviewing was done before data for main study were collected. It was considered particularly necessary to conduct an indepth interviewing to collect critical incidents with respect to tactics used by organizational members for exercising upward influence in the organization. It has been

the experience of researchers who collected data on influence tactics used in work organizations. that this approach yields much valuable data than using structured questionnaire method in the first instance (Goodchild, et al., 1975; Kipnis, et al., 1980). In this connection organizational members from different levels were interviewed. Based on this and previous information available on influence tactics and other variables included in this study a set of preliminary measures were developed. A pilot study was then conducted to ascertain the communicability and discriminability of each item in the questionnaire. Respondents were told to read each item carefully and markout the word or sentence with a question mark (?) on the left margin of the page, if they found it difficult to understand or ambiguous. Respondents were also asked to write their suggestions on the left margin of the page. Later on, a brief interview was held with each respondent, in which a detailed inquiry was made about the different parts of the questionnaire. During the interview, specific questions were asked about the tactics of influence part of the questionnaire to ascertain whether the hypothetical situation and interactional setting provided in case of each influence tactic worked properly. Suggestions and comments of the respondents were pooled and analysed. Items were modified, dropped or retained on the basis of the results of the pilot study.

A final questionnaire was prepared in the Hindi language, and was given to those respondents who could read and understand Hindi language. The general instructions were printed on the cover sheet of the questionnaire and specific instructions were

given separately with each part of the questionnaire. Although instructions were included as part of the questionnaire, yet each respondent was also verbally instructed and assured of the confidentiality of his responses. As some questions included in the questionnaire were of highly personal nature, respondents were specifically requested to be honest in their responses. They were told that there was no standard or correct answer to any question and that the investigator was interested only in the opinion and perception of the respondents. Respondents were also given instructions about the use of the rating scale.

Data were, thus, collected primarily through the self-administered questionnaire, except in a few cases where workers were not literate. In such cases responses on the questionnaire were secured through interviews. Questionnaires were personally given and collected by the investigator. For data collection, union officials were approached and taken into confidence and their informal help was sought in contracting the workers. Questionnaires were given to only those respondents who had willingly agreed to the investigators request for filling out the questionnaire. After the questionnaire had been completed by the respondent the investigator collected it and thanked him for his cooperation.

#### Measures

Data were collected on a large number of measures in this study. These measures fall under six broad headings :

(1) Individual characteristics, (2) Interpersonal relations, (3) Organizational processes, (4) Organizational structure, (5) Bases of power and (6) Influence tactics. The questionnaire items for all measures are given in Appendix A. However, a brief description of the measures used in this study is presented below.

#### Individual Characteristics

These measures are related to the measurement of self-esteem, n-power, perception of one's own power and other's power, relative power and values. Some of these measures were adopted from other researchers and some were developed by the investigator.

- Self-esteem : The measure of self-esteem had two dimensions :  
(1) Global self-esteem and (2) Occupational self-esteem. The measure of Global self-esteem consisted of four items which were taken from Rosenberg's scale of self-esteem (1965). These items have been found reliable in measuring self-esteem, recently by O'Malley and Bachman (1983). The measure of occupational self-esteem is based on the hierarchical facet model of self-esteem proposed by Shavelson, Hubner and Stanton (1976). According to them, at the apex of this hierarchy is general or global self-esteem and this general construct depends on secondary ones, which are in turn determined by lower order components representing more specific competencies. This model has been supported empirically by Flemming and Watts (1980). It was, therefore, thought that specific aspects of competence pertaining to occupation may be important secondary component

of global self-esteem and not its equivalent. Occupational self-esteem was considered an important determiner of work place behaviour. Four items to measure occupational self-esteem were developed by the investigator. Initially eight items were written and were rated by the experts. Based on the ratings of the experts only four items were retained. The interitem correlations were obtained and Coefficient Alpha was computed. The Coefficient Alphas for global self-esteem and Occupational self esteem were found to be .40.

Need for Power : The measure of n-power consisted of six items, of which four items were adopted from Steers and Braunstein(1976). These items have been also used by Mowday (1978) to measure n-power. The remaining two items were framed by the investigator after expert ratings. Inter-item correlations were computed and Coefficient Alpha was obtained to see the internal consistency of the items. The Coefficient Alpha for the measure was found to be .83 .

Perception of self (one's own) and other's Power: Three items measuring the perception of one's own power were taken from Vroom (1960). They have also been recently used in a study by Abdel Halim (1983). The same three items with changed referent were used to measure the respondent's perception of other's power i.e., the power of the immediate boss. The Coefficient Alpha for one's own power was .70 and for other's power .50.

Relative power : With the help of indices of the perception of one's own power and the perception of other's power, a relative power index was developed. This index was generated by subtracting respondent's score of other's power from his score of perception of one's own power (perception of one's own power minus perception of other's power).

Values : Six items measuring six values i.e., aram, dependence proneness, preference for personalized relations, team orientation, committment and showing off, were adopted from J.B.P. Sinha and M. Sinha (1974). Each value was measured by one item.

### Interpersonal Relations

Subordinate's attraction toward his superior (i.e., immediate boss) and trust in him were taken as two measures of interpersonal relations. Two items from Byrne's 'Interpersonal Judgement Scale' (1961) were adopted to measure subordinate's attraction toward his superior. These two items have been used and found reliable and valid measure of Interpersonal Attraction by a number of researchers (Schlenker & Tedeschi, 1972). To measure Interpersonal Trust, ten items were adopted from George and Swap (1982) and Cook and Wall (1980). However, items were rephrased to suit the context. The Coefficient Alphas for interpersonal attraction and interpersonal trust were .84 and .82 respectively.

### Organizational Processes

Organizational process variables, such as, supervisory leadership, peerleadership, technological readiness human resource primacy, communication flow, decision making practices,

motivational conditions and union-management relations were measured with the help of items from 'Survey of Organizations' of Taylor and Bowers (1971). The measures of supervisory leadership and peer leadership are based upon the four factors theory of leadership proposed by Bowers and Seashore (1966). These factors are support, interaction facilitation, work facilitation and goal emphasis. The measures of performance basis of rewards and performance basis of punishments consisted of five items each. Of these, two items were taken from 'Measuring and Assessing Organizations' of Van de Ven and Ferry (1980) and three similar items were developed by the investigator after seeking ratings from the experts. The measures of the political basis of distribution of reward and punishments were also developed by the investigator. All these measures, with a total of 61 items, have been labelled as organizational processes. These measures alongwith their Coefficient Alphas obtained in this study are presented in Appendix. A.

Some of the organizational process variables, such as, technological readiness, human resource primacy, communication flow, decision making practices and motivational conditions were used to form an organizational climate index. Such an index of organizational climate has been suggested by Drexler (1977). The correlations among the five climate variables were also found to be quite high (See Appendix B).

### Organizational structure

The measures of variables for organizational structure, such as, centralization and formalization were adopted from Hage and Aiken (1967, 1969b). The reliability of these measures has recently been verified by Dewar, Whetten and Boje (1980). Centralization had two parts; decentralization of policy decision making (Participation) and centralization of work operations (hierarchy of authority). The scales used to measure participation, hierarchy of authority and formalization had in them 4,5 and 11 items respectively. The Coefficient Alphas were found to be .73 for participation, .66 for hierarchy of authority and .67 for formalization.

The distribution of control was measured using the technique of Tannenbaum and Kahn (1957). The exact question used was as follows : How much say or influence do the following groups or persons actually have on what goes on in this department?

|             | Very Little | Little | Neither<br>Little<br>Nor much | Much | Very<br>Much |
|-------------|-------------|--------|-------------------------------|------|--------------|
| Top Officer | 1           | 2      | 3                             | 4    | 5            |

Similar ratings were also obtained for middle managers(Officers) supervisors, workers as a group, workers' unions, self and members of the department.

The average of responses on the above items provided the actual amount of control of people in the organization. With the help of these indices two more indices were computed. These indices were computed in a fashion similar to Tannenbaum (1968) and Tannenbaum, et al.,(1974). A brief description of these

indices is presented below. The score of a particular index was computed for each of the respondent. The scores for respondents were, then, averaged to obtain the organizational level score of that index.

(i) Total amount of control : This index was generated by summing up the ratings obtained for the top officer, middle officers, supervisors and workers.

(ii) Slope of control curve : The index for the slope of control was obtained by subtracting the amount of control of workers from the rating about the control of top officer in the organization.

#### Bases of Power

French and Raven (1959) enunciated five bases of power, which they termed reward, coercive, referent, expert and legitimate. In this study the measure of the bases of power was the same as used by Tannenbaum, et al.(1974). To measure the five bases of power the respondents were asked, why do you do what your superior (immediate boss) asks you to do on the job ? The question was followed by five possible reasons for compliance. Each of the reasons represented a particular base of power. The subjects were asked to rate each of the reasons on a 5 point rating scale.

#### Upward Influence Tactics

The measurement of upward influence tactics has been found to be quite problematic, primarily, because most of the

upward influence attempts, if not all, are political. Political aspects of behaviour in organizations are something that are denied by the organizations, as well as, its members (Porter, et al., 1981). Individuals who frequently make political influence attempts generally tend to deny that they themselves engage in it because such behaviours are considered socially undesirable and about them, therefore, there is great defensiveness. Porter, et al. (1981) have, therefore, expressed doubts about the success of direct method of studying upward influence in field setting.

Keeping in view the sensitiveness of the subject matter and the doubts expressed by researchers about the success of direct method of study an attributional method of measurement was adopted in this study. Eight upward influence tactics were identified by the investigator on the basis of observations of organizational behaviours and the review of the literature on influence tactics. Out of the eight tactics, six tactics were the same as found by Kipnis, et al. (1980). These tactics were reasoning, ingratiation, threat, work obstruction, informal exchange and upward appeal. Two new tactics, pressure and whistle blowing, were added on the basis of depth interviews conducted by us. A brief description of these tactics is provided below :

Persuasion : The tactic involved worker convincing the supervisor about his own work and worth by arguing that his work has been as good as that of others. Further that he had not given him any occasion to complain and that he had been quite devoted to his work.

Ingratiation : In this tactic, the person concerned tried to please his superior by visiting him at his residence, giving him gifts, acting in an obsequious manner, by becoming his 'Yes' man, praising him before others and expressing his dependence on him.

Threat : This tactic involved holding out personal threats to supervisor, as well as, getting threats issued from the toughs.

Work obstruction : This tactic involved withholding important informations from the supervisor, not completing assigned work on time and deliberately disrupting the work flow by committing avoidable errors.

Informal exchange : Here the worker reminded the supervisor of how he has been helping him in his day to day work and in solving of various problems, such as, how he got demonstrations against him stopped, helped in getting his children admitted to prestigious schools and helped in solving various departmental problems.

✓ Upward appeal : This tactic is an acceptable practice in all bureaucratic organizations where a particular member may seek the help and intervention of higher officers.

Whistle-blowing : This tactic involves engaging in verbal propaganda, as well as, taking out leaflets against the supervisor lodging complaints with the high ups and employee union and organizing demonstrations against the supervisor.

Pressure : This tactic involved bringing pressure on the supervisor of the influential people from within or outside the organization.

#### Measurement of Influence Tactics

The general procedure involved in the measurement of the influence tactics was as follows. After specific instructions, a hypothetical situation involving promotion was presented to the respondent. He was told that "some promotions are going to take place in your department. In this connection your supervisor has been asked to submit a confidential report about his subordinates. One of your colleague Vinod is a candidate for promotion. Vinod knows that unless his supervisor recommends his case by giving him a good report chances of his promotion are very low. He also feels that the supervisor on his own would not send a good report, so he has to do something to influence the supervisor. Vinod is shown as engaging in one of the eight sets of behaviours; each consisting of a tactic. For example, in case of persuasion tactic, Vinod is shown as meeting his supervisor and saying "Sir, you know about my work. I have never given you a chance for complaint. You may also feel that compared to others my work has been better. I rarely go on leave. I therefore, hope that you will send a good report of my work." Similarly, one by one, each tactic was presented in a interactional framework. After presenting each tactic respondent was asked to keep in his mind the behaviours of Vinod, shown above, as an example and then respond to two questions : (1) What is the probability that Vinod will succeed by using this method (for example - persuasion) in

getting a good report sent by his supervisor ? (2) How frequently would your colleagues use this tactic to get their work done from your supervisor ? These two questions were presented with each influence tactic. Probability of success was measured on a six point scale while its frequency of use on a 7 point rating scale. In doing so it was thought that a respondent, while responding to these questions will identify with Vinod and others and his responses will indicate his own preference for a particular mode of exercising upward influence. In the last of questionnaire respondents were required to give the information about their job level, age, education, caste, family income, monthly salary, total experience, duration of stay in organization and number of promotions received.

#### Analysis of Data

The data were analysed in terms of univariate analyses which involved computing of Means and SDs. All the variables were checked for their distributions and their degree of Skewness. Some of the variables, such as, influence network effectiveness and the level of aspiration had highly skewed distributions. Their response rate was also very low. These variables, therefore, were dropped from the analysis.

Inter variable correlations were computed to find out the nature and amount of relationship among various variables. Partial correlations were computed to control for the effect of expectancy of success of influence tactics from the relationship of the

actual use of tactics with personal, interpersonal and organizational variables. This was done in order to determine the role of expectancy of success of influence tactics as an intervening variable. Regression analyses were performed to determine the relative contribution of antecedent variables in predicting the actual use of various upward influence tactics.

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**Chapter III : RESULTS**

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## RESULTS

The results of the present study are presented under three sections. Section I reports the distribution and univariate statistics on the use of eight upward influence tactics. Mean differences for levels of hierarchy, types of ownership, type of organizations and for departments are also discussed. Section II presents the zero-order correlations between individual, interpersonal and organizational variables and the use of influence tactics for the total sample, as well as, for the sub-groups. Section III deals with the results of Multiple Regression Analyses and the first order partial correlations which have been performed to test the theoretical model of this study.

Section I : Means and Standard Deviations of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics.

As stated, one important objective of this study was to determine the relative use of different tactics which subordinates employ to influence superiors. Means and Standard Deviations for the use of eight upward influence tactics are reported in Table 5.

As the means of influence tactics show, according to the respondents, subordinates most often used ingratiation and persuasion tactics to influence their superiors. The upward influence tactics which were used less frequently by the subordinates were whistle blowing, work-obstruction and threat. In general, the use of tactics was also associated with the expectancy of success.

Table 5 :

Use and Expectancy of Success of Upward Influence Tactics in the Ten Organizations (N = 344).

| Ranks | Influence Tactics | Use of Tactics                | Expectancy of success of Tactics <sup>1</sup> |
|-------|-------------------|-------------------------------|---|
|       |                   | Mean (SD)                     | Mean (SD)                                     |
|       |                   | 1 = Very Low<br>7 = Very High | 1 = Very Low<br>7 = Very High                 |
| 1     | Ingratiation      | 4.25<br>(1.70)                | 4.74<br>(1.59)                                |
| 2     | Persuasion        | 4.19<br>(1.82)                | 4.27<br>(1.50)                                |
| 3     | Pressure          | 3.48<br>(1.68)                | 4.34<br>(1.54)                                |
| 4     | Informal Exchange | 3.39<br>(1.61)                | 4.19<br>(1.53)                                |
| 5     | Upward Appeal     | 3.03<br>(1.60)                | 3.69<br>(1.43)                                |
| 6     | Threat            | 2.56<br>(1.65)                | 3.50<br>(1.56)                                |
| 7     | Work Obstruction  | 2.36<br>(1.49)                | 2.98<br>(1.39)                                |
| 8     | Whistle Blowing   | 2.35<br>(1.50)                | 3.04<br>(1.27)                                |

Note : 1. A constant of 1 has been added to the expectancy of success scores to make the scale comparable with the use of tactics.

2. Values reported in parentheses are SDs

The rank order correlation between means of the frequency of use and the expectancy of success of influence tactics was found to be .97 ( $P < .01$ ). Hypothesis 1 stated that persuasion and ingratiation would be used most frequently and threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing less frequently by the subordinates to influence their superiors in the Indian organizations. The results obtained were supportive of this hypothesis.

#### Mean Differences in the Use of Upward Influence Tactics

To find out whether the perceived use of upward influence tactics differed across hierarchies, ownership, types of organizations and departments, comparisons of means were made using the F-test. These results are reported in Tables 6 to 9.

(a) Effect of Hierarchy: Three hierarchical levels were compared with respect to the use of upward influence tactics, namely, workers supervisors and managers. Table 6 shows that workers, in general, had higher overall means scores on the use of upward influence in comparison to supervisors and managers. However, in case of ingratiation significant mean differences were obtained ( $P < .01$ ). Workers perceived that ingratiation was used significantly more often to influence their superiors than did the supervisors and managers. These results only partially supported our Hypothesis 2(a). We had expected that coercive and manipulative tactics will be used more often by workers than by supervisors and managers.

Table 6

Means of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics as a Function of Levels of Hierarchy

| Influence Tactics        | Workers<br>Mean (SD)<br>(n=196) | Supervisor's<br>Mean (SD)<br>(n=31) | Managers<br>Mean (SD)<br>(n=117) | F      |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|
| Ingratiation             | 4.51<br>(1.76)                  | 3.48<br>(1.68)                      | 3.94<br>(1.54)                   | 5.17** |
| Persuasion               | 4.29<br>(1.88)                  | 4.19<br>(1.87)                      | 4.02<br>(1.70)                   | .84    |
| Pressure                 | 3.57<br>(1.71)                  | 3.03<br>(1.38)                      | 3.43<br>(1.68)                   | 1.44   |
| Informal Exchange        | 3.53<br>(1.67)                  | 3.22<br>(1.43)                      | 3.20<br>(1.54)                   | 1.65   |
| Upward Appeal            | 3.03<br>(1.61)                  | 3.03<br>(1.58)                      | 3.01<br>(1.59)                   |        |
| Threat                   | 2.69<br>(1.78)                  | 2.45<br>(1.48)                      | 2.37<br>(1.44)                   | 1.46   |
| Work Obstruction         | 2.48<br>(1.62)                  | 2.39<br>(1.33)                      | 2.16<br>(1.29)                   | 1.63   |
| Whistle Blowing          | 2.48<br>(1.62)                  | 2.13<br>(1.12)                      | 2.18<br>(1.34)                   | .15    |
| Overall Upward Influence | 28.20<br>(8.45)                 | 25.35<br>(7.81)                     | 25.79<br>(8.16)                  | 3.87*  |

Note : \*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

The rankings of the means on influence tactics indicated some difference in the most preferred and least preferred influence tactics for the three groups. Workers perceived using the ingratiation tactic most often followed by persuasion. Supervisors and managers perceived using the tactic of persuasion most often. This was followed by ingratiation. Further, while manager perceived using work-obstruction tactic least, supervisors and workers perceived using whistle blowing least. On the whole, for all the three groups, ingratiation and persuasion were the most commonly used tactics and threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing were the least commonly used tactics to influence superiors.

(b) Effect of Ownership : Table 7 gives means for the use of influence tactics in the Public Sector Organizations and the Private Sector Organizations. It was found that respondents in the Public Sector Organizations as compared to Private Sector Organizations had higher mean scores with respect to all the influence tactics. In general, members of the Public Sector Organizations reported considerably more overall exercise of upward influence ( $M = 28.24$ ) than the members of the Private Sector Organizations ( $M = 22.44$ ).

The results on the use of these tactics in the Public Sector and Private Sector Organizations, except for persuasion, were in the predicted direction (see Hypothesis 2,b). We had hypothesized that manipulative and coercive tactics would be used more in the Public Sector Organizations and the persuasion tactics

Table 7

Means of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics in  
Public Sector and Private Sector Organizations.

| Influence Tactics                  | Public<br>Mean (SD)<br>(n=278) | Private<br>Mean (SD)<br>(n=66) | F       |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------|
| Ingratiation                       | 4.36<br>(1.67)                 | 3.80<br>(1.78)                 | 5.59*   |
| Persuasion                         | 4.34<br>(1.79)                 | 3.54<br>(1.81)                 | 10.57** |
| Pressure                           | 3.59<br>(1.68)                 | 3.00<br>(1.59)                 | 6.64**  |
| Informal Exchange                  | 3.52<br>(1.59)                 | 2.84<br>(1.58)                 | 9.29**  |
| Upward Appeal                      | 3.11<br>(1.58)                 | 2.66<br>(1.64)                 | 4.22*   |
| Threat                             | 2.69<br>(1.70)                 | 2.00<br>(1.26)                 | 9.57**  |
| Work Obstruction                   | 2.47<br>(1.56)                 | 1.91<br>(1.09)                 | 7.64**  |
| Whistle Blowing                    | 2.43<br>(1.52)                 | 1.98<br>(1.31)                 | 4.91*   |
| Overall Use of<br>Upward Influence | 28.24<br>(8.19)                | 22.44<br>(7.46)                | 27.64** |

\*P < .05

\*\*P < .01

will be employed more in the Private Sector Organizations. The pattern of the use of upward influence is remarkably the same in both types of organizations. It is in their level of use that the two types of Organizations were found to differ.

(c) Effect of Organization Type : To find out whether the use of influence tactics in the upward direction was different in the Engineering and Textile Organizations mean differences in the use of various tactics were computed for the two types of organizations. These results appear in Table 8.

Table 8 shows that the Engineering Organizations, in comparision to the Textile Organizations, had lower means on all the influence tactics, except on whistle blowing. Engineering Organizations differed from the Textile Organizations in their significantly less use of the tactics of ingratiation, persuasion pressure and informal exchange. Further, total mean scores derived for both organizations showed that overall upward influence was exercised more in the Textile Organizations (Mean = 29.33) than in the Engineering Organizations (Mean = 25.30). The ranking of means on influence tactics indicated that both in Engineering, as well as, in the Textile Organizations, ingratiation and persuasion were more commonly used, while threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing were less commonly used tactics of subordinates to influence their superiors.

(d) Effect of Department : The purpose for comparing the means of upward influence tactics for different departments was to see whether the nature of function performed by the departments

Table 8

Means of the Use of Upward Influence in Engineering and Textile Organizations

| Influence Tactics        | Engg. Orgs.<br>Mean (SD)<br>(n=188) | Textile Orgs.<br>Mean (SD)<br>(n=156) | F       |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------|
| Ingratiation             | 3.98<br>(1.61)                      | 4.58<br>(1.75)                        | 11.08** |
| Persuasion               | 3.86<br>(1.78)                      | 4.58<br>(1.79)                        | 13.93** |
| Pressure                 | 3.18<br>(1.62)                      | 3.83<br>(1.69)                        | 12.98** |
| Informal Exchange        | 3.11<br>(1.54)                      | 3.72<br>(1.63)                        | 12.54** |
| Upward Appeal            | 2.81<br>(1.52)                      | 3.29<br>(1.65)                        | 7.86**  |
| Threat                   | 2.48<br>(1.55)                      | 2.65<br>(1.77)                        | .83     |
| Work Obstruction         | 2.26<br>(1.37)                      | 2.49<br>(1.62)                        | 2.03    |
| Whistle Blowing          | 2.60<br>(1.39)                      | 2.45<br>(1.61)                        | 1.45    |
| Overall Upward Influence | 25.30<br>(8.32)                     | 29.33<br>(7.90)                       | 20.99** |

Note : \*\*P < .01

**Means of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics in Six Departments**

| Influence Tactics        | Personnel & Admin.  |                     | Finance & A/c       |                     | Purchase & Stores   |                     | Prod. Maint. & Engg. |                      | Production & Sales   |                     | Marketing           |  |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--|
|                          | Mean (SD)<br>(n=83) | Mean (SD)<br>(n=40) | Mean (SD)<br>(n=27)  | Mean (SD)<br>(n=123) | Mean (SD)<br>(n=123) | Mean (SD)<br>(n=44) | Mean (SD)<br>(n=44) |  |
| Ingratiation             | 4.34<br>(1.91)      | 4.25<br>(1.86)      | 4.59<br>(1.25)      | 4.78<br>(1.74)      | 4.11<br>(1.66)      | 3.95<br>(1.40)      | 1.21                 |                      |                      |                     |                     |  |
| Persuasion               | 4.23<br>(1.83)      | 3.77<br>(2.01)      | 4.33<br>(1.52)      | 4.78<br>(2.10)      | 4.17<br>(1.85)      | 4.09<br>(1.48)      | 1.05                 |                      |                      |                     |                     |  |
| Pressure                 | 3.75<br>(1.66)      | 3.32<br>(1.47)      | 3.85<br>(1.59)      | 3.81<br>(1.66)      | 3.23<br>(1.73)      | 3.34<br>(1.76)      | 1.58                 |                      |                      |                     |                     |  |
| Informal Exchange        | 3.37<br>(1.68)      | 3.23<br>(1.56)      | 3.59<br>(1.55)      | 3.30<br>(1.56)      | 3.44<br>(1.64)      | 3.36<br>(1.56)      | .20                  |                      |                      |                     |                     |  |
| Upward Appeal            | 3.12<br>(1.63)      | 2.87<br>(1.36)      | 2.96<br>(1.48)      | 3.04<br>(1.37)      | 3.07<br>(1.78)      | 2.89<br>(1.43)      | .22                  |                      |                      |                     |                     |  |
| Threat                   | 2.67<br>(1.73)      | 2.27<br>(1.20)      | 2.26<br>(1.48)      | 2.59<br>(1.80)      | 2.57<br>(1.57)      | 2.73<br>(1.63)      | .59                  |                      |                      |                     |                     |  |
| Work Obstruction         | 2.45<br>(1.59)      | 2.07<br>(1.42)      | 2.11<br>(1.28)      | 2.15<br>(1.32)      | 2.38<br>(1.50)      | 2.73<br>(1.56)      | 1.23                 |                      |                      |                     |                     |  |
| Whistle Blowing          | 2.45<br>(1.59)      | 1.95<br>(1.20)      | 1.93<br>(1.17)      | 2.30<br>(1.38)      | 2.37<br>(1.51)      | 2.75<br>(1.66)      | 1.74                 |                      |                      |                     |                     |  |
| Overall Upward Influence | 28.42<br>(9.12)     | 24.90<br>(7.89)     | 27.26<br>(7.13)     | 27.74<br>(8.00)     | 26.39<br>(8.35)     | 28.32<br>(8.03)     | 1.37                 |                      |                      |                     |                     |  |

influenced the exercise of upward influence. Table 9 reports means and mean comparisons among six departments. In all departments ingratiation and persuasion stood out as most frequently used tactics and threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing as less frequently used upward influence tactics. No differences in the use of eight influence tactics were found for the different departments. These results did not support Hypothesis 2(d), which stated that coercive and manipulative tactics would be used more often in the service departments than in the production departments. Thus, departmental function had no influence on the use of various upward influence tactics.

Summary : Results of Section I suggest two things. Firstly, ingratiation and persuasion were the most frequently used upward influence tactics, whereas threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing were the least frequently used upward influence tactics. Secondly, mean comparisons across levels of hierarchy showed that there were no differences in the use of influence tactics based on hierarchical level, except in case of ingratiation which was reported to be used more often by the workers than by the supervisors and managers. Significant differences on all the eight influence tactics were obtained between the Public and Private Sector Organizations. In the Textile Organizations, ingratiation, persuasion pressure, informal exchange and upward appeal tactics were used significantly more often than in the Engineering Organizations. Further, use of any of the influence tactics did not vary with different departmental functions.

Section II : CORRELATES OF UPWARD INFLUENCE TACTICS

This section deals with the analyses performed to examine the relationship of the use of eight influence tactics with various individual, interpersonal and organizational variables. Zero-order correlations of these variables for the total samples, as well as, for the sub-groups based on hierarchy, ownership and organizational type are presented.

Relationship of the use of Upward Influence Tactics with Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables for the total sample.

To examine the relationship of various individual, interpersonal and organizational variables with the use of upward influence tactics zero-order correlations were computed for the total sample. These correlations are reported in Tables 10 to 14.

Individual Characteristics and Use of Upward Influence Tactics

The individual characteristic variables were grouped under :

- (a) Power and Self-Esteem (Self Power, Relative Power, Need for power, Global Self-esteem, and Occupational self-esteem);
- (b) Personal values (Aram, Dependence Proneness, Preference for Personalized Relations, Team Orientation, Commitment and Showing Off); (c) Personal Background (Age, Education, Caste and Family Income) and (d) Organizational Background (Job level, monthly salary, stay in Organization, Promotions Received and Experience).

Table 10

Zero-Order Correlations Between Individual Characteristics and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics (N = 344)

| Individual Characteristics        | Use of Upward Influence Tactics |                   |        |                          |                             |               |                     |                  |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|--------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------------|------------------|
|                                   | Persua-<br>sion                 | Ingra-<br>tiation | Threat | Work<br>Obstruc-<br>tion | Inform-<br>al Ex-<br>change | Pressu-<br>re | Whistle-<br>Blowing | Upward<br>Appeal |
| <u>Power and Self-esteem</u>      |                                 |                   |        |                          |                             |               |                     |                  |
| Self Power                        | .11*                            | -.05              | .10    | .07                      | .01                         | .01           | .15**               | .09              |
| Relative Power                    | .07                             | -.07              | .10    | .10                      | -.06                        | -.06          | .07                 | .04              |
| Need for Power                    | .04                             | -.06              | -.02   | -.06                     | -.05                        | -.08          | -.09                | -.10             |
| Global Self-esteem                | -.05                            | -.09              | -.19** | -.19**                   | -.10                        | -.09          | -.22**              | -.16**           |
| Occupation self-Esteem            | -.05                            | -.05              | -.13*  | -.10                     | -.06                        | -.01          | -.09                | -.08             |
| <u>Personal Values</u>            |                                 |                   |        |                          |                             |               |                     |                  |
| Aram                              | .03                             | .13*              | .04    | -.01                     | -.02                        | .06           | -.03                | -.04             |
| Dependence Prone-ness             | -.08                            | .03               | .06    | -.08                     | -.03                        | -.03          | -.07                | -.10             |
| Preference for Personal Relations | .02                             | .07               | .05    | -.03                     | .08                         | .08           | .02                 | -.01             |
| Team Orientation                  | -.19**                          | -.10              | -.04   | -.11*                    | -.08                        | -.04          | -.09                | -.07             |
| Commitment                        | -.12*                           | -.16**            | -.14** | -.09                     | -.10                        | -.07          | -.14**              | -.01             |
| Showing Off                       | .09                             | .08               | -.05   | .03                      | -.02                        | -.04          | -.03                | -.05             |
| <u>Personal Background</u>        |                                 |                   |        |                          |                             |               |                     |                  |
| Age                               | -.11*                           | -.09              | -.07   | -.03                     | -.05                        | -.06          | -.01                | -.07             |
| Education                         | -.04                            | -.05              | -.03   | -.03                     | -.06                        | .00           | -.03                | -.01             |
| Caste                             | .10                             | .06               | .03    | .03                      | .05                         | .04           | -.05                | .00              |
| Family Income                     | -.07                            | -.18**            | -.07   | -.04                     | -.09                        | -.08          | -.05                | -.04             |
| <u>Organizational Background</u>  |                                 |                   |        |                          |                             |               |                     |                  |
| Job Level                         | -.07                            | -.16**            | -.09   | -.10                     | -.09                        | -.04          | -.10                | -.01             |
| Monthly Salary                    | -.09                            | -.18**            | -.06   | -.10                     | -.11*                       | -.13*         | -.09                | -.07             |
| Stay in Organization              | -.09                            | -.09              | -.08   | -.06                     | -.08                        | -.06          | -.03                | -.10             |
| Promotions received               | -.12*                           | -.14**            | -.13*  | -.13*                    | -.20**                      | -.24**        | -.16**              | -.18**           |
| Experience                        | -.10                            | -.11*             | -.12*  | -.10                     | -.10                        | -.08          | -.07                | -.14**           |

\*P < .05; \*\*P < .01

Correlations obtained between these measures of individual characteristics and the use of upward influence tactics are reported in Table 10.

The table reveals that among the power and self-esteem variables, global self esteem was largely associated with the use of various upward influence tactics such that lower was the global self esteem more frequent was the use of strong coercive tactics. It was also noted that individuals, who perceived themselves as having more power and who tended to be low on occupational self-esteem, were more likely to use strong coercive tactics to influence superiors.

Among the personal values, team-orientation and commitment were frequently associated with the use of manipulative and strong coercive tactics of upward influence, whereas 'Aram' was found positively associated only with the use of ingratiation tactics. Other values, such as, dependence proneness and preference for personalized relations were, in general, not related with the exercise of upward influence. The negative relationship of team orientation and commitment with influence tactics suggested that less was the value placed on team work and commitment, more frequent was the use of manipulative and strong coercive tactics.

It was also found that personal background variables were not frequently associated with the use of influence tactics. However, organizational background variables, such as, monthly salary, number of promotions received and experience were associated with the use of upward influence tactics. It was also

found that less were the number of promotions received, more frequent was the use of manipulative and strong and weak coercive tactics.

Relationship Between Interpersonal Variables and Use of Upward Influence Tactics

The correlations obtained for interpersonal trust and interpersonal attraction with the use of various upward influence tactics were uniformly low. The results indicated that greater was the trust in and attraction for the superior, less frequent was the use of manipulative and such coercive tactics as informal exchange and pressure. Interpersonal trust and attraction were not found to influence the use of persuasion and other coercive tactics, such as, threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing (Table 11).

Relationship Between Organizational Process Variables and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics

Zero order correlations of organizational process variables with the use of upward influence tactics are reported in Table 12. None of the process variables, except Union-management relations, correlated with the use of persuasion tactics. Three of the organizational process variables, namely, union-management relations political basis of rewards and political basis of punishment were found associated with the use of various upward influence tactics . Better Union-management relations discouraged, whereas greater politicalization of rewards and punishments encouraged the use of manipulative and most of the coercive influence tactics in the exercise of upward influence. It was also found that supportive

Table 11

Zero-Order Correlations Between Interpersonal Variables and Use of Upward Influence Tactics (N=344)

| Inter-personal variables | Use of Upward Influence Tactics |              |        |                  |                   |          |                |               |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------|--------|------------------|-------------------|----------|----------------|---------------|
|                          | Persuasion                      | Ingratiation | Threat | Work Obstruction | Informal Exchange | Pressure | Whistleblowing | Upward Appeal |
| Trust                    | .05                             | -.14**       | -.05   | -.04             | -.17**            | -.12*    | -.02           | -.05          |
| Attraction               | .08                             | -.13*        | -.04   | -.04             | -.11*             | -.12*    | -.05           | -.09          |

\*P < .05

\*\*P < .01

Table 12

Zero-Order Correlations Between Organizational  
Process Variables and the Use of Upward Influence  
Tactics ( $N = 344$ )

| Organizational Process Variables | Use of Upward Influence Tactics |              |        |                  |                   |          |                |               |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------|--------|------------------|-------------------|----------|----------------|---------------|
|                                  | Persuasion                      | Ingratiation | Threat | Work Obstruction | Informal Exchange | Pressure | Whistleblowing | Upward Appeal |
| Supervisory Leadership           | .02                             | -.19**       | -.07   | -.10             | -.14**            | -.15**   | -.03           | -.03          |
| Peer Leadership                  | -.04                            | -.13*        | -.03   | -.11*            | -.05              | -.09     | -.04           | -.02          |
| Organizational Climate           | .01                             | -.11*        | -.04   | -.10             | -.07              | -.17**   | -.03           | -.04          |
| Union Management Relations       |                                 | -.14**       | -.23** | -.14**           | -.16**            | -.12*    | -.23**         | -.12*         |
| Performance Based Rewards        | -.02                            | -.21**       | -.09   | -.07             | -.12*             | -.12*    | -.04           | -.01          |
| Performance Based Punishments    | .01                             | -.01         | -.03   | -.13*            | -.10              | -.04     | -.01           | -.08          |
| Politics Based Rewards           | .07                             | .31**        | .21**  | .16**            | .23**             | .25**    | .16**          | .10           |
| Politics Based Punishments       | .03                             | .24**        | .20**  | .15**            | .24**             | .24**    | .15**          | .08           |

\* $P < .05$

\*\* $P < .01$

Supervisory and peer leadership and supportive organizational climate were associated with the less frequent use of ingratiation and pressure. Further, performance basis of reward was found associated with upward influence tactics such that less was the emphasis on performance in distribution of rewards, more frequent was the use manipulative and weak coercive tactics.

Relationship Between Organizational Structure Variables and Use of Upward Influence Tactics

Among the six organizational structure variables, only two variables, namely, total amount of control and slope of control were found correlated, although these correlations were low with a large number of upward influence tactics (Table 13). It was found that as the total amount of control in organization went up the use of various strong coercive tactics of upward influence decreased. Thus, perception of greater mutual influence across hierarchical levels restricted the exercise of upward influence through negative influence tactics. The correlations obtained for slope of control also showed that steeper control gradients were negatively associated with the use of negative influence tactics. However, they did not influence the use of positive influence tactics, namely, persuasion and ingratiation. It was also found that as the control of unions in organizations increased, so did the use of some negative and manipulative influence tactics.

Relationship Between Bases of Power and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics.

Of the five bases of power, only two bases of power, namely, referent power and coercive power were found somewhat associated with the exercise of upward influence (Table 14). Correlations

Table 13

Zero-Order Correlations Between Organizational Structure and Use of Upward Influence Tactics (N=344)

| Organizational Structure            | Use of Upward Influence Tactics |              |        |                  |                   |          |                 |               |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------|--------|------------------|-------------------|----------|-----------------|---------------|
|                                     | Persuasion                      | Ingratiation | Threat | Work Obstruction | Informal Exchange | Pressure | Whistle Blowing | Upward Appeal |
| Decentralization of Decision Making | .05                             | -.14*        | .04    | .08              | -.02              | -.07     | .09             | .04           |
| Centralization of Work Operations   | .02                             | .11*         | .07    | .01              | .09               | .11*     | -.01            | .01           |
| Formalization                       | .05                             | -.02         | -.07   | -.20**           | .00               | -.05     | -.12*           | -.14          |
| Total amount of Control             | -.09                            | -.09         | -.11*  | -.12*            | -.15**            | -.10     | -.11*           | -.07          |
| Slope of Control                    | .04                             | -.03         | -.13*  | -.16**           | -.15**            | -.14**   | -.18**          | -.14**        |
| Control of Unions                   | .05                             | .11*         | .17**  | .06              | .02               | .12*     | .10             | .10           |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

Table 14

Zero-Order Correlations Between Bases of Power and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics (N = 344)

| Bases of Power   | Use of Upward Influence Tactics |        |         |          |          |          |         |        |
|------------------|---------------------------------|--------|---------|----------|----------|----------|---------|--------|
|                  | Persua-                         | Ingra- | Threat  | Work     | Informal | Pressure | Whistle | Upward |
| sion.            | tiation                         |        | Obstru- | Exchange |          | Blowing  | Appeal  |        |
| Expert Power     | .01                             | -.02   | -.08    | -.08     | -.08     | -.05     | -.09    | -.02   |
| Reward Power     | -.05                            | -.04   | -.01    | -.06     | -.01     | -.01     | -.03    | -.01   |
| Coercive Power   | -.03                            | .08    | .06     | .08      | .14**    | .16**    | .07     | -.01   |
| Referent Power   | -.02                            | -.10   | -.16**  | -.06     | -.04     | -.01     | -.02    | .00    |
| Legitimate Power | .07                             | .04    | -.04    | .01      | -.01     | -.05     | -.05    | -.02   |

\*P < .05

\*\*P < .01

obtained for coercive and referent bases of power suggest that greater perception of coercive base of power increased the use of weak coercive tactics, whereas greater referent power decreased the use of threats.

Summary : The correlational results obtained for variables grouped as 'Power and Self esteem' partially supported our Hypothesis 4. The relationship of global self esteem with coercive upward influence tactics provided partial support to the second part of the Hypothesis 4 in which an association of higher self-esteem with less frequent use of manipulative and coercive influence tactics was postulated. However, it did not provide any support to the first part of the same hypothesis in which a positive relationship of self-esteem with more frequent use of persuasive tactics was predicted. Positive correlations of perception of one's own power with more frequent use of persuasion contradicted to a great extent, the second part of the Hypothesis 3 in which greater perception of one's own power was predicted to be associated with less use of persuasive tactics. Among the values, the relationships of team orientation and commitment with influence tactics supported the second part of the Hypothesis 6<sub>b</sub> but contradicted the first part of the same hypothesis. It was predicted that greater team orientation and commitment will be related with more frequent use of the persuasive tactics and less frequent use of manipulative and coercive tactics. Support for the first part of the Hypotheses 6<sub>a</sub> relating to more frequent use of manipulative tactics with more concern for 'aram' was also found from the correlations with the use of upward influence tactics.

In case of interpersonal variables, greater trust and attraction for superiors was found associated with less frequent use of ingratiation, informal exchange and pressure tactics. This provided partial support to Hypothesis 7, in which interpersonal trust and interpersonal attraction were hypothesized to be associated with less frequent use of manipulative and coercive influence tactics.

The pattern of correlations obtained for organizational variables provided strong support to the Hypotheses related to Union-management relations (Hypothesis 8<sub>a</sub>), politicalization of rewards and punishments (Hypothesis 8<sub>c</sub>) and slope and total amount of control (Hypothesis 9<sub>a</sub>). From these correlations, partial support for the Hypotheses related to leadership and organizational climate (Hypothesis 8a) performance basis of rewards (Hypothesis 8b). and control of unions (Hypothesis 9c) was also found. In these hypotheses an association of better union management relations, supportive leadership, supportive organizational climate, more emphasis on performance basis of rewards and greater slope and total amount of control with less frequent use of manipulative and coercive influence tactics, and of greater politicalization of rewards and punishments and greater control of unions with more frequent use of coercive influence tactics was postulated. Moreover, basis of power did not affect much the exercise of upward influence. Correlations obtained for bases of power provided a weak and partial support to hypotheses related to coercive power (Hypothesis 10a) and referent power (Hypothesis 10b).

#### Dimensional Analysis of Influence Tactics

The correlational analyses of eight upward influence with various individual, interpersonal and organizational variables for the total sample revealed that a number of variables were associated with threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing but not with other tactics. Similarly, some were more associated with pressure, upward appeal and informal exchange than with other tactics. A few variables were found associated only with persuasion and/or ingratiation tactics. To get a clearer overall picture an attempt was made to group the influence tactics. For this purpose, correlations among various upward influence tactics were computed. These correlations are reported in Table 15. The table shows that all the eight upward influence tactics were positively related to each other. However, the strength of correlations of a tactic with other tactics varied. These data were, therefore, cluster analysed to see whether there were any dimensions along which the influence tactics clustered.

The correlogram technique for clustering variables, as suggested by Andrew and Withey (1976), was used for this purpose. A cut off point of  $r = .45$  was taken. Correlations greater than .45 were plotted as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 suggested three groupings among the influence tactics. They have been called Cluster I, Cluster II and Cluster III. Details about these Clusters are as given below.

Table 15

## Correlations Among Upward Influence Tactics

| Upward<br>Influence<br>Tactics | 1     | 2     | 3     | 4     | 5     | 6     | 7     | 8    |
|--------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| 1. Persuasion                  | 1.00  |       |       |       |       |       |       |      |
| 2. Ingratiation                | .51** | 1.00  |       |       |       |       |       |      |
| 3. Threat                      | .19** | .36** | 1.00  |       |       |       |       |      |
| 4. Work<br>Obstruction         | .11*  | .29** | .64** | 1.00  |       |       |       |      |
| 5. Informal<br>Exchange        | .20** | .41** | .45** | .44** | 1.00  |       |       |      |
| 6. Pressure                    | .20** | .40** | .36** | .38** | .60** | 1.00  |       |      |
| 7. Whistle<br>Blowing          | .21** | .30** | .63** | .55** | .49** | .46** | 1.00  |      |
| 8. Upward Appeal               | .27** | .31** | .40** | .34** | .46** | .48** | .56** | 1.00 |

\* $P < .05$


\*\* $P < .01$

Cluster I (Manipulative Tactics): This cluster includes the tactics of persuasion and ingratiation. As seen in Figure 2, they had correlations above .45 between them and less than .45 with other tactics. Together they were named as manipulative tactics. The reasons for calling them manipulative tactics were; (i) that ingratiation tactics have been frequently interpreted as manipulative tactics by several researchers (Jones, 1964; Porter, et al., 1981; Pandey, 1980; Tripathi, 1981) Persuasion, especially, in organizational context is nothing more than affect manipulation by twisting facts and presenting them in a positive manner. The coefficient alpha for this cluster was .34.

Cluster II (Strong Coercive Tactics): This cluster includes three influence tactics, namely, threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing. They correlated highly among themselves, and not as highly with other tactics. This cluster of tactics was labelled "Strong coercive tactics". Kipnis, et al. (1980) have grouped similar tactics as strong tactics. These tactics have greater potentiality of harming the target person. The coefficient alpha for this cluster was .82.

Cluster III (Weak Coercive Tactics): This cluster included such tactics as pressure, upward appeal and informal exchange. Figure 2 shows that they are more homogenous among themselves than with other tactics. Although, upward appeal had higher correlation with whistle blowing than with pressure and informal exchange,

Figure 2  
A Correlogram of Influence Tactics



yet it did not fall with whistle blowing as it did not correlate with the other two tactics, namely, threat and work obstruction. By definition, upward appeal is subordinates request to higher authorities to help him. It is used to exert a little pressure on the immediate boss. Thus, pressures, informal exchange and upward appeal limit the freedom of the decision maker by creating informal pressure or fear. Therefore, these tactics were labelled as "weak coercive tactics". Internal consistency among these three tactics as indicated by coefficient alpha was .50.

These three clusters, namely, manipulative tactics, strong coercive tactics and weak coercive tactics, have been used in further correlational analyses, except in case of partial correlation.

Relationship of Upward Influence Tactics  
with Individual, Interpersonal and  
Organizational Variables by Hierarchy.

Three clusters of upward influence tactics, namely, manipulative tactics, strong coercive tactics and weak coercive tactics were correlated with individual, interpersonal and organizational variables for the three hierarchical levels, namely, workers (W), Supervisors (S) and managers (M). Separate correlations for the three levels of hierarchy were computed to see whether correlates of upward influence tactics and their nature of relationship with these tactics were the same or different for workers, supervisors and managers. These correlations are reported in Tables 16 to 20.

Individual characteristics and Upward Influence Tactics :

As seen in Table 16, none of the power and self-esteem variables was found associated with the exercise of upward influence in case of supervisors. However, in case of workers and managers, these variables were largely associated with coercive tactics, especially, strong coercive tactics. But their relationship with coercive influence tactics was different for workers and managers. Higher score on self perception of power and relative power was associated with more frequent use of strong coercive tactics in case of workers but not in case of managers. Similarly, high need for power correlated with less frequent use of both the strong and weak coercive tactics in case of managers only. It was only global self esteem which influenced the exercise of upward influence by workers and managers in the same manner. It was found that lower was the self-esteem more frequent was the use of strong coercive tactics in both workers and managers to influence superiors.

Personal values were more frequently found associated with the use of manipulative tactics than with the use of strong coercive tactics in case of workers and managers. The pattern of relationship obtained with influence tactics suggested some similarities and some differences across the levels of hierarchy in exercise of upward influences. It was found that less importance given to team work correlated with frequent use of manipulative tactics in case of workers and managers, but not in case of supervisors. While greater commitment was associated with less frequent use of

Table 16

Zero-Order Correlations Between Individual characteristics and the use of Upward Influence Tactics for Workers (n = 196), Supervisors (n = 31), and Managers (n = 117)

| Individual characteristics        | Manipulative Tactics |       | Strong Coercive Tactics |        | Weak Coercive Tactics |        |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-------|-------------------------|--------|-----------------------|--------|
|                                   | W<br>S               | M     | W<br>S                  | M      | W<br>S                | M      |
| <u>Power and Self Esteem</u>      |                      |       |                         |        |                       |        |
| Self Perception of Power          | .02                  | .27   | .07                     | .20**  | .04                   | .07    |
| Relative Power                    | -.03                 | .15   | .09                     | .14*   | -.01                  | .12    |
| Need for Power                    | .07                  | -.02  | -.05                    | .07    | -.01                  | -.32** |
| Global Self-esteem                | -.06                 | .12   | -.11                    | -.15*  | -.26                  | -.36** |
| Occupational Esteem               | -.07                 | .27   | -.08                    | -.11   | .18                   | -.20*  |
| <u>Personal Values</u>            |                      |       |                         |        |                       |        |
| Aram                              | -.02                 | .07   | .25**                   | -.03   | .14                   | -.02   |
| Dependence Prononess              | .05                  | -.07  | -.18*                   | .01    | -.03                  | -.16   |
| Preference for Personal Relations | .06                  | .04   | .07                     | .07    | -.13                  | -.07   |
| Team Orientation                  | -.15*                | .19   | -.33**                  | -.14*  | .33                   | -.08   |
| Commitment                        | -.15*                | -.30  | -.11                    | -.10   | -.21                  | -.20*  |
| Showing off                       | .16*                 | -.39* | .16                     | .00    | -.02                  | -.03   |
| <u>Personal Background</u>        |                      |       |                         |        |                       |        |
| Age                               | .01                  | .01   | -.19*                   | -.05   | -.14                  | -.03   |
| Education                         | .05                  | -.07  | -.11                    | .04    | .02                   | -.09   |
| Caste                             | .05                  | -.14  | -.21*                   | -.04   | .15                   | .02    |
| Family Income                     | .10                  | .02   | -.13                    | .02    | .10                   | .06    |
| <u>Organizational Background</u>  |                      |       |                         |        |                       |        |
| Job level                         | -.08                 | .35*  | -.11                    | -.21** | .05                   | -.09   |
| Monthly Salary                    | -.04                 | .26   | -.23*                   | -.07   | -.02                  | -.02   |
| Stay in organization              | -.08                 | .11   | -.13                    | -.01   | -.27                  | -.04   |
| Promotions received               | -.14*                | .07   | -.16                    | -.09   | -.17                  | -.22*  |
| Experience                        | -.04                 | .12   | -.20*                   | -.05   | .22                   | -.04   |

\*P < .05; \*\*P < .01

•.06 •.09 •.10

-.05 •.10 •.16

-.08 •.08 •.17

-.03 •.03 •.17

-.06 •.06 •.17

-.08 •.08 •.17

-.03 •.03 •.17

-.06 •.06 •.17

manipulative tactics in case of workers, it was found associated with less frequent use of strong coercive tactics in case of managers. Further, greater importance to 'area' correlated with frequent use of manipulative tactics but only for managers. Relationship of showing off with manipulative tactics, in case of supervisors, was contrary to that found for the workers.

Personal background variables, such as, age, education, caste and family income were not associated with the exercise of upward influence in case of workers and supervisors. In case of managers, it was found that higher age and lower caste led to less frequent use of manipulative tactics. Of the organizational background variables, low monthly salary and less experience were associated with more frequent use of manipulative tactics in case of managers. Whereas, in case of workers, fewer number of promotions received encouraged the use of these tactics. These variables were not found associated with the use of manipulative tactics in case of supervisors. It was also found that job level only, in case of workers, was associated with coercive tactics such that lower was the job level more frequent was the use of strong and weak coercive tactics. Further, larger number of promotions received discouraged the use of weak coercive tactics in all the three groups. However, longer stay in the organization influenced the use of weak coercive tactics in supervisors only.

#### Interpersonal Factors and Upward Influence

None of the interpersonal variables, in case of workers, was found correlated with the use of upward influence tactics.

Table 17

Zero-Order Correlations Between Interpersonal Variables and Use of Upward Influence Tactics for Workers (n = 196), Supervisors (n = 31) and Managers (n = 117)

| Interpersonal Variables | Use of Upward Influence Tactics |       |      |                         |     |       |      |      |        |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------|-------|------|-------------------------|-----|-------|------|------|--------|
|                         | Manipulative Tactics            |       |      | Strong Coercive Tactics |     |       |      |      |        |
|                         | W                               | S     | M    | W                       | S   | M     |      |      |        |
| Trust                   | -.00                            | .19   | -.13 | .05                     | .08 | -.22* | -.02 | .36* | -.36** |
| Attraction              | -.06                            | .57** | -.10 | -.04                    | .03 | -.12  | -.07 | .33  | -.26** |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

In case of supervisors, interpersonal attraction correlated with the use of influence tactics such that greater was the attraction toward superior more frequent was the use of manipulative tactics. Interpersonal trust and attraction, in case of managers, correlated with both strong and weak coercive tactics. It was found that with greater trust in superior strong and weak coercive tactics were used less often to influence him. Similarly, with greater attraction towards superior, weak coercive tactics were used less often. It was also found that interpersonal trust correlated negatively with the use of weak coercive tactics, in case of managers, whereas, it correlated positively in case of supervisors.

Organizational Process Variables and Upward Influence Tactics :

Table 18 shows that organizational process variables were associated widely and strongly with the use of various upward influence tactics in case of managers. It was found that with the increase in the politicalization of reward and punishments the use of various manipulative and coercive influence tactics also went up. Greater emphasis on performance basis of rewards and better union-management relations led to less frequent use of manipulative and coercive influence tactics. Whereas, supportive supervisory leadership and supportive organizational climate led to less frequent use of weak coercive influence tactics only. In case of workers, better union-management relations and greater politicalization of rewards were found associated with the less frequent use of manipulative tactics. In case of supervisors, poor union-management relations correlated

Table 18

Zero-Order Correlations Between Organizational Processes and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics for Workers (n = 196), Supervisors (n = 31) and Managers (n = 117)

| Organizational<br>Processes      | Use of Upward Influence Tactics |      |        |                         |       |        |      |      |        |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|------|--------|-------------------------|-------|--------|------|------|--------|
|                                  | Manipulative Tactics            |      |        | Strong Coercive Tactics |       |        |      |      |        |
|                                  | W                               | S    | M      | W                       | S     | M      |      |      |        |
| Supervisory Leadership           | -.12                            | .04  | -.08   | -.01                    | .07   | -.19*  | -.03 | .04  | -.32** |
| Peer Leadership                  | -.08                            | .18  | -.18*  | -.01                    | .13   | -.12   | -.04 | .24  | -.17   |
| Organizational Climate           | -.03                            | .21  | -.13   | -.03                    | .19   | -.17   | -.02 | .05  | -.30** |
| Performance based<br>Reward      | -.09                            | .17  | -.22*  | -.04                    | .24   | -.18*  | .04  | .01  | -.30** |
| Politics Based Reward            | .20**                           | .08  | .24**  | .12                     | .15   | .38**  | .08  | .24  | .46**  |
| Performance Based<br>Punishments | .00                             | -.10 | .04    | -.05                    | -.05  | -.06   | -.03 | .06  | .01    |
| Politics Based<br>Punishment     | .08                             | .00  | .27**  | .09                     | .18   | .38**  | .09  | .17  | .41**  |
| Union-Management<br>Relations    | -.19**                          | -.23 | -.25** | -.07                    | -.41* | -.29** | -.10 | -.21 | -.35** |

\*p < .05;  
\*\*p < .01

with the frequent use of strong coercive tactics. Other organizational process variables, in case of workers and supervisors, were not found associated with the exercise of upward influence tactics in general.

Organizational Structural Variables and Upward Influence Tactics :

Large number of organizational structure variables were found associated, particularly, with the use of coercive influence tactics. Greater total amount of control correlated with the less frequent use of both manipulative and coercive influence tactics in case of workers. Whereas, in case of supervisors, it correlated with the more frequent use of coercive tactics. Greater control of Unions was associated with more frequent use of manipulative and weak coercive tactics of upward influence. It was found that higher was the control of unions greater was the use of manipulative and coercive influence tactics. However, this finding, in general, is more true in case of managers than in case of supervisors. Table 19 also shows that greater degree of formalization and steeper slope of control led to less frequent use of coercive influence tactics. However, this finding was true only for workers and managers but not for supervisors. In case of supervisors, greater formalization was found associated with more frequent use of weak coercive tactics.

Bases of Power and Upward Influence Tactics :

Table 20 shows that bases of power were, in general, not associated with the exercise of upward influence. Of the five bases of power, only referent power was associated with less

Table 19

Zero-Order Correlations Between Organizational Structure and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics for Workers (n = 196), Supervisors (n = 31) and Managers (n = 117)

| Organizational Structure  | Use of Upward Influence Tactics |      |      |                         |       |        |        |       |       |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|------|------|-------------------------|-------|--------|--------|-------|-------|
|                           | Manipulative Tactics            |      |      | Strong Coercive Tactics |       |        |        |       |       |
|                           | W                               | S    | M    | W                       | S     | M      |        |       |       |
| Decentralization of D.M.s | -.09                            | .32  | .04  | .18**                   | .30   | -.03   | .08    | .07   | -.14  |
| Centralisation of W.Os    | .05                             | -.19 | .08  | .00                     | -.08  | .02    | .01    | .19   | .15   |
| Formalization             | .05                             | -.13 | -.06 | -.15*                   | .07   | -.26** | -.04   | .41*  | -.19* |
| Total Amount of Control   | -.14*                           | .20  | -.07 | -.16*                   | .48** | -.14   | -.18** | .53** | -.12  |
| Slope of Control          | -.00                            | -.03 | .02  | -.15*                   | -.11  | -.31** | -.18** | -.04  | -.18* |
| Control of Union          | -.00                            | .40* | .19* | .12                     | .25   | .17    | -.02   | .33   | .27** |

\*P < .05;      \*\*P < .01

Table 20

Zero-Order Correlations Between Bases of Power and Use of Upward Influence Tactics for Workers ( $n = 196$ ), Supervisors ( $n = 31$ ) and Managers ( $n = 117$ )

| Bases of Power   | Use of Upward Influence Tactics |      |                         |      |                       |      |
|------------------|---------------------------------|------|-------------------------|------|-----------------------|------|
|                  | Manipulative Tactics            |      | Strong Coercive Tactics |      | Weak Coercive Tactics |      |
|                  | W                               | S    | M                       | W    | S                     | M    |
| Expert Power     | -.01                            | .15  | .06                     | -.10 | -.09                  | -.10 |
| Reward Power     | -.05                            | -.26 | .02                     | .03  | .08                   | -.08 |
| Coercive Power   | -.05                            | -.13 | .17                     | .05  | -.07                  | .15  |
| Referent Power   | -.15*                           | .11  | .10                     | -.04 | -.22                  | -.13 |
| Legitimate Power | .07                             | .09  | .04                     | -.01 | .07                   | -.12 |

\*  $P < .05$

frequent use of manipulative tactics in case of workers.

Summary : A large number of significant correlations of upward influence tactics with individual, interpersonal and organizational variables were found for workers and managers than for supervisors. Power and self-esteem variables did not influence the use of manipulative tactics in all the three groups. However, frequent coercive influence attempts were associated with greater perception of one's own power and greater relative power in the case of workers and with low need for power in the case of managers. Low self esteem led to frequent use of strong coercive tactics in groups of workers and managers but not in the group of supervisors. Personal values, such as, team orientation, commitment, and showing off were more often associated with the use of manipulative tactics. The relationship of showing off with the manipulative tactics, in case of supervisors, was found to be different as compared to workers.

Personal background variables were not important in the exercise of upward influence. However, organizational background variables were found associated with the use of manipulative and weak coercive tactics. Their relationships with manipulative tactics were more true for managers. The less use of weak coercive tactics was associated with higher monthly salary and greater number of promotions received. Job level influenced the use of strong and weak coercive tactics, but only in case of the workers. Interpersonal trust which led to decrease in the use of coercive tactics in managers was found to increase their use in supervisors.

Organizational process variables were found more frequently associated with various upward influence tactics in case of managers but not in case of workers and supervisors. Greater politicalization of rewards and poor union-managements relations led to an increase in the use of only manipulative/tactics in workers. Organizational process variables, however, were not important in exercising upward influence in case of supervisors. Structural variables were largely associated with the use of upward influence tactics in all the three groups. While the nature of relationship of total amount of control and formalization was the same for workers and managers, it was found different in case of supervisors. Bases of power were not associated with the use of tactics in all the three groups.

Relationship of Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables with Use of Upward Influence Tactics in Engineering and Textile Organizations

As discussed in Section I, we found that the use of some upward influence tactics differed significantly in the Engineering and Textile Organizations. In order to see whether the correlates of upward influence tactics were different for Engineering and Textile Organizations, zero order correlations of manipulative tactics, strong coercive tactics and weak coercive tactics with individual, interpersonal and organizational variable were computed. These correlations are reported in Table 21 to 25.

Individual Characteristics and Use of Upward Influence Tactics :

Table 21 shows that none of the power and self-esteem variables was related with the use of upward influence tactics in Textile Organizations. However, in the Engineering Organizations the influence of power and self-esteem variables in exercising upward influence was more pervasive. High global self esteem was associated with the less frequent use of all the influence tactics. Low need for power led to the frequent use of manipulative and weak coercive tactics and higher perception of self power led to the frequent use of the strong coercive tactics in the Engineering Organization but not in the Textile Organizations.

Among the personal values, team orientation was associated with the use of manipulative tactics in both the organizations. However, while greater commitment correlated with the less frequent use of all the influence tactics in the Engineering Organizations, it did not in the Textile Organizations. It was also noted that greater importance to 'status' and 'showing off' were associated with the more frequent use of manipulative tactics in the Textile Organizations but not in the Engineering Organizations.

Organizational background variables, such as, job level and monthly salary were associated with the influence tactics such that lower was the job level and less was the monthly salary, more frequent was the use of strong coercive tactics

Table 21

Zero-Order Correlations Between Individual Characteristics and Use of Upward Influence Tactics in Engineering and Textile Organizations

| Individual Characteristics        | Use of Upward Influence Tactics     |                         |                       |                                 |                         |                       |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                   | Engineering Organisations (n = 188) |                         |                       | Textile Organizations (n = 156) |                         |                       |
|                                   | Manipulative Coercive Tactics       | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics | Manipulative Coercive Tactics   | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics |
| <u>Power and Self-Esteem</u>      |                                     |                         |                       |                                 |                         |                       |
| Self Perception of Power          | .08                                 | .15*                    | .10                   | -.00                            | .11                     | -.04                  |
| Relative Power                    | .01                                 | .08                     | .02                   | .04                             | .15                     | -.04                  |
| Need for Power                    | -.14*                               | -.10                    | -.16*                 | .12                             | -.03                    | -.04                  |
| Global Self-esteem                | -.15*                               | -.30**                  | -.19**                | .05                             | -.13                    | -.01                  |
| Occupational Esteem               | -.07                                | -.12                    | -.12                  | .01                             | -.11                    | .04                   |
| <u>Personal Values</u>            |                                     |                         |                       |                                 |                         |                       |
| Hram                              | -.00                                | -.08                    | .01                   | .18*                            | .07                     | .00                   |
| Dependence Proneness              | -.05                                | -.05                    | -.04                  | .00                             | -.01                    | -.08                  |
| Preference for Personal Relations | .04                                 | -.01                    | .08                   | .06                             | .03                     | .02                   |
| Team Orientation                  | -.16*                               | -.08                    | -.08                  | -.17*                           | -.09                    | -.06                  |
| Commitment                        | -.15*                               | -.24**                  | -.21**                | -.14                            | -.03                    | .10                   |
| Showing Off                       | .09                                 | -.10                    | -.06                  | .19*                            | .08                     | .03                   |
| <u>Personal Background</u>        |                                     |                         |                       |                                 |                         |                       |
| Age                               | -.11                                | -.09                    | -.01                  | .03                             | -.04                    | -.05                  |
| Education                         | -.06                                | .07                     | -.04                  | .01                             | -.13                    | .02                   |
| Caste                             | .07                                 | .03                     | .04                   | .05                             | -.05                    | -.06                  |
| Family Income                     | -.06                                | .13                     | .04                   | -.11                            | -.10                    | -.02                  |
| <u>Organizational Background</u>  |                                     |                         |                       |                                 |                         |                       |
| Job Level                         | -.15*                               | .01                     | -.06                  | -.05                            | -.31**                  | -.09                  |
| Monthly Salary                    | -.09                                | .05                     | -.02                  | -.03                            | -.25**                  | -.09                  |
| Stay in Organization              | -.09                                | -.16*                   | -.08                  | .07                             | .12                     | .00                   |
| Promotions Received               | -.12                                | -.21**                  | -.15*                 | -.02                            | -.05                    | -.23**                |
| Experience                        | -.10                                | -.13                    | -.05                  | .02                             | .02                     | -.05                  |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

in the Textile Organizations. But this was not found true in case of the Engineering Organizations. In Engineering Organizations fewer number of promotions received correlated with more frequent use of both strong and weak coercive influence tactics. Whereas, in the Textile Organizations it correlated only with the frequent use of weak coercive tactics.

Interpersonal Variables and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics :

None of the interpersonal variables was found related with the use of upward influence tactics in the Engineering Organizations. In Textile Organizations only interpersonal trust was associated with the upward influence tactics. It was found, greater was the trust in the supervisor the less frequent was the use of weak coercive influence tactics (Table 22).

Organizational Process Variables and the use of Upward Influence Tactics :

Table 23 indicates that organizational process variables were significantly associated with upward influence in both Textile and Engineering Organizations. However, their influence on use of various upward influence tactics was much frequent and stronger in the Engineering Organizations than in the Textile Organizations. Three organizational process variables which correlated with upward influence in both Engineering and Textile Organizations were political basis of rewards, political basis of punishments and union-management relations. To the extent, political considerations in giving rewards and punishments were greater and union-management relations were poorer, the use of various manipulative and coercive influence tactics to influence

Table 22

Zero-Order Correlations Between Interpersonal Variables and  
Use of Upward Influence Tactics in Engineering and Textile  
Organisations

| Interpersonal<br>Variables | Use of Upward Influence Tactics          |                               |                             |                                    |                               |                             |
|----------------------------|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                            | Engineering Organiza-<br>tions (n = 188) |                               |                             | Textile Organisations<br>(n = 156) |                               |                             |
|                            | Manipu-<br>lative<br>Tactics             | Strong<br>Coercive<br>Tactics | Weak<br>Coercive<br>Tactics | Manipula-<br>tive<br>Tactics       | Strong<br>Coercive<br>Tactics | Weak<br>Coercive<br>Tactics |
| Trust                      | -.04                                     | .03                           | -.04                        | -.01                               | -.11                          | -.19**                      |
| Attraction                 | -.07                                     | .05                           | -.08                        | .03                                | -.15                          | -.15                        |

\* P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

Table 23

Zero-Order Correlations Between Organizational Process Variables and Use of Upward Influence Tactics in Engineering and Textile Organizations

| Organizational Process Variables | Use of Upward Influence Tactics     |                         |                       |                                 |                         |                       |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                  | Engineering Organizations (n = 188) |                         |                       | Textile Organizations (n = 156) |                         |                       |
|                                  | Manipulative Tactics                | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics | Manipulative Tactics            | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics |
| Supervisory Leadership           | -.10                                | .03                     | -.06                  | -.12                            | -.17*                   | -.18*                 |
| Peer Leadership                  | -.12                                | -.12                    | -.07                  | -.07                            | .03                     | -.08                  |
| Organizational Climate           | -.09                                | -.06                    | -.14*                 | -.04                            | -.08                    | -.12                  |
| Performance Based Rewards        | -.10                                | .02                     | -.03                  | -.14                            | -.17*                   | -.16*                 |
| Politics Based Rewards           | .32**                               | .21**                   | .34**                 | .08                             | .20*                    | .10                   |
| Performance Based Punishment     | -.04                                | -.15*                   | -.10                  | -.02                            | .01                     | .01                   |
| Politics Based Punishment        | .27**                               | .17*                    | .26**                 | .03                             | .23**                   | .20*                  |
| U.M. Relations                   | -.22**                              | -.25**                  | -.23**                | -.18*                           | -.05                    | -.14                  |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

superiors was more frequent. It was more true in case of the Engineering Organisations than for the Textile Organizations. In case of the Textile Organizations, politicalization of rewards and punishments did not influence the use of manipulative tactics. Also the union-management relations did not influence the use coercive tactics. It was also noticed that performance based rewards mattered in the Textile Organizations but did not in case of the Engineering Organizations. However, performance based punishments had no such effect. Similarly supportive supervisory leadership mattered in restricting the use of coercive upward influence tactics in the Textile Organizations but did not in the Engineering Organizations.

Organizational Structural Variables and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics :

Organizational structural variables, in general, were not found correlated with the use of manipulative tactics in both the Engineering and Textile Organizations (Table 24). More significant correlations with the use of coercive influence tactics were obtained in the Textile Organizations than in the Engineering Organizations. In both organizations, organizational structure variables correlated negatively with strong and weak coercive tactics. Structural variables which correlated with the strong and weak coercive influence tactics in both Engineering and Textile Organizations were formalization, total amount of control and slope of control. It was found that when the degree of formalization and total amount of control was higher and the slope of control was steep, less frequent was

Table 24

Zero-Order Correlations Between Organizational Structure Variables and Use of Upward Influence Tactics in Engineering and Textile Organizations

| Organizational Structure Variables | Use of Upward Influence Tactics     |                         |                       |                                 |                         |                       |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                    | Engineering Organizations (n = 188) |                         |                       | Textile Organizations (n = 156) |                         |                       |
|                                    | Manipulative Tactics                | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics | Manipulative Tactics            | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics |
| Decentralization of D.M.           | -.02                                | .06                     | -.03                  | -.13                            | .08                     | -.07                  |
| Centralization of W.Ds.            | .02                                 | -.07                    | -.02                  | .07                             | .13                     | .15                   |
| Formalization                      | -.09                                | -.13                    | -.15*                 | .00                             | -.21**                  | -.09                  |
| Total amount of Control            | -.08                                | -.14*                   | -.14*                 | -.12                            | -.12                    | -.11                  |
| Slope of Control                   | -.07                                | -.12                    | -.18**                | .06                             | -.26**                  | -.19**                |
| Control of Union                   | .11                                 | .04                     | .08                   | .12                             | .26**                   | .17*                  |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

the use of coercive influence tactics in the Engineering and Textile Organizations. On the other hand, greater control of union encouraged the use of coercive influence tactics in the Textile Organizations but not in the Engineering Organizations.

Bases of Power and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics :

As Table 25 shows, bases of power were found to have little association with the use of upward influence tactics. Of the 30 correlations between bases of power and influence tactics in Engineering and Textile Organizations, only two correlations were found to be statistically significant which too may have been due to chance. However, these correlations suggested that higher was the perception of coercive base of power more frequent was the use of strong coercive tactics in the upward direction in the Textile Organizations. Similarly, the perception of rewards as base of power was associated with low use of manipulative tactics in the Engineering Organizations.

Summary : In sum, power and self-esteem variables had pervasive and stronger influence on exercising upward influence in the Engineering Organizations but not in the Textile Organizations. Greater commitment correlated with less frequent use of all the influence tactics in Engineering Organizations. But it did not correlate with the use of any tactic in Textile Organizations. Greater importance to 'arau' and 'showing off', which were associated with more frequent use of manipulative tactics in the Textile Organizations, were not found associated with any of the influence tactics in the Engineering Organizations.

Table 25

Zero-Order Correlations Between Bases of Power and Use of  
Upward Influence Tactics in Engineering and Textile Organizations

| Bases of Power   | Use of Upward Influence Tactics     |                         |                       |                                 |                         |                       |
|------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
|                  | Engineering Organizations (n = 188) |                         |                       | Textile Organizations (n = 156) |                         |                       |
|                  | Manipulative Tactics                | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics | Manipulative Tactics            | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics |
| Expert Power     | .04                                 | -.06                    | -.06                  | -.02                            | -.12                    | -.03                  |
| Reward Power     | -.15*                               | .03                     | -.03                  | .00                             | .05                     | -.01                  |
| Coercive Power   | -.08                                | -.06                    | .08                   | .10                             | .21**                   | .15                   |
| Reference Power  | -.04                                | -.06                    | .01                   | -.09                            | -.12                    | -.00                  |
| Legitimate Power | .05                                 | -.06                    | -.02                  | .09                             | -.01                    | -.04                  |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

Organisational background variables, such as, job level and monthly salary were negatively associated with the use of strong coercive tactics in the Textile Organization but not in the Engineering Organizations. Number of promotions received was more important in exercising upward influence in the Engineering Organizations compared to the Textile Organizations.

Interpersonal variables, such as, greater trust in superior led to less use of coercive influence tactics but only in the Textile Organizations. However, a number of organizational process variables, such as, political basis of reward and punishments and union-management relations were found much strongly associated with the exercise of upward influence in the Engineering Organizations than in the Textile Organizations. Among the organizational structural variables, formalization, total amount of control and slope of control were associated with the less frequent use of coercive tactics in both the Engineering and Textile Organizations. Bases of power, except for coercive power, were not found associated with the exercise of upward influence.

Relationship of Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables with the Use of Upward Influence Tactics in the Public Sector and Private Sector Organizations

Analyses presented here were done with a view to understand the similarities and differences in the correlates of upward influence tactics in the Public Sector and Private Sector Organizations. In Section-I we presented findings which showed

that Public and Private Organizations differed significantly with respect to the use of various upward influence tactics. Tables 26 to 30 provide correlations of individual, interpersonal and organizational variables with the use of upward influence tactics.

Individual Characteristics and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics:

As seen in Table 26, individual characteristics were more frequently associated with the use of upward influence tactics in Public Sector Organizations than in Private Sector Organizations. Of the power and self esteem variables, global self-esteem correlated with the use of manipulative, as well as, coercive influence tactics in Public Organizations but not in Private Organizations. Again, greater self perception of power led to an increase in the use of strong coercive tactics in the Public Organizations but not in the private organizations. Thus, power and self-esteem variables did not at all matter in the Private Sector Organizations.

Among personal values, preference for personalized relations was negatively associated with the use of strong coercive tactics in the Private Sector Organizations but not in the Public Sector Organizations. Similarly low commitment and less importance to team work led to frequent use of manipulative tactics in the Public Sector Organizations but not in Private Sector Organizations. In Private Organizations, less commitment was associated with more frequent use of strong coercive tactics.

Table 26

Zero-Order Correlations Between Individual Characteristics and Use of Upward Influence Tactics in the Public Sector and Private Sector Organizations

| Individual Characteristics        | Use of Upward Influence Tactics   |                         |                                   |                      |                         |                       |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                   | Public Organizations<br>(n = 278) |                         | Private Organizations<br>(n = 66) |                      |                         |                       |
|                                   | Manipulative Tactics              | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics             | Manipulative Tactics | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics |
| <u>Power and Self Esteem</u>      |                                   |                         |                                   |                      |                         |                       |
| Self Perception of Power          | .02                               | .13*                    | .03                               | .06                  | .14                     | .00                   |
| Relative Power                    | -.01                              | .11                     | -.04                              | .01                  | .10                     | -.01                  |
| Need for Power                    | .02                               | -.06                    | -.07                              | -.13                 | -.09                    | -.21                  |
| Global Self Esteem                | -.10                              | -.25**                  | -.14**                            | -.02                 | -.20                    | -.10                  |
| Occupational Esteem               | -.03                              | -.09                    | -.04                              | -.05                 | -.21                    | -.06                  |
| <u>Personal Values</u>            |                                   |                         |                                   |                      |                         |                       |
| Aram                              | .12*                              | -.00                    | -.03                              | -.03                 | .05                     | .22                   |
| Dependence Proneness              | -.00                              | -.01                    | -.07                              | -.14                 | -.19                    | -.07                  |
| Preference for Personal Relations | .10                               | .07                     | .08                               | -.09                 | -.24*                   | -.04                  |
| Team Orientation                  | -.16**                            | -.06                    | -.04                              | -.17                 | -.17                    | -.20                  |
| Commitment                        | -.15**                            | -.11                    | -.05                              | -.16                 | -.27*                   | -.15                  |
| Showing Off                       | .11                               | .00                     | -.00                              | .22                  | .02                     | -.10                  |
| <u>Personal Background</u>        |                                   |                         |                                   |                      |                         |                       |
| Age                               | -.06                              | -.03                    | -.06                              | -.09                 | -.15                    | .02                   |
| Education                         | -.03                              | -.06                    | -.02                              | -.18                 | .04                     | -.15                  |
| Caste                             | .04                               | -.04                    | .00                               | .11                  | -.03                    | -.02                  |
| Family Income                     | -.11                              | .01                     | -.06                              | -.21                 | .02                     | .16                   |
| <u>Organizational Background</u>  |                                   |                         |                                   |                      |                         |                       |
| Job Level                         | .11                               | -.16**                  | -.10                              | -.19                 | -.10                    | -.08                  |
| Monthly salary                    | -.14**                            | -.10                    | -.15**                            | -.16                 | -.09                    | -.06                  |
| Stay in Organization              | -.01                              | .06                     | -.05                              | -.01                 | -.18                    | -.03                  |
| Promotions Received               | -.09                              | -.07                    | -.21**                            | -.15                 | -.37**                  | .18                   |
| Experience                        | -.07                              | -.01                    | -.07                              | -.01                 | -.15                    | .00                   |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

Personal background variables, such as, age, education, caste and family income were not important in exercising upward influence in the public, as well as, in the Private Sector Organizations. One of the organizational background variable, namely, monthly salary was associated with the exercise of upward influence such that less was the salary more frequent was the use of manipulative and weak coercive influence tactics in the Public Sector Organizations. Similarly low job level encouraged the use of strong coercive tactics only in Public Organizations. These organizational background variables were not associated with upward influence in the Private Sector Organizations. Large number of promotions received correlated with less use of strong coercive tactics in the Private Organizations. It correlated with the less frequent use of weak coercive tactics in the Public Organizations.

Interpersonal Variables and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics:

Table 27 shows that interpersonal variables were not importantly associated with the exercise of upward influence in the Public Sector Organizations. However, in the Private Sector Organizations interpersonal attraction was found important in the exercise of upward influence. As Table 27 indicates, greater attraction toward superior was associated with less frequent use of manipulative and weak coercive tactics.

Organizational Process Variables and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics :

As seen in Table 28, the three organizational process variables, namely, political basis of rewards, political basis of punishments and union management relations were found associated

Table 27

Zero-Order Correlations Between Interpersonal Variables and Use of Upward Influence Tactics in the Public and Private Sector Organizations

| Interpersonal Variable   | Use of Upward Influence Tactics   |                         |                       |                                   |                         |                       |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
|                          | Public Organizations<br>(n = 278) |                         |                       | Private Organizations<br>(n = 66) |                         |                       |
|                          | Manipulative Tactics              | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics | Manipulative Tactics              | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics |
| Interpersonal Trust      | -.03                              | -.02                    | -.12*                 | -.06                              | -.11                    | -.14                  |
| Interpersonal Attraction | .03                               | -.06                    | -.09                  | -.32**                            | -.08                    | -.30*                 |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

Table 28

Zero-Order Correlations Between Organizational Process Variables and Use of Upward Influence Tactics in the Public and Private Sector Organizations

| Organizational Process Variables | Use of Upward Influence Tactics   |                         |                       |                                   |                         |                       |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                  | Public Organizations<br>(n = 278) |                         |                       | Private Organizations<br>(n = 66) |                         |                       |
|                                  | Manipulative Tactics              | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics | Manipulative Tactics              | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics |
| Supervisory Leadership           | -.09                              | -.08                    | -.11                  | -.15                              | .05                     | -.15                  |
| Peer Leadership                  | -.06                              | -.01                    | -.05                  | -.21                              | -.15                    | -.11                  |
| Organizational Climate           | -.03                              | -.06                    | -.09                  | -.19                              | -.12                    | -.26*                 |
| Performance Based Rewards        | -.11                              | -.06                    | -.07                  | -.11                              | -.01                    | -.03                  |
| Politics Based Rewards           | .18**                             | .20**                   | .19**                 | .27*                              | .19                     | .34**                 |
| Performance based punishment     | .04                               | -.03                    | .05                   | -.12                              | -.16                    | -.20                  |
| Politics Based punishment        | .08                               | .17**                   | .18**                 | .29*                              | .15                     | .24*                  |
| Union Management Relations       | -.19**                            | .12*                    | -.19**                | -.14                              | -.23                    | -.13                  |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

with various upward influence tactics. Their influence on the use of upward influence tactics was more pervasive and stronger in the Public Sector Organizations than in the Private Sector Organizations. It was found that greater politicalization of rewards and punishments significantly influenced the use of manipulative, as well as, strong and weak coercive tactics in the Public Sector Organizations. None of the organizational process variables correlated with the use of strong coercive tactics in the Private Sector Organizations. Similarly, better union-management relations, in general, discouraged the use of all the three types of influence tactics in the Public Sector Organizations but it did not matter in the Private Organizations.

Organizational Structure Variables and the Use of Upward Influence Tactics:

Organizational structure variables were not found related with the use of any of the influence tactics in the Private Organizations, except for formalization which was found correlated with weak coercive tactics (Table 29). However, in Public Sector Organizations, structural variables had large number of significant correlations with strong and weak coercive influence tactics. Structural variables which correlated with the exercise of upward influence in the Public Sector Organizations were total amount of control, slope of control and control of unions. It was found that with greater total amount of control, steeper slope of control and low control of unions, the use of both strong and weak coercive influence tactics in the Public Sector Organizations was less frequent.

Table 29

Zero-Order Correlations Between Organizational Structure Variables and Use of Upward Influence Tactics in the Public and Private Sector Organizations

| Organizational<br>Structure Variables | Use of Upward Influence Tactics   |                               |                             |                                   |                               |                             |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                                       | Public Organizations<br>(n = 278) |                               |                             | Private Organizations<br>(n = 66) |                               |                             |
|                                       | Manipula<br>tive<br>Tactics       | Strong<br>Coercive<br>Tactics | Weak<br>Coercive<br>Tactics | Manipula<br>tive<br>Tactics       | Strong<br>Coercive<br>Tactics | Weak<br>Coercive<br>Tactics |
| Decentralization of D.M.              | -.09                              | -.07                          | -.03                        | .13                               | .12                           | .04                         |
| Centralization of W.Os                | .09                               | .05                           | .12*                        | -.01                              | -.07                          | -.04                        |
| Formalization                         | .02                               | -.15**                        | -.01                        | .01                               | -.09                          | -.27*                       |
| Total Amount of Control               | -.10                              | -.13*                         | -.11                        | -.09                              | -.15                          | -.19                        |
| Slope of Control                      | .03                               | -.22**                        | -.17 **                     | -.09                              | -.03                          | -.16                        |
| Control of Unions                     | .10                               | .18**                         | .13*                        | .10                               | -.07                          | .01                         |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

Table 30

Zero-Order Correlations Between Bases of Power and Use of Upward Influence Tactics in the Public and Private Sector Organizations

| Bases of Power   | Use of Upward Influence Tactics   |                         |                       |                                   |                         |                       |
|------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
|                  | Public Organizations<br>(n = 278) |                         |                       | Private Organizations<br>(n = 66) |                         |                       |
|                  | Manipulative Tactics              | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics | Manipulative Tactics              | Strong Coercive Tactics | Weak Coercive Tactics |
| Expert Power     | .02                               | -.04                    | .01                   | .04                               | -.27*                   | -.27*                 |
| Reward Power     | -.02                              | .06                     | .03                   | -.16                              | .01                     | -.09                  |
| Coercive Power   | .06                               | .10                     | .15**                 | -.08                              | .07                     | .06                   |
| Referent Power   | -.08                              | -.10                    | .01                   | .03                               | .00                     | -.04                  |
| Legitimate Power | .11                               | -.01                    | .01                   | -.07                              | -.08                    | -.11                  |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

Bases of Power and Use of Upward Influence Tactics :

Of the five bases of power, only expert power in case of Private Organizations and coercive power in case of Public Organizations were associated with the use of strong and/or weak coercive tactics. It was found that greater use of expert power encouraged and greater use of coercive power discouraged the use of coercive tactics in exercising upward influence (Table 30).

Summary : Results obtained, in general, suggested that individual and organizational variables were less important in the exercise of upward influence in the Private Sector Organizations. Individual characteristics, such as, global self-esteem, team orientation, aran, job level and monthly salary and organizational structural variables, such as, total amount of control, slope of control and control of unions, which were associated with the use of various manipulative, as well as, coercive influence tactics in the Public Sector Organizations, were not found associated with the upward influence tactics in the Private Sector Organizations. Organizational process variables, such as, political basis of rewards and political basis of punishments were found influencing the use of upward influence tactics in the Private, as well as, in Public Sector Organizations. However, union-management relation was found important in exercising upward influence only in Public Sector Orgaizations. Interpersonal attraction influenced the use of manipulative and weak coercive tactics only in Private Organizations. Except coercive base of power in the Public Sector Organizations and expert power in the Private Sector Organizations, other bases of power did not influence the exercise of upward influence.

### Section III : PREDICTION OF UPWARD INFLUENCE TACTICS

The model of upward influence, as discussed in Chapter I, proposes that the use of upward influence tactics in organizations is a function of several factors, such as, individual characteristics, interpersonal relations, organizational processes, organizational structure and bases of power. An attempt, therefore, was made to predict the use of upward influence tactics on the basis of these factors.

A two step strategy for this purpose was employed. In the first step, we searched for significant predictors of upward influence tactics within the set of individual, interpersonal, organizational process, organizational structure and bases of power variables. Separate regression analyses were performed for each of these sets for various groups and significant predictors chosen.

In the second step, stepwise multiple regression procedure was used in which the significant predictors from different sets, which were derived from the first step, were used to predict the use of the three types of upward influence tactics. These analyses were performed for the different subgroups and the total sample.

#### Simultaneous Multiple Regression Analyses

##### Prediction of Upward Influence Tactics from Individual Characteristics :

Of the 19 individual characteristics, seven were selected as predictors on the basis of their correlations with the use of upward influence tactics. These variables were relative power,

need for power, global self-esteem, team orientation, commitment, job level and number of promotion. They were found associated with the use of upward influence tactics in all the three sub-groups; workers, supervisors and managers. The three upward influence tactics, namely, manipulative tactics, strong coercive tactics and weak coercive tactics were then simultaneously predicted from these seven variables for workers, supervisors and managers. Table 31 gives these results. Individual characteristics contributed significantly to the prediction of the use of manipulative tactics only in case of managers ( $R = .38$ ;  $p < .05$ ). The use of strong coercive tactics got significantly predicted in case of both workers ( $R = .33$ ;  $p < .01$ ) and managers ( $R = .52$ ;  $p < .01$ ) by these seven individual characteristics. The overall contribution of individual characteristics, in case of supervisors, was not found significant in the prediction of any upward influence tactic, probably because the total number of cases were too small in relation to the number of predictors used.

Individual characteristics accounted for 15 per cent of the variance in the use of manipulative tactics in case of manager. Of the seven predictors only team orientation contributed significantly for managers such that greater team orientation was found associated with their less frequent use of manipulative tactics ( $B = -.30$ ). None of the beta-coefficient was found significant in the case of workers. In case of supervisors, beta-coefficient for commitment was significant. ( $B = -.44$ ), although multiple correlation was not.

Table 31

Prediction of Upward Influence Tactics from Individual Characteristics for Different Hierarchical Levels

| Predictors         | Manipulative Tactics |                     |                      | Strong Coercive Tactics |                     |                      | Weak Coercive Tactics |                      |                      |
|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                    | Beta<br>W<br>(n=196) | Beta<br>S<br>(n=31) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) | Beta<br>W<br>(n=196)    | Beta<br>S<br>(n=31) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) | Beta<br>W<br>(n=117)  | Beta<br>S<br>(n=196) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) |
| Relative Power     | -.03                 | .09                 | .15                  | .13                     | .00                 | .18*                 | .00                   | .08                  | -.02                 |
| Need for Power     | .08                  | .07                 | .05                  | .03                     | .17                 | -.23*                | .00                   | -.07                 | -.20*                |
| Global Self-Esteem | -.06                 | .20                 | -.11                 | -.12                    | -.35                | -.31**               | -.09                  | -.03                 | -.18                 |
| Team Orientation   | -.12                 | .27                 | -.30**               | -.07                    | .36                 | -.08                 | -.04                  | .39*                 | -.21*                |
| Commitment         | -.09                 | -.44**              | .04                  | -.06                    | -.19                | -.06                 | -.06                  | -.43*                | .15                  |
| Job Level          | -.04                 | .41                 | .00                  | -.22*                   | .22                 | -.03                 | -.17*                 | .06                  | .00                  |
| No. of Promotions  | -.14                 | -.04                | -.12                 | -.07                    | -.48**              | -.18*                | -.23**                | -.40                 | -.21*                |
| R =                | .26                  | .58                 | .38*                 | .33**                   | .58                 | .52**                | .34**                 | .63                  | .41*                 |
| R <sup>2</sup> =   | .07                  | .34                 | .15                  | .11                     | .34                 | .27                  | .12                   | .40                  | .17                  |

\*P < .05; \*\*P < .01

Note : W = Workers; S = Supervisors; M = Managers.

Approximately, 11% and 27% variance in the use of strong coercive tactics in workers and managers respectively was explained by the individual characteristics. Relative power ( $B = .18$ ), need for power ( $B = -.23$ ), global self esteem ( $B = -.30$ ) and number of promotions ( $B = -.18$ ) contributed to the use of strong coercive tactics by managers. Thus, low need for power, low global self-esteem, fewer number of promotions received and high relative power increased the probability of the use of strong coercive tactics by managers. In case of workers, job level contributed significantly to the use of strong coercive tactics ( $B = -.12$ ). Its negative beta-coefficient suggested that workers on higher job levels used strong coercive tactics less often to influence their superiors. The combined contribution of individual characteristics to the use of strong coercive tactics, in case of supervisors, was not significant. However, the number of promotions had significant B coefficient ( $B = -.44$ ), which indicated that supervisors who had received more number of promotions were less inclined to use strong coercive tactics to influence their superiors.

The pattern of prediction obtained in case of weak coercive tactics showed that individual characteristics explained 12% variance for workers and 17% for managers ( $p < .01$ ). The predictors which contributed significantly to the use of weak coercive tactics for workers were job level ( $B = -.17$ ) and number of promotions ( $B = -.23$ ). Thus, at higher job levels and in case of those workers who had received more number of promotions, the use of weak coercive tactics was found less. In case of managers, the significant

predictors were need for power ( $B = -.20$ ), team orientation ( $B = -.21$ ) and number of promotions ( $B = -.21$ ). This suggested that greater need for power, team orientations and more number of promotions discouraged the use of weak coercive tactics in managers. In case of supervisors, individual characteristics did not predict the use of weak coercive tactics significantly. However, commitment ( $B = -.43$ ) and team orientation ( $B = .39$ ) were found to have significant beta-coefficients.

Prediction of Upward Influence Tactics from Interpersonal Variables:

Table 32 presents the results of the three regression analyses, using two interpersonal variables as predictors and three measures of influence tactics as criterion variables. The table shows that interpersonal variables, in case of supervisors, accounted for 49% variance in the use of manipulative and 21% variance in the use of weak coercive tactics. Of the two interpersonal variables, interpersonal attraction contributed significantly to manipulative tactics. Greater liking for the superior led to greater use of manipulative tactics to influence him ( $B = .72$ ). In case of managers, interpersonal variables accounted for 6% variance in the use of strong tactics and 14% for weak coercive tactics. In both cases interpersonal trust was found to be significant predictor. It was found that among managers greater trust in their superiors was associated with less use of strong or weak coercive tactics. Interpersonal variables in case of workers did not contribute significantly to the prediction of any upward influence tactic.

Table 32

## Prediction of Upward Influence Tactics from Interpersonal Variables for Different Hierarchical Levels

| Predictors       | Manipulative Tactics |                     |                      | Strong Coercive Tactics |                     |                      | Weak Coercive Tactics |                     |                      |
|------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
|                  | Beta<br>W<br>(n=196) | Beta<br>S<br>(n=31) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) | Beta<br>W<br>(n=196)    | Beta<br>S<br>(n=31) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) | Beta<br>W<br>(n=196)  | Beta<br>S<br>(n=31) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) |
| Trust            | .03                  | -.05                | -.12                 | .07                     | -.02                | -.25*                | .00                   | .30                 | -.32**               |
| Attraction       | -.08                 | .72**               | .05                  | -.07                    | .25                 | .02                  | -.07                  | .23                 | -.07                 |
| R =              | .07                  | .70**               | .10                  | .07                     | .24                 | .24*                 | .06                   | .46*                | .37**                |
| R <sup>2</sup> = | .00                  | .49                 | .01                  | .00                     | .06                 | .06                  | .00                   | .21                 | .14                  |

\*P &lt; .05;

\*\*P &lt; .01

Note : W = Workers; S = Supervisors; M = Managers

Prediction of Upward Influence Tactics from Organizational Process Variables

Out of the eight organizational process variables five variables which were found associated with use of upward influence tactics were included in multiple regression analyses (Table 33). The table shows that these organizational process variables significantly explained 9% variance in the use of manipulative tactics in workers and 15% in case of managers. Multiple R was not found significant for supervisors. Organizational climate ( $B = .22$ ), union-management relations ( $B = -.17$ ) and political basis of rewards ( $B = -.20$ ) contributed significantly to the use of manipulative tactics in case of workers. Thus, supportive organizational climate, greater political considerations in reward distribution and poor union-management relations led to the greater use of manipulative tactics among workers to influence their superiors. In case of managers, peer leadership ( $B = -.30$ ) and political basis of rewards ( $B = .27$ ) contributed to the use of manipulative tactics. For managers, greater use of manipulative tactics in the upward direction resulted from the greater political consideration in reward distribution and less supportive peer leadership. Organizational process variables did not predict significantly the use of manipulative tactics in supervisors. However, in case of supervisors also it was found that greater political considerations in reward distribution encouraged the use of manipulative tactics ( $B = .65$ ).

So far as strong coercive tactics were concerned, organizational process variables explained 17% of the variance in case of managers. Political basis of rewards was the only

Table 33

Prediction of Upward Influence Tactics from Organizational Process Variables for Different Hierarchical Levels

| Predictors                       | Manipulative Tactics |                     |                      | Strong Coercive Tactics |                     |                      | Weak Coercive Tactics |                     |                      |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
|                                  | Beta<br>W<br>(n=196) | Beta<br>S<br>(n=31) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) | Beta<br>W<br>(n=196)    | Beta<br>S<br>(n=31) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) | Beta<br>W<br>(n=196)  | Beta<br>S<br>(n=31) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) |
| Supervisory Leadership           | -.13                 | -.07                | .26                  | -.01                    | -.03                | -.05                 | -.05                  | .26                 | -.09                 |
| Peer Leadership                  | -.10                 | .01                 | -.30*                | -.03                    | -.05                | -.01                 | -.04                  | .49                 | .00                  |
| Organizational Climate           | .22*                 | .71                 | .11                  | .08                     | .69                 | .07                  | .09                   | -.01                | .02                  |
| Political Basis of Reward System | .20*                 | .65*                | .27*                 | .16                     | .40                 | .32*                 | .08                   | .61*                | .36**                |
| Union-Management Relations       | -.17*                | .14                 | -.19                 | -.02                    | -.39                | -.16                 | -.08                  | -.04                | -.20*                |
| R =                              | .30**                | .50                 | .38**                | .15                     | .59                 | .41**                | .13                   | .55                 | .52**                |
| R <sup>2</sup> =                 | .09                  | .25                 | .15                  | .02                     | .35                 | .17                  | .02                   | .30                 | .27                  |

\*P < .05; \*\*P < .01

Note : W = Workers; S = Supervisors; M = Managers

significant predictor ( $B = .32$ ). Thus, greater were the political considerations in reward distribution, more frequent, was the use of strong coercive tactics ( $B = .32$ ). Organizational process variables did not predict significantly the use of strong coercive tactics in case of workers and supervisors. Also, none of the beta-coefficients was found significant.

In case of weak coercive tactics, significant multiple correlation was obtained for managers only. Approximately 27% variance in the use of weak coercive tactics was explained by the organizational process variables. Of the five predictors, political basis of rewards and union-management relations contributed significantly to the prediction. The positive contribution of political basis of rewards ( $B = .36$ ) and negative contribution of union-management relations ( $B = -.20$ ) revealed that greater use of weak coercive tactics resulted from the increased politicalization of rewards and poor union-management relations. Organizational process variables did not predict the use of weak coercive tactics in case of workers and supervisors. However, beta-coefficient for political basis of rewards, in case of supervisors, was found to be significant ( $B = .61$ ).

Prediction of Upward Influence Tactics from Organizational Structural Variables :

The three influence tactics were also predicted from the five organizational structural variables. Table 34 shows that structural variable did not significantly predict the use of manipulative tactics in any of the three groups, i.e., workers, supervisors and managers.

Table 34

Prediction of Upward Influence Tactics from the Variables of Organizational Structure for Different Hierarchical Levels

| Predictors               | Manipulative Tactics |                     |                      | Strong Coercive Tactics |                     |                      | Weak Coercive Tactics |                     |                      |
|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
|                          | Beta<br>W<br>(n=196) | Beta<br>S<br>(n=31) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) | Beta<br>W<br>(n=196)    | Beta<br>S<br>(n=31) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) | Beta<br>W<br>(n=196)  | Beta<br>S<br>(n=31) | Beta<br>M<br>(n=117) |
| Centralization of W.O.'s | .07                  | -.04                | .04                  | .01                     | .13                 | .15                  | .07                   | .28                 | .22*                 |
| Formalization            | .05                  | -.12                | -.06                 | -.11                    | -.14                | -.24*                | .00                   | .16                 | -.21*                |
| Total Amount of Control  | -.15                 | .17                 | -.14                 | -.21**                  | .56*                | -.14                 | -.20**                | .53**               | -.12                 |
| Slope of Control         | -.04                 | .22                 | .06                  | -.15                    | .07                 | -.31**               | -.23**                | .17                 | -.11                 |
| Control of Unions        | .03                  | .33                 | .17                  | .16*                    | .03                 | .04                  | -.02                  | .25                 | .22*                 |
| R =                      | .16                  | .39                 | .23                  | .32**                   | .49                 | .44**                | .27*                  | .71**               | .42**                |
| R <sup>2</sup> =         | .02                  | .15                 | .05                  | .10                     | .24                 | .19                  | .07                   | .50                 | .17                  |

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$

Note : W = Workers; S = Supervisors; M = Managers

However, the variance in the use of strong coercive tactics in workers (10%) and managers (19%) was significantly accounted for by organizational structural variables. Two predictors, namely, total amount of control ( $B = -.21$ ) and control of unions ( $B = .16$ ) contributed significantly to the prediction in case of workers. The frequent use of strong coercive tactics, in case of workers, was associated with low total amount of control and more control of unions. In case of managers, formalization ( $B = -.24$ ) and slope of control ( $B = -.31$ ) significantly explained the variance in the use of strong coercive tactics. It was found that lesser was the formalization and less steep was the slope of control, more frequent was the use of strong coercive tactics by managers to influence their superiors. In case of supervisors, structural variables did not significantly explain the variance in the use of strong coercive tactics. The only significant predictor found was the total amount of control ( $B = .56$ ). For supervisors, an increase in the total amount of control, rather than lowering down the use of strong coercive tactics, actually enhanced its use.

Structural variables predicted the use of weak coercive tactics in all the three groups. They accounted for 7%, 50% and 17% of the variance in use of weak coercive tactics in case of workers, supervisors and managers, respectively. In case of workers, the predictors which contributed significantly were total amount of control ( $B = -.20$ ) and slope of control ( $B = -.23$ ). Thus, weak coercive tactics were used more by workers with low total amount of control and less steep slope of control. However, in case of supervisors the results were different. It was found

that weak coercive tactics were used more often when the total amount of control was high ( $B = .53$ ). In case of managers, the use of weak coercive tactics was predicted by the control of unions ( $B = .22$ ), centralization of work operations ( $B = .22$ ) and formalization ( $B = -.21$ ). Managers, thus, used weak coercive tactics more with greater centralization of work operations, greater control of unions and low formalization in the organization.

Prediction of Upward Influence Tactics from Bases of Power :

Bases of power did not predict the use of any of the three upward influence tactics, either in case of workers, supervisors or managers (Table 35). Only two beta-coefficients, one in case of workers and another in case of managers, were found statistically significant. Workers used manipulative tactics less often in case of superiors who were perceived high on referent power. However, perceived coercive power of the superiors was associated with greater use of weak coercive tactics in managers.

Summary : Multiple regression analysis indicated that the significant predictors of upward influence tactics were largely different across the three groups, i.e., workers, supervisors and managers. None of the organizational structure variables and the bases of power, except referent power in case of workers, were associated with the use of manipulative tactics. Interpersonal variables and personal values, such as, high attraction towards superiors and low commitment led to frequent use of manipulative tactics in supervisors but not in case of workers and managers. In case of workers, organizational process variables, such as, supportive organizational climate, politicalization of rewards

Table 35

Prediction of Upward Influence Tactics from the Bases of Power for Different Hierarchical Levels

| Predictors       | Manipulative Tactics         |                             |                              | Strong Coercive Tactics      |                             |                              | Weak Coercive Tactics        |                             |                              |
|------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
|                  | Beta <sub>W</sub><br>(n=196) | Beta <sub>S</sub><br>(n=31) | Beta <sub>M</sub><br>(n=117) | Beta <sub>W</sub><br>(n=196) | Beta <sub>S</sub><br>(n=31) | Beta <sub>M</sub><br>(n=117) | Beta <sub>W</sub><br>(n=196) | Beta <sub>S</sub><br>(n=31) | Beta <sub>M</sub><br>(n=117) |
| Expert Power     | .01                          | .16                         | -.08                         | -.11                         | -.15                        | -.06                         | -.06                         | .21                         | -.07                         |
| Reward Power     | .02                          | -.01                        | -.12                         | .05                          | .44                         | .10                          | -.05                         | -.02                        | -.06                         |
| Coercive Power   | -.07                         | -.12                        | .18                          | .06                          | -.27                        | .19                          | .12                          | .15                         | .21*                         |
| Referent Power   | -.17*                        | .14                         | .18                          | -.06                         | -.19                        | -.10                         | .05                          | -.35                        | .06                          |
| Legitimate Power | .09                          | .07                         | -.04                         | -.02                         | .28                         | -.17                         | -.06                         | .07                         | -.11                         |
| R =              | .18                          | .33                         | .22                          | .16                          | .45                         | .28                          | .14                          | .31                         | .20                          |
| R <sup>2</sup> = | .03                          | .11                         | .05                          | .03                          | .20                         | .08                          | .02                          | .10                         | .04                          |

\*P < .05; \*\*P < .01

Note: W = Workers; S = Supervisors; M = Managers

and poor union-management relations, and in case of managers, less supportive peer leadership and politicalization of rewards increased the use of manipulative tactics. Politicalization of rewards also led to frequent use of manipulative tactics in supervisors.

Individual and organizational structural variables were largely associated with the prediction of the use of strong coercive tactics in case of workers and managers but not in case of supervisors. However, the significant predictors from individual and organizational structure variables were different in the two groups, i.e., workers and managers. In case of managers, more frequent use of strong coercive tactics resulted from such individual variables as greater relative power, low need for power, low global self esteem and fewer number of promotions received and such organizational variables as less formalization, low slope of control and high politicalization of rewards. Whereas, its frequent use, in case of workers, was a function of low job level, low total amount of control and higher control of unions. The use of weak coercive tactics was also associated more with individual and organizational structure variables in case of workers and managers. Total amount of control was associated with weak coercive tactics in case of supervisors also. However, in case of supervisors, it operated differently as compared to managers. While higher total amount of control restricted the use of weak coercive tactics in managers, it encouraged their use among supervisors.

### Stepwise Regression Analyses

The complete model of upward influence, discussed in Chapter II, required that the use of upward influence tactics be predicted simultaneously from the five sets of predictors, e.g., individual characteristics variables, interpersonal variables, organizational processes, organizational structure and bases of power. In the earlier regression analyses these measures were considered singly. Simultaneous multiple regression analyses were performed separately for workers, supervisors and managers to identify the best predictors amongst each set of variables on the basis of their individual contribution to the prediction of tactic use. In all, twelve such variables from five sets were selected as best predictors of upward influence.

Twelve best predictors were used in the stepwise regression analyses to predict the three types of upward influence tactics. This set of predictors included five individual characteristics, namely, global self esteem, team orientation, commitment, job level and number of promotions, one from interpersonal variables, e.g., interpersonal attraction, three organizational process variables, namely, organizational climate, political basis of rewards and union-management relations, two organizational structure variables, e.g., total amount of control and slope of control, and coercive power from the bases of power. Separate stepwise regression analyses, using these twelve variables as predictors and influence tactics as criterion variables, were performed to test the complete model for the total sample, groups of supervisors, workers and managers, as also for the different

types of organizations. Thus, based on the results of the stepwise regression analyses, the twelve predictors were used to test the role of individual, interpersonal and organizational factors in our model of exercise of upward influence in case of different groups. The results were also used for determining the relative significance of various predictors in the exercise of upward influence.

Prediction of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics (Total Sample):

The three measures of upward influence tactics, namely, manipulative tactics, strong coercive tactics and weak coercive tactics were predicted from the twelve selected predictors using stepwise procedure. Table 36 gives the results. Eleven predictors which entered the regression equation accounted for 14% of the total variance in the use of manipulative tactics ( $p < .01$ ). Political basis of rewards ( $B = .21$ ), an organizational process variable, entered at the first step in regression analysis. Other significant predictors were team orientation ( $B = -.14$ ), job level ( $B = -.12$ ), union management relations ( $B = -.13$ ) and organizational climate ( $B = .13$ ). The results showed that the frequent use of manipulative tactics in upward direction was a function of high politicalization in reward distribution, low team orientation, low job level, poor union-management relations and highly supportive organizational climate. While predicting the use of strong coercive tactics, all the twelve predictors entered the regression equation. They together explained about 19% variance in the use of strong coercive tactics. Political basis of rewards, again, entered at the first step ( $B = .19$ ). Other significant predictors were found to be global self-esteem ( $B = -.18$ ), slope of control ( $B = -.22$ ), number

Table 36

Prediction of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics from Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables for the Total Sample (N = 344)

| Predictors                 | Manipulative Tactics |            | Predictors                 |  | Strong Coercive Tactics |            | Predictors                 |            | Weak Coercive Tactics |            |
|----------------------------|----------------------|------------|----------------------------|--|-------------------------|------------|----------------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|
|                            |                      |            |                            |  | Beta                    | RSQ Change | Beta                       | RSQ Change | Beta                  | RSQ Change |
|                            | Beta                 | RSQ Change |                            |  |                         |            |                            |            |                       |            |
| Political Basis of Rewards | .21**                | .047       | Political Basis of Rewards |  | .19**                   | .051       | No. of Promotions          |            | -.22**                | .062       |
| Team Orientation           | -.14*                | .027       | Global Self-esteem         |  | -.18**                  | .040       | Slope of Control           |            | -.19**                | .041       |
| Job Level                  | -.12*                | .016       | Slope of Control           |  | -.22*                   | .031       | Political Basis of Rewards |            | .17**                 | .033       |
| U.M. Relations             | -.13*                | .013       | No. of Promotions          |  | -.13*                   | .023       | Total amount of Control    |            | -.12*                 | .014       |
| Organizational Climate     | .13*                 | .015       | Total Amount of Control    |  | -.15**                  | .018       | Global Self-Esteem         |            | -.10                  | .011       |
| Total amount of Control    | -.09                 | .007       | Organizational Climate     |  | .14*                    | .013       | U.M. Relations             |            | -.09                  | .006       |
| Commitment                 | -.08                 | .006       | Commitment                 |  | -.09                    | .010       | Organizational Climate     |            | .10                   | .005       |
| Attraction                 | .05                  | .002       | U.M. Relations             |  | -.07                    | .002       | Coercive Power             |            | .08                   | .006       |
| No. of Promotions          | -.05                 | .002       | Job Level                  |  | -.05                    | .003       | Attraction                 |            | -.03                  | .001       |
| Global Self-Esteem         | -.03                 | .001       | Attraction                 |  | .04                     | .001       | Team Orientation           |            | -.02                  | .001       |
| Coercive Power             | -.02                 | .000       | Coercive Power             |  | .03                     | .001       | Commitment                 |            | -.02                  | .000       |
|                            |                      |            | Team Orientation           |  | -.02                    | .000       |                            |            |                       |            |
|                            |                      |            |                            |  |                         |            |                            |            |                       |            |
|                            | R = .37**            |            |                            |  | R = .44**               |            | R = .42**                  |            |                       |            |
|                            | R <sup>2</sup> = .14 |            |                            |  | R <sup>2</sup> = .19    |            | R <sup>2</sup> = .18       |            |                       |            |

\* P < .05;  
\*\*P < .01

of promotions ( $B = -.13$ ), total amount of control ( $B = -.15$ ) and organizational climate ( $B = .14$ ). These six predictors together explained more than 17% of the total variance, while the remaining six predictors explained less than 2% of the variance. Thus, strong coercive tactics were used to exercise upward influence when the individual was low on self esteem, had received fewer promotions, saw that rewards in the organization were allocated on political basis and perceived the organization as low on total amount of control but with supportive climate and less steep control curve.

When the use of weak coercive tactics was predicted, number of promotions entered the regression equation at the first step. It contributed most to the use of weak coercive tactics ( $B = -.22$ ). Other significant predictors found were slope of control ( $B = -.19$ ), political basis of rewards ( $B = .17$ ) and total amount of control ( $B = -.12$ ). These significant predictors explained 15% variance out of the total 18% variance accounted for by the eleven predictors which entered the regression equation. It may be noted that the predictors found significant in predicting the weak coercive tactics also appeared as significant predictors in case of strong coercive tactics. The only difference was that two predictors, namely, global self esteem and organizational climate which contributed significantly to the use of strong coercive tactics did not do so in case of the weak coercive tactics.

Prediction of the Use of Influence Tactics for the Supervisors, Workers and Managers :

In stepwise regression analyses, workers and managers were treated as one group and supervisors as a different group. This

was done because in correlational, as well as, in simultaneous regression analyses, the predictor variables were found associated with upward influence tactics in the same direction in case of workers and managers. In case of supervisors, the directionality of many of these variables with influence tactics was found to be different. The results of stepwise regression analyses on these two groups are reported in Table 37 and 38. As seen in Table 37 and 38, ten predictors in case of supervisors and all the twelve predictors in case of managers and workers entered into the equation to predict the use of manipulative tactics. They, together, accounted for 71% variance in the use of manipulative tactics in case of supervisors and 16% variance for the group of managers and workers. Attraction ( $B = .50$ ), an interpersonal variable, entered as the first predictor in the regression equation in case of supervisors. It explained a little more than 4% variance of the total variance. Also, this was the only significant contributor to total variance. In case of managers and workers, political basis of rewards ( $B = .22$ ), an organizational process variable, entered at the first step and accounted for about 6% of the total variance. Another variable which contributed significantly to explaining of the variance was team orientation ( $B = -.18$ ). Thus, the use of manipulative tactics while in case of the supervisors was largely a function of attraction towards the superior. In case of workers and managers, the use of manipulative tactics was determined by basis of reward allocation and belief in team orientation. It may also be noted that unusually large amount of variance which got explained in case of supervisors was probably due to small size of the sample relative to the number of predictors.

Table 37

Prediction of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics from Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables for Supervisors (N = 31)

| Predictors                 | Manipulative Tactics |            | Predictors                 |  | Strong Coercive Tactics |            | Predictors                 |            | Weak Coercive Tactics |            |
|----------------------------|----------------------|------------|----------------------------|--|-------------------------|------------|----------------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|
|                            |                      |            |                            |  | Beta                    | RSQ Change | Beta                       | RSQ Change | Beta                  | RSQ Change |
|                            | Beta                 | RSQ Change |                            |  |                         |            |                            |            |                       |            |
| Attraction                 | .50**                | .447       | Total Amount of Control    |  | .29**                   | .240       | Total Amount of Control    |            | .56**                 | .310       |
| Union-Management Relations | -.27                 | .097       | Union-Management Relations |  | -.61**                  | .197       | No. of Promotions          |            | -.40*                 | .220       |
| Job Level                  | .19                  | .024       | Team Orientation           |  | .32                     | .079       | Attraction                 |            | .26                   | .082       |
| Organizational Climate     | .34                  | .030       | Attraction                 |  | .18                     | .048       | Commitment                 |            | -.22                  | .058       |
| Global Self-Esteem         | .30                  | .032       | No. of Promotions          |  | -.27                    | .034       | Team Orientation           |            | .10                   | .009       |
| Commitment                 | -.23                 | .035       | Organizational Climate     |  | .32                     | .046       | Job Level                  |            | -.13                  | .007       |
| Team Orientation           | .18                  | .026       | Coercive Power             |  | -.19                    | .024       | Global Self-Esteem         |            | .17                   | .009       |
| Political Basis of Rewards | .22                  | .018       | Slope of Control           |  | -.13                    | .009       | Union-Management Relations |            | .11                   | .010       |
| Slope of Control           | -.05                 | .002       | Political Basis of Rewards |  | .15                     | .008       | Political Basis of Rewards |            | .18                   | .003       |
| No. of Promotions          | .04                  | .001       | Commitment                 |  | .08                     | .004       | Organizational Climate     |            | .19                   | .013       |
|                            |                      |            | Job Level                  |  | -.02                    | .000       | Slope of Control           |            | .04                   | .001       |
|                            |                      |            |                            |  |                         |            |                            |            | R = .85**             |            |
|                            |                      |            |                            |  |                         |            |                            |            | R <sup>2</sup> = .72  |            |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

Table 38

Prediction of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics from Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational variables for Workers and Managers Together ( $N = 313$ )

In predicting the use of strong coercive tactics by supervisors, total amount of control and union-management relations contributed significantly to the total variance of 69% accounted for by eleven predictors which entered into the regression equation. Total amount of control with positive beta weight entered first ( $B = .29$ ) and union-management relations with negative beta weight entered at the second step ( $B = -.61$ ). These predictors together accounted for about 44% of the total variance. In case of managers and workers, political basis of rewards, again, entered at the first step and explained a little more than 5% of the total variance. Its contribution in predicting the use of strong coercive tactics was positive ( $B = .19$ ). Other significant predictors were global self-esteem ( $B = -.17$ ), slope of control ( $B = -.22$ ), total amount of control ( $B = -.18$ ) and number of promotions ( $B = -.12$ ). These five significant predictors explained most of the total 20% variance accounted for by all the twelve predictors. These results show that total amount of control predicts differently in case of supervisors, as against in case of managers and workers. Whereas in case of supervisors, high total amount of control brings about an increase in the use of strong coercive tactics to influence superiors, in case of workers and managers it restricts the use of such tactics. In case of supervisors, poor union-management relationship, further, encourages the use of strong coercive methods but it is unrelated in case of workers and managers.

As table 37 and 38 show, while predicting the use of weak coercive tactics eleven predictors in case of supervisors and ten predictors in case of managers and workers entered into

stepwise regression analysis. They altogether explained 72% of the variance in case of supervisors and 19% in case of managers and workers. In case of supervisors, two predictors, namely, total amount of control ( $B = .56$ ) and number of promotions ( $B = -.40$ ) contributed significantly to explaining of the variance in use of weak coercive tactics. Thus, greater use of weak coercive tactics by supervisors resulted when they perceived greater total amount of control and they had received fewer promotions. In case of managers and workers, political basis of rewards was the most potent predictor ( $B = .16$ ). Other significant predictors were number of promotions ( $B = -.20$ ), slope of control ( $B = -.19$ ) and total amount of control ( $B = -.15$ ). These four significant predictors accounted for about 16% of the total 19% variance explained. It was again found that greater politicalization in reward distribution and fewer number of promotions, less steep slope of control and low total amount of control led to the use of weak coercive tactics in managers and workers.

Summary : The cross comparison of two tables, one for the superiors and the other for the group of managers and workers, showed that the twelve predictors significantly explained the variance in the use of upward influence tactics in both the group of supervisors and the group of managers and workers. However, the significant predictors of the use of influence tactics were different in the two groups. The use of manipulative tactics, in case of supervisors, was largely a function of attraction towards the superior. In case of workers and managers, the use of manipulative tactics was determined by organizational conditions, such as, basis of reward allocation and personal values, such as, belief in team work.

Poor union-management relations, in case of supervisors, encouraged the use of strong coercive tactics but was unrelated with influence tactics, in case of workers and managers. The total amount of control which correlated with the use of strong and weak coercive tactics in case of supervisors and in case of the workers and managers, operated differently in the two groups. Whereas, in case of supervisors, high total amount of control brought about an increase in the use of strong coercive tactics to influence supervisors, while in case of workers and managers it restricted the use of such tactics.

Prediction of the use of Upward Influence Tactics in the Public Sector and Private Sector Organizations

Table 39 and 40 report the results of stepwise regression analyses performed to predict the use of upward influence tactics in the Public and Private Sector Organizations. As seen in Table 39 in case of Private Organizations eleven predictors entered the regression equation while predicting the use of manipulative tactics. None of the beta coefficients, including that of interpersonal attraction which entered at the first step, was found to be significant. On the other hand, in case of Public Organizations, 13% variance in manipulative tactics was significantly accounted for by the eleven predictors which entered the regression equation. Political basis of rewards ( $B = .19$ ) entered at the first step and contributed most to the total variance. Other predictors which were significant were team orientation ( $B = -.14$ ), organizational climate ( $B = .15$ ) and union management relations ( $B = -.14$ ). These four significant predictors together explained 9% of the total variance. The use of manipulative tactics in Public Sector

Table 39

Prediction of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics from Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables for the Private Sector Organizations (N = 66)

| Predictors                 | Manipulative Tactics |            | Predictors                 |            | Strong Coercive Tactics |                            | Predictors           |            | Weak Coercive Tactics |            |
|----------------------------|----------------------|------------|----------------------------|------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|
|                            | Beta                 | RSQ Change | Beta                       | RSQ Change | Beta                    | RSQ Change                 | Beta                 | RSQ Change | Beta                  | RSQ Change |
| Attraction                 | -.23                 | .105       | No. of Promotions          | -.40**     | .137                    | Political Basis of Rewards | .21                  | .117       |                       |            |
| Team Orientation           | -.15                 | .027       | Team Orientation           | -.24       | .063                    | Team Orientation           | -.22                 | .033       |                       |            |
| No. of Promotions          | -.10                 | .025       | U.M. Relations             | -.19       | .041                    | Total Amount of control    | -.20                 | .032       |                       |            |
| Political Basis of Rewards | .11                  | .011       | Global Self-Esteem         | -.17       | .022                    | Attraction                 | -.20                 | .027       |                       |            |
| Total Amount of Control    | -.02                 | .003       | Coercive Power             | .10        | .012                    | Coercive Power             | .10                  | .013       |                       |            |
| Job Level                  | -.09                 | .002       | Slope of Control           | -.10       | .006                    | No. of Promotions          | -.17                 | .011       |                       |            |
| Global Self-Esteem         | .09                  | .003       | Total Amount of Control    | -.09       | .005                    | Job Level                  | .15                  | .009       |                       |            |
| Commitment                 | -.07                 | .003       | Job Level                  | .08        | .006                    | Slope of Control           | -.09                 | .010       |                       |            |
| Union-Management Relations | -.04                 | .001       | Commitment                 | -.05       | .001                    | Global Self-Esteem         | -.09                 | .006       |                       |            |
| Coercive Power             | -.03                 | .001       | Attraction                 | .04        | .001                    | U.M. Relations             | .04                  | .001       |                       |            |
| Slope of Control           | -.02                 | .000       | Organizational Climate     | .04        | .001                    | Organizational Climate     | -.02                 | .000       |                       |            |
|                            |                      |            | Political Basis of Rewards | .04        | .001                    |                            |                      |            |                       |            |
|                            |                      |            |                            |            |                         | R = .54                    | R = .51              |            |                       |            |
|                            |                      |            |                            |            |                         | R <sup>2</sup> = .29       | R <sup>2</sup> = .26 |            |                       |            |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

Table 40

Prediction of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics from Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables for the Public Sector Organizations (N = 278)

| Predictors                 | Manipulative Tactics |            | Predictors                 |            | Strong Coercive Tactics |                            | Predictors |            | Weak Coercive Tactics |                      |
|----------------------------|----------------------|------------|----------------------------|------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------|------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
|                            | Beta                 | RSQ Change | Beta                       | RSQ Change | Beta                    | RSQ Change                 | Beta       | RSQ Change | Beta                  | RSQ Change           |
| Political Basis of Rewards | .19**                | .034       | Global Self-Esteem         | -.19**     | .057                    | No. of Promotions          | -.20**     | .045       |                       |                      |
| Team Orientation           | -.14*                | .023       | Slope of Control           | -.25**     | .051                    | Slope of Control           | -.20**     | .040       |                       |                      |
| Job Level                  | -.10                 | .013       | Political Basis of Rewards | .15**      | .037                    | Political Basis of Rewards | .15*       | .028       |                       |                      |
| Organizational Climate     | .15*                 | .012       | Total Amount of Control    | -.16**     | .019                    | Global Self-Esteem         | -.12*      | .019       |                       |                      |
| U.M. Relations             | -.14*                | .017       | Organizational Climate     | .14*       | .011                    | Total Amount of Control    | -.12*      | .012       |                       |                      |
| Total Amount of Control    | -.11                 | .010       | Job Level                  | -.08       | .009                    | U.M. Relations             | -.11       | .006       |                       |                      |
| Attraction                 | .12                  | .010       | Commitment                 | -.08       | .007                    | Organizational Climate     | .12        | .008       |                       |                      |
| Commitment                 | -.07                 | .006       | No. of Promotions          | -.06       | .004                    | Coercive Power             | .09        | .006       |                       |                      |
| Global Self-Esteem         | -.06                 | .003       | U.M. Relations             | -.03       | .001                    | Team Orientation           | .03        | .000       |                       |                      |
| No. of Promotions          | -.03                 | .001       | Coercive Power             | .02        | .000                    | Attraction                 | -.02       | .000       |                       |                      |
| Slope of Control           | .01                  | .000       | Commitment                 |            |                         | Commitment                 | -.02       | .000       |                       |                      |
|                            |                      |            |                            |            |                         |                            |            |            | R = .41**             | R = .41**            |
|                            |                      |            |                            |            |                         |                            |            |            | R <sup>2</sup> = .20  | R <sup>2</sup> = .16 |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

Organization was found to be a function of greater politicalization in reward distribution, less team orientation, more permissive organizational climate and poor union management relations (Table 40).

While predicting the use of strong coercive tactics in Private Sector Organizations, all the twelve predictors entered the regression equation. However, the amount of variance explained by them was not statistically significant. Whereas, in case of Public Organizations, ten predictor entered the regression equation. They explained 20% of the variance in the use of strong coercive tactics. Global self-esteem was the first to enter. It accounted for about 6% of the total variance. Five predictors which were significant were global self-esteem ( $B = -.19$ ), slope of control ( $B = -.25$ ), political basis of rewards ( $B = .15$ ), total amount of control ( $B = -.16$ ) and organizational climate ( $B = .14$ ). They explained approximately 18% of the total variance and the remaining five predictors explained only 2% of the variance. Thus, in Public Sector Organizations the use of strong coercive tactics resulted from politicalization in reward distribution, supportive organizational climate, low global self-esteem, less slope of control and low total amount of control.

In case of weak coercive tactics, the eleven predictors together in Private Sector Organizations could not explain significant amount of variance. The individual contribution of none of the predictor was found to be significant (Table 39). On the other hand, in case of Public Organizations, eleven predictors which entered the analysis explained 16% variance in the use of

weak coercive tactics. Number of promotions received entered first ( $B = -.20$ ). It explained a little over 4% variance. Other significant predictors were slope of control ( $B = -.20$ ), political basis of rewards ( $B = .15$ ), global self esteem ( $B = -.12$ ) and total amount of control ( $B = -.12$ ). The five significant predictors explained 14% of the total variance, whereas the remaining six explained just 2 percent.

Summary : The stepwise regression analyses for the Public Sector and Private Sector Organizations showed that the twelve predictors which entered the regression equations did not significantly predict the use of upward influence tactics in the Private Sector Organizations. The individual contribution of only number of promotions received was significant in predicting the use of strong coercive tactics. Whereas, in case of Public Sector Organizations, these predictors significantly predicted the use of tactics of upward influence. It was found that in Public Sector Organizations greater politicalization of reward distribution led to an increase in the use of manipulative, as well as, coercive influence tactics. Fewer number of promotions, less slope of control and low self esteem were associated with more use of strong and weak coercive tactics but not with the manipulative tactics. While team orientation, job level and union management relation contributed significantly to the prediction of the use of manipulative tactics, they did not contribute to the prediction of the use of strong or weak coercive tactics.

Prediction of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics in Engineering and Textile Organizations

As discussed earlier, the correlations of individual, inter-personal and organizational variables with use of upward influence tactics were different for the Engineering and Textile Organizations. This suggested the possibility that different predictors may account for the use of upward influence tactics in these two types of organizations. To test this, separate stepwise regression analyses were done for the respondents of the engineering and Textile Organizations. The results of these analyses are reported in Tables 41 and 42.

As seen in Table 41, the twelve predictors did not predict significant amount of variance in the use of manipulative tactics in Textile Organizations. None of the beta coefficients was found significant. However, in case of Engineering Organizations, eleven predictors entered the regression equation and explained 18% of the variance in the use of manipulative tactics (Table 42). Political basis of reward ( $B = .31$ ) and organizational climate ( $B = .16$ ) were significant predictors of the use of manipulative tactics. Thus, in Engineering Organizations, greater politicalization in reward distribution and supportive organizational climate were associated with increase in the use of manipulative tactics to influence superiors.

Eleven predictors which entered the regression equation explained 31% variance in the use of strong coercive tactics in the Engineering Organizations and 26% variance in the Textile Organizations. In Engineering Organizations, eight predictors, namely, global self esteem ( $B = -.28$ ), number of promotions ( $B = -.22$ ), commitment ( $B = -.21$ ), job level ( $B = .15$ ),

Table 41

Prediction of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics from Individual, Intepersonal and Organizational Variables for the Textile Organizations (N = 156)

| Predictors                 | Manipulative Tactics |            | Predictors                 |            | Strong Coercive Tactics |            | Predictors                 |            | Weak Coercive Tactics |            |
|----------------------------|----------------------|------------|----------------------------|------------|-------------------------|------------|----------------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|
|                            | Beta                 | RSQ Change | Beta                       | RSQ Change | Beta                    | RSQ Change | Beta                       | RSQ Change | Beta                  | RSQ Change |
| Team Orientation           | -.15                 | .029       | Job Level                  |            | -.28**                  | .099       | No. of Promotions          |            | -.21*                 | .058       |
| U.M. Relations             | -.13                 | .015       | Slope of Control           |            | -.24**                  | .061       | Slope of Control           |            | -.20*                 | .046       |
| Attraction                 | .11                  | .016       | Political Basis of Rewards |            | .23**                   | .037       | Coercive Power             |            | .16                   | .017       |
| Total Amount of Control    | -.11                 | .013       | Total amount of Control    |            | -.17*                   | .019       | Total Amount of Control    |            | -.14                  | .014       |
| Job Level                  | -.11                 | .006       | Coercive Power             |            | .16*                    | .018       | Commitment                 |            | .16                   | .020       |
| Slope of Control           | .08                  | .005       | Organizational Climate     |            | .15                     | .012       | Attraction                 |            | -.10                  | .008       |
| Commitment                 | -.06                 | .004       | Attraction                 |            | -.11                    | .009       | Political Basis of Rewards |            | .08                   | .005       |
| Global Self-Esteem         | .09                  | .004       | Commitment                 |            | .06                     | .003       | U.M. Relations             |            | -.06                  | .002       |
| Coercive Power             | .07                  | .005       | U.M. Relations             |            | .06                     | .002       | Organizational Climate     |            | .04                   | .001       |
| No. of Promotions          | .04                  | .002       | Team Orientation           |            | -.04                    | .002       | Global Self-Esteem         |            | .04                   | .001       |
| Political Basis of Rewards | .06                  | .002       | Global Self-Esteem         |            | .03                     | .001       | Team Orientation           |            | .03                   | .001       |
| Organizational Climate     | .04                  | .001       | No. of Promotions          |            | -.03                    | .001       | Job Level                  |            | -.01                  | .000       |

$$\begin{aligned}
 R &= .32 & R &= .51** \\
 R^2 &= .10 & R^2 &= .26 \\
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 R &= .42** \\
 R^2 &= .17
 \end{aligned}$$

\*P < .05;  
\*\*P < .01

Table 42

Prediction of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics on Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables for the Engineering Organizations (N = 188)

| Predictors                 | Manipulative Tactics |            | Predictors                 |          | Strong Coercive Tactics |                            | Predictors |            | Weak Coercive Tactics |            |
|----------------------------|----------------------|------------|----------------------------|----------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|
|                            |                      |            |                            |          | Beta                    | RSQ Change                 | Beta       | RSQ Change | Beta                  | RSQ Change |
|                            | Beta                 | RSQ Change |                            |          |                         |                            |            |            |                       |            |
| Political Basis of Rewards | .31 **               | .103       | Global Self-Esteem         | -.028 ** | .097                    | Political Basis of Rewards | -.30 **    | .125       |                       |            |
| Commitment                 | -.10                 | .025       | No. of Promotions          | -.022 ** | .043                    | Commitment                 | -.09 **    | .045       |                       |            |
| Team Orientation           | -.12                 | .009       | Committment                | -.021 ** | .034                    | Slope of Control           | -.09 **    | .024       |                       |            |
| Organizational Climate     | .16 *                | .010       | Job Level                  | -.015 *  | .028                    | Total Amount of Control    | -.019      |            |                       |            |
|                            |                      |            | Political Basis of Rewards | .018 *   | .026                    |                            | -.017 *    | .024       |                       |            |
| Total Amount of Control    | -.09                 | .008       | Total Amount of Control    | -.019 ** | .017                    | Global Self-Esteem         | -.013      | .012       |                       |            |
| Global Self-Esteem         | -.07                 | .009       | Slope of Control           | -.018 ** | .019                    | Organizational Climate     | .012       | .006       |                       |            |
| U.M. Relations             | -.11                 | .006       | Attraction                 | -.014 *  | .022                    | U.M. Relations             | -.009      | .008       |                       |            |
| Job Level                  | -.11                 | .008       | Organizational Climate     | .013     | .011                    | Coercive Power             | .007       | .005       |                       |            |
| Slope of Control           | -.08                 | .004       | U.M. Relations             | -.011    | .010                    | No. of Promotions          | -.008      | .005       |                       |            |
| Coercive Power             | -.08                 | .005       | Coercive Power             | -.004    | .001                    | Job Level                  | .004       | .001       |                       |            |
| No. of Promotions          | -.01                 | .000       |                            |          |                         | Attraction                 | .003       | .001       |                       |            |
|                            |                      |            |                            |          |                         | Team Orientation           | -.01       | .000       |                       |            |
|                            |                      |            |                            |          |                         |                            |            |            | R = .51 **            |            |
|                            |                      |            |                            |          |                         |                            |            |            | R <sup>2</sup> = .26  |            |
|                            |                      |            |                            |          |                         |                            |            |            | R <sup>2</sup> = .31  |            |
|                            |                      |            |                            |          |                         |                            |            |            | "                     |            |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

political basis of rewards ( $B = .18$ ), total amount of control ( $B = -.19$ ), slope of control ( $B = -.18$ ) and attraction ( $B = .14$ ) explained more than 28% of the total variance in the use of strong coercive tactics. In Textile Organizations, only five predictors, namely, job level ( $B = -.28$ ), slope of control ( $B = -.24$ ), political basis of rewards ( $B = .23$ ), total amount of control ( $B = -.17$ ) and coercive power ( $B = .16$ ) explained significantly the variance in the use of strong coercive tactics. They, together, explained more than 23% of the total variance.

Thus, individual characteristics, such as, low self esteem, fewer number of promotions, low commitment, greater attraction for superiors, which were associated with frequent use of strong coercive tactics in Engineering Organizations, were not found correlated in Textile Organizations. While low job level led to more use of the strong coercive tactics in the Textile Organizations, it led to less use of these tactics in the Engineering Organizations. However, greater politicalization of rewards, low total amount of control and less slope of control increased the use of strong coercive tactics in both types of organizations.

In case of weak coercive tactics also, the predictors in the two types of organizations explained significant amount of variance. The twelve predictors which entered the regression equation, together, accounted for 26% variance in the Engineering Organizations and 17% variance in the Textile Organizations. Number of promotions ( $B = -.21$ ) and slope of control ( $B = -.20$ ) were found to be significant predictors in the Textile Organizations.

It was found that fewer number of promotions and less steep slope of control (low influence discrepancy in top and bottom levels) led to the use of weak coercive tactics in Textile Organizations. In Engineering Organizations, political basis of rewards ( $B = .30$ ) was the first to enter. Other significant predictors were found to be commitment ( $B = -.19$ ), slope of control ( $B = -.19$ ) and total amount of control ( $B = -.17$ ). These predictors together explained about 22% of the total variance in the use of weak coercive tactics in Engineering Organizations.

Summary : The comparison of significant predictors of use of upward influence tactics in Engineering and Textile Organizations showed that the variables chosen did not explain the use of manipulative tactics in the Textile Organizations but they did so in the engineering Organizations. Only two predictors, namely, political basis of rewards and team orientation contributed significantly. The significant predictors of the use of strong coercive tactics and weak coercive tactics were different in the Engineering and Textile Organizations. They also differed in terms of relative importance and in some cases, in nature of relationship. In case of the Textile Organizations, use of strong coercive tactics was based on low job level, less steep control curve, political allocation of rewards and low amount of total control, while in the Engineering Organizations, the predictors which were more important were global self esteem, number of promotions received and commitment.

Intervening Effect of the Expectancy  
of success of Tactic Use

The twelve predictors which were found significant among the individual, interpersonal and organizational variables, namely, global self esteem, team orientation, commitment, job level, number of promotions, interpersonal attraction, organizational climate, political basis of rewards, union-management relations, total amount of control, slope of control and coercive power, were used in this analysis. Their selection was as follows. They were found associated with the exercise of upward influence and were used in stepwise regression analyses. As the purpose of the present analysis was to find out whether expectancy of success of a tactic influences the relationship between the use of a tactic and its various determinants, we decided to focus only on the significant correlates of tactic use.

It may be recalled that the model discussed earlier postulated that the expectancy of success of a tactic will intervene between the use of a tactic and individual, interpersonal and organizational variables. To examine this, we first computed zero-order correlations of the use of influence tactics with these twelve individual, interpersonal and organizational variables. Next, partial correlations between the above sets of variables were computed, after controlling for the effect of expectancy of success of influence tactics. The assumption was that if the expectancy of success acts as an intervening variable, then after parlialling out its effect the correlations between the use of that tactic and individual, interpersonal and organizational variables should change by a significant amount.

The twelve predictors were correlated with the expectancy of success of tactics, and expectancy of success of a tactic with its use. Zero order correlations between expectancy of success and use of tactics, and between expectancy of success of influence tactics and the twelve predictors are reported in Table 43 and 44. Partial correlations after controlling the expectancy of success are reported in Table 45.

Relationship Between Expectancy of success and Tactic use

It was found that the expectancy of success of a tactic was very strongly associated with the use of tactic. Remarkably all correlations varied between .57 to .69. Thus, a tactic was likely to be used more often to exercise upward influence to the extent it was expected to succeed (Table 43)

Relationship between Expectancy of Success of Upward Influence Tactics and the Individual Interpersonal and Organizational Variables.

Table 44 gives the correlations between expectancy of success of tactics and the individual, interpersonal and organizational variables. The table shows that expectancy of success ratings were largely a function of number of promotions received, interpersonal attraction, political basis of rewards and union-management relations. Allocation of rewards on political basis enhanced the expectancy of success of almost all the influence tactics except persuasion, while remaining variables had negative correlations with the expectancy of success. Among the other variables, job level was found to have positive correlations with expectancy of success of persuasion and negative with ingratiation, work obstruction and informal exchange. Organizational structure,

Table 43  
Zero-Order Correlations Between Expectancy of Success and Use of Tactic (N = 344)

| Name of Tactics          | Tactic Use       |                    |        |                          |                      |                |                     |                  |
|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------|---------------------|------------------|
|                          | Persua-<br>-sion | Ingra-<br>-tiation | Threat | Work<br>Obstru-<br>ction | Informal<br>exchange | Pressu-<br>res | Whistle-<br>blowing | Upward<br>Appeal |
| Expectancy<br>of Success | .57**            | .66**              | .62**  | .66**                    | .62**                | .63**          | .68**               | .69**            |

\* P < .01

Table 44

Zero-Correlations of Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables with the Expectancy of Success of Influence Tactics

| Variables                         | Persua-sion | Ingra-tiation | Threat | Work Ob-structi-on | Informal Exchange | Pressure | Whistle Blowing | Upward Appeal |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|---------------|--------|--------------------|-------------------|----------|-----------------|---------------|
| <u>Individual Characteristics</u> |             |               |        |                    |                   |          |                 |               |
| Global Self-Esteem                | -.04        | -.06          | -.07   | -.13*              | -.06              | -.07     | -.19**          | -.15**        |
| Team Orientation                  | -.20**      | -.11*         | -.07   | -.07               | -.05              | -.08     | -.09            | -.10          |
| Commitment                        | -.04        | -.08          | -.09   | -.08               | -.08              | -.02     | -.10            | -.01          |
| Job Level                         | .11*        | -.20**        | -.06   | -.18**             | -.17**            | -.09     | -.07            | -.04          |
| Number of Promotions              | -.09        | -.19**        | -.11*  | -.13*              | -.21**            | -.22**   | -.18**          | -.21**        |
| <u>Interpersonal Variables</u>    |             |               |        |                    |                   |          |                 |               |
| Attraction                        | .09         | -.27**        | -.14** | -.09               | -.17**            | -.17**   | -.12*           | -.10          |
| <u>Organizational Processes</u>   |             |               |        |                    |                   |          |                 |               |
| Organizational Climate            | .03         | -.27**        | -.16** | -.09               | -.14**            | -.27**   | -.10            | -.07          |
| Political Basis of Rewards        | -.01        | .39**         | .36**  | .19**              | .30**             | .39**    | .23**           | .19**         |
| U.M. Relations                    | -.07        | -.33**        | -.24** | -.14**             | -.18**            | -.33**   | -.18**          | -.15**        |
| <u>Organizational Structure</u>   |             |               |        |                    |                   |          |                 |               |
| Total amount of Control           | -.08        | -.12*         | -.10   | -.15**             | -.12*             | -.09     | -.10            | -.10          |
| Slope of Control                  | .09         | -.02          | -.08   | -.13*              | -.05              | -.07     | -.10            | -.05          |
| <u>Bases of Power</u>             |             |               |        |                    |                   |          |                 |               |
| Coercive Power                    | -.08        | .09           | .08    | .07                | .06               | .13      | .13             | .00           |

\*P < .05;

\*\*P < .01

bases of power and individual variables, such as, team orientation and commitment were generally not associated with the expectancy of success of influence tactics and in case they did associate, the correlations, in general, were quite weak.

So far as influence tactics are concerned, persuasion's expectancy of success was associated with individual characteristics, such as, team orientation and job level. The expectancy of success of coercive tactics, namely, threat, work obstruction, whistle blowing, upward appeal, informal exchange and pressure were largely associated with organizational processes, interpersonal attraction and number of promotions.

Relationship Between Tactics use and Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables After controlling for the Expectancy of Success.

Table 45 gives the zero-order and partial correlations of the use of upward influence tactics with various individual, interpersonal and organizational variables. The table shows that after the effect of the expectancy of success was partialled out from the relationship of the use of a tactic with individual, interpersonal and organizational variables, many of the partial correlations were found generally lower than the zero-order correlations. However, only some of the partial correlations were found to be statistically significant.

When the expectancy of success of influence tactics was controlled the significant zero-order correlations of the use of upward influence tactic(s) with organizational processes, interpersonal attraction and such individual characteristics as, team

Table 45

Zero-Order (*r*) and Partial Correlations (*r*12.3) of the Use of Upward Influence Tactics with Individual Interpersonal and Organizational Variables (N=268, df=n-p-1).

| Variables                         | Use of Upward Influence Tactics |              |               |                   |                   |          |                 |          |               |          |               |       |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------|---------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------|-----------------|----------|---------------|----------|---------------|-------|
|                                   | Persuasion                      | Ingratiation | Threat        | Work Obs-truction | Informal exchange | Pressure | Whistle blowing | Appeals  | Upward        |          |               |       |
| <i>r</i>                          | <i>r</i> 12.3                   | <i>r</i>     | <i>r</i> 12.3 | <i>r</i>          | <i>r</i> 12.3     | <i>r</i> | <i>r</i> 12.3   | <i>r</i> | <i>r</i> 12.3 | <i>r</i> | <i>r</i> 12.3 |       |
| <u>Individual Characteristics</u> |                                 |              |               |                   |                   |          |                 |          |               |          |               |       |
| Global Self Esteem                | -.02                            | -.04         | -.14*         | -.10              | -.22**            | -.20**   | -.23**          | -.16**   | -.14*         | -.09     | -.11          | -.09  |
| Team Orientation                  | -.20**                          | -.10         | -.12*         | -.10              | -.02              | .01      | -.10            | -.07     | -.09          | -.09     | -.05          | .01   |
| Commitment                        | -.10                            | -.12*        | -.15*         | -.12*             | -.12*             | -.08     | -.07            | -.03     | -.11          | -.06     | -.04          | -.05  |
| Job Level                         | -.05                            | -.01         | -.15*         | -.05              | -.10              | -.06     | -.09            | .02      | -.05          | .02      | -.03          | .00   |
| No. of Promotions                 | -.15*                           | -.09         | -.14*         | -.02              | -.13*             | -.10     | -.13*           | -.07     | -.16**        | -.07     | -.21*         | -.09  |
| <u>Interpersonal Variables</u>    |                                 |              |               |                   |                   |          |                 |          |               |          |               |       |
| Attraction                        | .08                             | .01          | -.18**        | .00               | -.12**            | .00      | -.09            | -.03     | -.13*         | -.05     | -.16**        | -.06  |
| <u>Organizational Processes</u>   |                                 |              |               |                   |                   |          |                 |          |               |          |               |       |
| Organizational Climate            | -.01                            | -.05         | -.09          | .09               | -.05              | .05      | -.07            | .02      | -.01          | .05      | -.13*         | .04   |
| Political Basis of Rewards        | .08                             | .07          | .29**         | .05               | .20**             | -.03     | .16**           | .06      | .15*          | .01      | .21**         | .02   |
| U.M. Relations                    | -.11                            | -.09         | -.20**        | .00               | -.13*             | .07      | -.12*           | -.02     | -.07          | .03      | -.20**        | -.03  |
| <u>Organizational Structure</u>   |                                 |              |               |                   |                   |          |                 |          |               |          |               |       |
| Total Amount of Control           | -.03*                           | -.13*        | -.12*         | -.06              | -.18**            | -.13*    | -.15*           | -.06     | -.11          | -.09     | -.07          | -.03  |
| Slope of Control                  | .00                             | -.05         | -.04          | -.04              | -.13*             | -.13*    | -.17**          | -.13*    | -.15*         | -.15*    | -.15*         | -.15* |
| Bases of Power                    | -.06                            | -.02         | .07           | .02               | .05               | .00      | .07             | .02      | .15*          | .13*     | .18**         | .12*  |
| Coercive Power                    |                                 |              |               |                   |                   |          |                 |          |               |          | .06           | -.03  |
|                                   |                                 |              |               |                   |                   |          |                 |          |               |          |               | -.02  |
|                                   |                                 |              |               |                   |                   |          |                 |          |               |          |               | -.04  |

orientation, job level and number of promotions became non-significant. The number of promotions and union-management relations had significant negative and political basis of rewards had significant positive zero-order correlations with the use of most of the upward influence tactics. However, when the expectancy of success of these tactics were controlled the correlations dropped to almost zero. Similarly, significant negative correlations had been found between interpersonal attraction and the use of the tactics of ingratiation, threat, informal exchange and pressures. After parlialling out the effect of the expectancy of success of these tactics, correlations dropped almost to zero. This was also true in case of team-orientation and job level. This suggests that the expectancy of success of the influence tactics, in general, intervened between the relationship or its use with organizational processes, interpersonal attraction and some individual characteristics, such as, team orientation, job level and number of promotions received.

The expectancy of success of the influence tactics was not found to be generally intervening between the relationship of tactic use with organizational structure, bases of power and some individual characteristics, such as, global self-esteem and commitment. Slope of control was found to have significant negative correlations with the use of all the influence tactics, except persuasion and ingratiation. However, when the expectancy of success of these tactics was controlled the correlations did not show any change. Similarly, coercive base of power had significant positive zero-order correlations with informal exchange and

pressure tactics. After controlling for the expectancy of success of these tactics, the partial correlations were not found very different from their respective zero-order correlations. The same was also largely true for global self-esteem and total amount of control. Significant negative correlations were found between the global self-esteem and the use of upward influence tactics, except for persuasion and pressures. When the expectancy of success of these influence tactics were controlled, partial correlations in case of strong coercive tactics, namely, threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing did not differ from their zero-order correlations. However, in case of global self-esteem and total amount of control, the expectancy of success was found intervening between the relationship of the use of ingratiation and upward appeal with these variables, but its influence was less stronger. Thus it appears that organizational structure, bases of power and such individual characteristics as, commitment and global self-esteem were directly related with the use of these tactics.

Summary : Partial correlation results indicated that, on the whole, the expectancy of success of a tactic intervened between the tactic use and organizational processes, interpersonal attraction and some of the individual characteristics, such as, team orientation, job level and number of promotion. In case of organizational structure, bases of power and such individual characteristics as, commitment and global self-esteem, the expectancy of success did not appear to intervene or did so less strongly.

SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS

- (I) Ingratiation and persuasion were perceived as the most successful and most frequently used influence tactics by the subordinates, whereas threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing were perceived as less successful and less frequently used influence tactics by the subordinates to influence their superiors.
- (II) The use of upward influence tactics in Public Organizations differed significantly from Private Organizations and in the Textile Organizations from the Engineering Organizations. In Public Sector Organizations, subordinates made significantly more use of all the eight influence tactics in comparison to Private Organizations. In the Textile Organizations, except for the strong Coercive tactics, other influence tactics were used significantly more as compared to the Engineering Organizations.
- (III) No differences in the use of influence tactics were found across hierarchical levels and between departments. However, it was found that workers exercised more overall influence and made significantly more frequent use of ingratiation tactics than supervisors and managers.
- (IV) Union management relations, political basis of rewards and punishments and number of promotions consistently significantly correlated with all the upward influence tactics, i.e., manipulative, strong coercive and weak coercive tactics, across hierarchical levels and also in different types of organizations.

- (V) Manipulative tactics were correlated more frequently with individual characteristics, such as, team orientation, job level, showing off, commitment, number of promotions and interpersonal attraction. Some organizational process variables, such as, politicalization of rewards and punishments and union management relations were also associated with the use of manipulative tactics. Their relationships with manipulative tactics were generally negative, except in case of political basis of rewards and punishments.
- (VI) The use of strong and weak coercive tactics was found more frequently correlated with organizational structure and process variables, such as, political basis of rewards and punishments, union management relations, total amount of control, slope of control and control of unions. Individual characteristics, such as, global self esteem, self perception of power and commitment were found related with the use of strong coercive tactics only, while number of promotions was found related with the use of both strong and weak coercive tactics. Among these variables, political basis of rewards and punishments, control of unions and self-perception of power correlated positively, while other variables correlated negatively with the use of coercive influence tactics.
- (VII) The nature of relationship of individual, interpersonal and organizational variables with the use of various upward influence tactics was found to be the same in case of workers and managers but was different for supervisors.

(VIII) The correlations of the use of influence tactics with most of the individual characteristics and organizational variables were not significant in the Private Organizations and for supervisors.

- (IX) Results of stepwise regression analyses revealed that political basis of rewards, team orientation and union-management relations were significant predictors of manipulative tactics. Political basis of rewards was also a significant predictor of the use of strong and weak coercive tactics. Slope of control, total amount of control and number of promotions were the other significant predictors of the use of both strong and weak coercive tactics. Global self esteem predicted the use of strong coercive tactics but did not predict the use of weak coercive tactics. While political basis of rewards was found associated with the greater use of tactics, other predictors were found associated with lack of tactic use.
- (X) None of the individual, interpersonal and organizational variables, except number of promotions in case of strong coercive tactics, was found a significant predictor of the use of upward influence tactics in the Private Sector Organizations.
- (XI) None of the individual, interpersonal and organizational variables predicted the use of manipulative tactics in case of supervisors and Textile Organizations.

(XII) Expectancy of success was found, in general, intervening between the use of the tactic and interpersonal variables, organizational processes and some of the individual characteristics, such as, team orientation, job level and number of promotions, but did not in case of global self esteem, commitment, bases of power and organizational structure variables.

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**Chapter IV : DISCUSSION**

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### DISCUSSION

The coalition models of intraorganizational behaviour (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Cyert & March, 1963; Pfeffer, 1978; Pfeffer & Salancik & Leblebici, 1976) hold that organizational decision making is not rational. Who gets what and how much depends on one's power and influence within the organization. The conditions of resource scarcity, uncertainty due to decision making process, and power motivation lead organizational members (especially, at lower levels) to continuously come into conflict, negotiate and contest. They use different forms of tactics, such as, persuasion, ingratiation threat, work-obstruction, informal exchanges and pressures to influence the actions and decisions of persons who significantly affect their outcomes (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980).

The present study was carried out against this perspective of intraorganizational behaviour. Exercise of upward influence was examined in the context of a situation involving promotional opportunity. The situation studied was personal in nature rather than organizational, as it was concerned with the careers of organizational members. The form of upward influence exercised in a personal situation is quite different from the form of influence exercised in an organizational situation (Kipnis, et al., 1980). In important personal situations upward influence attempts are more pervasive, calculative and political than in organizational situations.

In this study, four basic issues related to upward influence process were examined. Firstly, we examined the most common upward influence tactics of subordinates. Secondly, the role of the

individual, interpersonal and organizational factors in the use of influence tactics was also studied. Thirdly, we examined the use of influence tactics across hierarchies, departments and the type of organizations. Lastly, the role of expectancy of success in the use of tactics was investigated to determine the extent to which the relationship between individual, interpersonal and organizational factors and the use of upward influence tactics was contingent on the expectancy of success.

The findings of the study suggested that the ingratiation and persuasion were the most frequently used upward influence tactics. Whereas, Threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing were found to be relatively less frequently used. Among the personal characteristics global self-esteem, team orientation and number of promotions received were found to be the best predictors of the use of upward influence tactics. Two organizational process variables, namely, political basis of rewards and union management relations were similarly found to be significant. Two organizational structural variables, i.e., total amount of control and slope of control were also found to be important predictors of the use of influence tactics. The use of upward influence tactics differed significantly across organizations but it did not vary across hierarchies and departments. The relationships of interpersonal variables, organizational process variables and some of the individual characteristics, such as, team orientation, job level and number of promotions with upward influence tactics use were, in general, mediated by the expectancy of success of the tactics. The expectancy of success of a tactic did not influence the relationship of tactic use with global self esteem (in case of strong

coercive tactics), coercive power and slope of control.

The more frequent use of persuasion and ingratiation tactics and less frequent use of strong coercive tactics, such as, threat, work obstruction and whistle blowing by subordinates to influence superiors has been consistently reported (Kipnis, et al., 1980). These results may be explained in terms of the situation involving upward influence and also within the subjective expected utility theory of Edwards (1954, 1961). The situation used in this study for studying exercise of upward influence was such in which the outcome was important for the person exercising influence. Researches done by Kipnis, et al. (1984, 1980) point out that managers, in order to secure personal benefits from a superior, often use "soft" words and engage in impression management and ingratiation. Research evidence suggests that manipulative tactics also have a higher expectancy of success (Pandey, 1980 b) because they are less likely to evoke reactance (Brehm, 1966) and the likelihood of favourable outcomes is higher in their case (Kipnis & Vanderveer, 1971). The strong coercive tactics, on the other hand, have low expectancy of success because their use invites stronger retaliations and punishments (Parmerlee, et al., 1982; Tjosvold, 1974) and decreases the chances for favourable outcomes resulting from the target of influence (Kipnis & Vanderveer, 1971).

Many psychological theories, such as, expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), subjective expected utility theory (Edward, 1954, 1961) and decision making theory (Pollard & Mitchell, 1972) are

based on the premise that behaviour of individuals in organization is a function of perceived consequences. Behaviours which have been rewarded in the past are more probable behaviours in the future. Organizational members undertake a series of subjective cost/benefit analyses in deciding about the appropriate tactics. They use available informations, such as, the results of their past attempts at social influence on which the perceived probability of success of chosen behaviours is based. Behaviours which have a high probability of success are likely to be used more often than the behaviours which have a low probability of success. This view gets support from the results of the present study. The most frequently used tactics of ingratiation and persuasion had higher mean scores on the probability of success, whereas, less frequently used coercive tactics were found to have lower mean scores. The most frequent use of ingratiation tactics may also be due to social legitimacy accorded to ingratiation in the Indian context. It is argued that the Indian society being traditional, feudal and hierachial encourages ingratiation (Pandey, 1981). Further, Indian people are found high on such personal values as aram, dependence proneness and preference for personal relations (Sinha & Sinha, 1974) which are conducive for exercising influence attempts involving ingratiation. Whether preference for ingratiation in exercising upward influence is due to its higher probability of success or due to cultural factors calls for further investigation.

Another major concern of this study was to investigate the role of individual, interpersonal and organizational factors in determining the use of upward influence tactics. For this purpose,

we explored significant correlates and predictors of the influence tactics. Our comparisons of significant predictors and correlates across hierarchies and type of organizations indicated that global self esteem, team orientation and number of the promotions received from individual variables, political basis of rewards and union-management relations from organizational processes and the total amount of control and slope of control from organizational structural variables predicted significantly the use of upward influence tactics. It was also found that some variables, such as, perception of self power, commitment, interpersonal attraction, formalization, and control of unions were largely associated with the use of upward influence tactics, although, they did not significantly contribute to the prediction of these tactics.

One important finding of this study was the important role played by global self-esteem in the exercise of upward influence. Global self-esteem correlated negatively with the use of strong coercive tactics. This supported our hypothesis that higher self-esteem will be associated with less frequent use of coercive influence tactics. It is contended that special education, skills, experience and an ability to communicate with others are requisites for successful use of non-coercive power (Tedeschi, Gaes & Rivera, 1977). Individuals with high self-esteem possess these characteristics which enable them to develop feelings of adequacy, self confidence in influencing decisions and a sense of power. These qualities, perhaps, predispose individuals with high self-esteem to use non-coercive tactics more than the coercive tactics. Two important characteristics associated

with high self-esteem, namely, internal control orientation (Goodstadt & Hjelle, 1973) and self confidence in one's ability to successfully influence (Gamson, 1968; Kipnis & Lane, 1962; Mowday, 1979) have been found positively associated with the use of non-coercive influence tactics and negatively associated with the use of coercive influence tactics. On the other hand, a sense of powerlessness associated with low self-esteem has been found related with one's willingness to use strong coercive influence tactics more frequently to redress grievances (Kerner Commission Report on Civil Disorders, 1968; Ransford, 1968). It is found that the greater use of strong coercive tactics makes low self-esteem individuals to feel that they are capable and strong (Berger, 1973; Kipnis, 1976; Kite, 1964) and it also frees them from the deeply ingrained feelings of inferiority. Thus, it appears that a strong desire to regain their lost self-image pre-disposes low self-esteem individuals to initiate coercive influence attempts. Tedeschi, et al. (1977) report that after engaging in property riots during the middle 60's, a substantial number of young Blacks in the U.S. expressed an increased sense of pride and manhood. However, it was also observed that after Black Americans gained social status, they often complied to the laws and norms of the society just like any other average middle class White American.

Another important individual characteristic which influenced the exercise of upward influence was the value placed on team orientation. Greater importance given to team work was found associated with less frequent use of manipulative tactics, such as, ingratiation and persuasion. It appears that belief in team

orientation strengthens one's tendency for participativeness, maintenance of group solidarity and team spirit and, therefore, for making direct positive influence attempts. Since manipulation is a political tactic which is used to achieve success, its use for upward influence induces a sense of doubt and suspicion in group members' minds towards the agent of influence. It also invites individual competition. These consequences, resulting from the use of manipulative tactics, in turn, destroy the team spirit and the feeling to which team oriented persons attach great importance. A person who gives great importance to team work, therefore, may not engage political manoeuvering of his superiors by employing manipulative tactics, especially ingratiation.

The findings regarding larger number of promotions leading to low use of upward influence tactics, particularly coercive, can be understood within the mixed framework of reciprocity aspect of the social exchange theory (Gouldner, 1960) and the face saving rationale of conflict spiral theory (Deutsch & Krass, 1962). It can be assumed that a person who has received a large number of promotions would also be higher on job level. He may have also received a number of monetary and non-monetary rewards. According to the social exchange theory (Gouldner, 1960), such a person following the norms of reciprocity will desist from making coercive upward influence attempts. Similarly, upward coercive influence attempts may also create face saving situations for the superiors. Research evidence suggests that coercion by immediate subordinate leads to loss of face of high status person (Tjosvold, 1974). They, therefore,

become more concerned about appearing strong and capable to the person lower in organizational hierarchy (Kelly, 1965). The use of coercion by subordinates in higher job levels may be taken as a potential threat to organizational stability and, therefore, will be met with stronger retaliation in the form of demotion, suspension and even termination of services (Parmerlee, et al., 1982). Probable negative consequences of coercive influence attempts combined with the norm of reciprocity, perhaps, may be responsible for less frequent use of the coercive tactics in exercising upward influence in such cases.

Two organizational process variables, namely, political basis of rewards and union-management relations appeared as the most significant predictors of the use of upward influence tactics. Good union management relations reduced the use of manipulative tactics. On the other hand, political basis of rewards was associated with greater use of manipulative, as well as, coercive influence tactics. The increase in the use of manipulative and coercive influence tactics associated with greater politicalization of rewards appears to be a result of increased ambiguity, apprehension of injustice and the learning of informal political norms of behaviour. Extraneous considerations (other than performance) in the allocation of rewards should enhance a sense of ambiguity regarding who is going to get what and how much? When the goal sought is important, such as, promotion in our case, organizational members are not likely to remain silent spectators of decision making process. They would actively try to increase their control over the decision making process to maximize their gains (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). If organizational members find that rewards are given more frequently

to those who can ingratiate, pressurise, informally exchange benefits in cash or kind, and issue effective threats, the instrumental value of such behaviours will go up in the eyes of members. It may be argued that learning of these informal norms of behaviours, which Porter, et al (1981) call the political norms of behaviours, under conditions of high ambiguity and apprehension of impending injustice due to politicalization of rewards, should result in the more frequent use of manipulative, as well as, coercive tactics by subordinates to influence their superiors (Thibaut & Kelley 1959).

It was also found that poor union and management relations were associated with more frequent use of manipulative tactics to influence superiors. What may be the reasons for this ? We propose that poor union-management relations indicate the presence of greater conflicts and less cooperation between the union and the management. In any work organization, organizational members consider unions as protectors of their interests in the organization, and union president as their patron. Under conditions of conflict and less cooperation between the union and the management, unions become less effective in protecting the interests of their members. Also due to conflict there is greater degree of uncertainty about the union succeeding in influencing outcomes in favour of their members. This, then, leads to individual efforts being made to protect one's interests in the organization. Under these circumstances, manipulative tactics, such as, ingratiation which have a higher probability of success are resorted to. There is also evidence to suggest that under conditions of greater interpersonal conflicts and stresses loyal workers can expect to be rewarded more frequently than the workers considered

neutrals (Kipnis & Vanderveer, 1971).

Among the organizational structure variables, indicators of organizational control came out as the most potent predictors of the use of coercive upward influence tactics. With greater total amount of control and steeper slope of control, the use of both, strong, as well as, weak coercive tactics went down. On surface, these results may appear contradictory as greater total amount of control is indicative of a democratic structure, whereas, steeper control of an authoritarian structure. Why then the use of coercive tactics should go down under both the conditions ? It appears that under the conditions of mutual influence different parties are more concerned with maintaining their existing power base. Therefore, they avoid those tactical actions which have the slightest possibility of resulting in loss of power. Since the use of coercive influence tactics through action and counteraction ultimately results in power reduction of the parties, the two parties (subordinates/or superiors) therefore, desist from using coercive tactics against each other. This interpretation is suggested by the concept of deterrence used within the framework of subjective utility theory (Morgan, 1977; Schelling, 1966). The theory suggests that greater the potential of conflicting parties, less will be the use of coercion (Morgan, 1977). Also, within an organization, coalitions that are highly dependent on one another should be less inclined to use coercion in their influence attempts due to non-utilitarian consequences of coercion (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980).

So far as the slope of control is concerned, it appears that as the centralization of power increases the magnitude and credibility of structural threats, i.e., threats of superiors are also increased (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). This decreases the use of coercive influence tactics in subordinates, who perceive that they have no power or very little power in comparison to their superiors (Tedeschi, Schlenker & Lindskold, 1972). Greater total amount of control in the organization should deter subordinates from using coercive influence tactics due to their strong desire to maintain equality of power. Under the conditions of steeper slope of control subordinates should desist from using coercive tactics due to the fear of retaliation from superiors.

Another important concern of the present study was to examine the use of upward influence tactics and differences across hierarchies and the type of organizations. In general, results relating to the use of influence tactics pertaining to hierarchy, did not support our hypothesis that workers will use more coercive tactics than supervisors and managers. But we did find that workers exercised more overall influence. Differences in influence attempts across positions have been reported in some earlier studies of Madison, etc. al. (1980). They found that staff positions, i.e., workers were perceived more engaged in political influence attempts than the managers.

The question of why workers exercised more overall influence than supervisors and managers led us to investigate the individual and organizational factors on which workers differed significantly

from managers and supervisors. Mean comparisons were made across workers, supervisors and managers. The mean comparisons indicated that while workers significantly differed from managers on a number of individual and organizational variables (Appendix - C(i)) no striking differences on these variables, except on demographic characteristics, were found between workers and supervisors (Appendix - C(ii)).

The demographic characteristics on which differences were obtained between workers and managers were job level, monthly salary, number of promotions, age and experience which are covariants of the positions in industrial organizations. Workers low monthly salary and fewer number of promotions may have been responsible for their economic frustrations. Lower age and experience levels suggest the possibility of low degree of integration of personal values with organizational values (Tripathi, 1982). Low levels of interpersonal trust, lack of performance basis of rewards and supervisory support, perhaps, result in greater apprehension of injustice and uncertainty in resource distribution. All of these in association with a sense of job security may motivate workers to exercise more influence in organizations than supervisors and managers. The perception of threats and uncertainties has been found associated with increase in influence motivation in many earlier studies (Cohen, 1959; Horowitz, 1958; Scotland, 1959).

A somewhat intriguing finding of this study was that most of the organizational and personal variables which significantly correlated and predicted the use of upward influence tactics for workers and managers, did not predict or correlate with influence

tactics in case of supervisors. One obvious reason for this could be that these results are not reliable because of the low sample size of the supervisors. They will have to be cross validated in other studies. Nevertheless, to the extent they are different they do invite our attention. The group of supervisors has been found to yield different results in the Textile industry in another study (Tiwari, 1984). Many of the relationships, in case of supervisors, such as, between the value placed on showing off, job level, interpersonal trust and total amount of control and the use of tactics were opposite in direction compared to the relationships found for workers and managers. This suggests the possibility that supervisors, as indicated by control graph studies, experience a sense of powerlessness (Tiwari, 1984). It appears that this sense of powerlessness and helplessness in them influenced their perceptions of the influence situation in characteristically different way as compared to workers and managers, who experience and exercise more control in organizations in comparison with the supervisors.

The role of organizational context also appears to be important in the use of influence tactics in organizations (Ansari & Kapoor, 1986; Erez & Rim, 1982). This was evident from the fact that employees in the Textile and Public Sector Organizations made significantly greater use of influence tactics than employees in the Engineering and Private Sector Organizations. The difference in the use of upward influence tactics across organizations may have been due to the differences in the characteristics of its employees and the characteristics of the organizations associated with organizational structure and process.

Textile Organizations differed significantly from Engineering Organizations (Appendix-D(i)) and Public Sector Organizations from the Private Sector Organizations on a number of individual and organizational variables (Appendix-D(ii)). Textile Organizations as compared to Engineering Organizations, and Public Sector Organizations as compared to Private Sector Organizations, were characterized by low self-esteem, lower age levels, low levels of experience, fewer promotional opportunities, greater degree of politicalization of rewards and punishments, low bases of referent and expert power and poor union-management relations. Both, Textile, as well as, Public Sector Organizations also had greater number of workers belonging to the high caste. These mean comparisons, as discussed earlier, suggest greater uncertainty and apprehension of injustice in resource allocation, greater economic frustrations (due to perceived inequity), greater union-management and interpersonal conflicts, less supportive interpersonal relations, less integration of personal and organizational values in the Public Sector and Textile Organizations as compared to the Private Sector and Engineering Organizations. These results do not surprise us. A number of studies done in India have found that Public Sector Organizations are characterised by low morale of managers (Das, 1978), lack of autonomy in managerial matters (Paranjpe, 1979), feeling of insecurity among managers (Das, 1978), and high political interference (Paranjpe, 1980). These characteristics are also found in the Textile Organizations included in the present study, all of which belong to the Public Sector. Our contention is that the presence of these characteristics in the Textile and Public Sector Organizations, perhaps, dilutes the traditional hierachial control structure of the organizations. Thus, as stated above, greater uncertainty and apprehension of

injustice, greater economic frustrations, dominance of high caste, less integration of personal values with organizational values, less interpersonal trust and support and greater interpersonal conflicts in the Public Sector and Textile Organizations, under the conditions of weak hierarchical control, appear to be the reasons responsible for the greater use of manipulative and coercive upward influence tactic in the Public Sector and Textile Organizations compared to Private Sector and Engineering Organizations.

Another finding related to the Public Sector Organizations needs to be commented upon. It was found that except in case of a few individual and organizational process variables, such as, commitment, number of promotions and political basis of rewards and punishments, other variables were generally not associated with the use of influence tactics. Also, except for the number of promotions received, which predicted the use of strong coercive tactics, no other variable contributed significantly to the prediction of the use of upward influence tactics. Because the number of respondents from the Private Organizations were quite low one may not lay a great deal of credence on this. Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that the nature of two Private Organizations selected for this study were different. One of the Private Organizations was of corporate nature, while the other one was a family run organization in which majority of the employees belonged to a particular minority community, similar to the religious affiliation of the owner of the organization. A large number of workers were relatives of each other. Also, a number of high ranking officers were directly or indirectly related to the owner of the

organization. Thus, the different nature of these two Private Organizations could have influenced the emergence of any systematic trend. However, this will have to be verified in future studies.

The model of the study, as discussed in Chapter-I, envisaged that the expectancy of success of the influence tactics will intervene between the relationship of its use with individual, interpersonal and organizational variables. Partial correlations indicated that the expectancy of success of influences tactics appeared to intervene between the relationships of interpersonal variables, organizational processes and most of the individual variables, namely, team orientation, job level, and the number of promotions received with the use of influence tactics. The partial correlations were significantly lower than zero order correlations in these cases. However, after partialling out the effects of expectancy of the success from the relationships of the global self-esteem(in case of strong coercive tactics), commitment, slope of control and coercive power with use of upward influence tactics, partial correlations were not found to go down or up as compared to the zero-order correlations. Therefore, it appears that the expectancy of success did not act as an intervening variable in these cases. Stable personality characteristics, such as, global self-esteem leads individuals to behave in a characteristic manner irrespective of other influences. The support for this conjecture comes from the studies of Falbo (1977) and Mowday (1979). Falbo (1977) found that the power strategies that students reported they characteristically used to 'get their way' were related to several

personality dimensions (e.g., conformity, Machiavellianism).

Mowday (1979) also found that several leader personality characteristics (e.g., need for power and need for achievement) were directly related with the likelihood of using different methods of influence. So far as the direct relationship of coercive base of power with the use of negative influence tactics is concerned, it may be argued that the use of coercive base of power by superiors to influence subordinates induces strong hostility, aggression and a tendency for reactive use of power in subordinates towards superiors which, in turn, may result in consistent and frequent use of coercive influence tactic by subordinates to influence superiors, irrespective of the probability of success of these tactics. Thus, except in few cases, the expectancy of success of a tactic generally intervened between tactic use and most of the individual, interpersonal and organizational process variables. However, our hypothesis relating to the role of expectancy of success of a tactic, acting as an intervening variables, was not supported in full.

Nevertheless, the theoretical model which dealt with antecedent variables and the use of upward influence tactics by subordinates was generally supported by the results obtained in this study.

#### Limitations of the Study

Like any other study, the present study too has certain limitations. Firstly, the study is primarily based on perceptual measures. We are also aware of the fact that most of the upward influence attempts, if not all, are political and that political aspects of behaviour are something which are denied by its members,

even though they engage in it, because of their social undersirability (Porter, et al., 1981). We, therefore, adopted the indirect attributional method to measure the use of upward influence tactics. During the course of interviews it was noted that many respondents were able to guess that their own behaviour was being studied. This may have caused defensiveness in the respondents and may have biased their reporting of the use of upward influence tactics to some extent. The upward influence behaviours, in this study, were examined in the context of only one type of situation. Generalizations across situations, therefore, are not possible. Our initial plan was to study upward influence behaviours within each organizations, irrespective of hierarchical levels. The Supervisors and Private Orgaizations, therefore, were not properly represented in the sample. Comparisons across hierarchies and the type of organizations have been made based on these inadequate sample sizes.

#### Future Directions of Research

As stated above, even indirect attributional method of measuring upward influence behaviours is not free from problems. Some other methods, such as, participant observation, diaries and interviews could be tried in future studies. Organizational members, in general, do not want to commit themselves in black and white because of their rational and irrational fears. Indian workers and managers also do not consider the survey type of studies of any value to them or to the organization. If they answer questions, they do so to help the researcher and not because they want to vent their true feelings. The results pertaining to supervisors and Private Organizations suggest that the comparisons

across hierarchies and the type of organizations need to be made more systematically.

This study also raises a number of questions which can be pursued in future studies. For example, do supervisors actually differ in their perception about the use of tactics from workers and managers ? Secondly, why it is that organizational structure and process variables are not found associated with the exercise of upward influence in Private Organizations ? Is it that they do not contribute to the use of upward influence tactics or certain variables mask their influences ? These questions may be studied through proper selection of the sample of respondents from various hierarchical levels and different types of organizations.

The present study also suggests several other important directions for future research on exercise of upward influence in organizations. Unlike the present study, future studies may attempt to examine the use of influence tactics in different situational contexts, both personal and organizational, as individuals appear to take situational factor into account in making assessment of the effectiveness of different tactics. Further, as discussed elsewhere, organizations also differ in terms of feelings of demoralization, insecurity which their workers have and degree of political interference. This is particularly true when one compares Public Sector and Private Sector Organizations. These differences are also found in other types organizations. The overall political climate of organizations may be an important determinant of the exercise of influence in organizations and should

be studied. Further, the interactional effect of various individual, interpersonal and organizational variables on the use of upward influence tactics by subordinates should also be studied.

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**R E F E R E N C E S**

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**APPENDICES**

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## APPENDIX - A

### Measures

#### Individual Characteristics

All the items of measures of 'power and self-esteem' and 'personal values' were answered on the 5-point Likert type scales, given below. Whereas demographic information relating to 'personal background' and 'organizational background' was collected on open-ended questions.

|         |    |             |      |           |
|---------|----|-------------|------|-----------|
| बहुत कम | कम | न कम न अधिक | अधिक | बहुत अधिक |
| 1       | 2  | 3           | 4    | 5         |

#### Power and Self-esteem

##### Self-Power (Coefficient Alpha .70)

1. आपके सुपरवाइजर यदि कोई ऐसा निर्णय लेते हैं जो आपको या आपके काम को प्रभावित करता है तो निर्णय लेने के पहले, वह आपके विचारों का कहाँ तक ध्यान रखते हैं ?
2. आप कहाँ तक ऐसा सोचते हैं कि आप अपने उच्चाधिकारियों से वह काम करवा सकते हैं जिनको वे सामान्यतया नहीं करना चाहेंगे ?
3. आप कहाँ तक ऐसा सोचते हैं कि आप अपने सुपरवाइजर से उनके निर्णयों को अपने हक में बदलवा सकते हैं ?

##### Other's Power (Coefficient Alpha .50)

1. यदि आप कुछ ऐसा करते हैं जो आपके सुपरवाइजर को या उनके काम को प्रभावित करता है तो ऐसा करने के पूर्व, आप अपने सुपरवाइजर का ध्यान कहाँ तक रखते हैं ?

2. आप अपने सुपरवाइजर के कहने पर उन कार्यों को कहाँ तक करेंगे जिनको आप सामान्यतया नहीं करना चाहेंगे ।
3. आपके सुपरवाइजर आप द्वारा लिये गये किसी निर्णय को कहाँ तक बदल सकते हैं ?

#### Need for Power (Coefficient Alpha, .83)

आप कहाँ तक इस बात की कोशिश करते हैं कि -

1. आपको अपने समूह के नेतृत्व में महत्वपूर्ण स्थान प्राप्त हो
2. आपके साथी वैसा ही करें जैसा कि आप स्वयं करते हैं या चाहते हैं
3. आपको दूसरों की क्रियाओं को संगठित एवं निर्दिशित करने का अवसर प्राप्त हो
4. आप जिस समूह में कार्य कर रहे हैं उसका संचालन स्वयं करें
5. विभागीय मसलों में किसी निर्णय के पूर्व, आपकी भी राय ली जाये
6. अपने कार्य स्थल पर आस पास की घटनाओं के ऊपर आपका और अधिक नियंत्रण (Control) हो

#### Global Self-esteem (Coefficient, .40)

आप अपने बारे में कहाँ तक ऐसा महसूस करते हैं कि -

1. आप उतने ही महत्वपूर्ण आदमी हैं जितना कि अन्य लोग
2. आप अच्छे आदमी हैं
3. आपके पास अपने ऊपर गर्व करने के लिए कुछ विशेष नहीं हैं
4. आपका जीवन बहुत काम का नहीं है

#### Occupational Self-esteem (Coefficient Alpha, .40)

आप अपने बारे में कहाँ तक ऐसा महसूस करते हैं कि -

1. आपके अच्छे काम के कारण लोग बहुत इज्जत करते हैं
2. आपको जो भी काम दिया जाता है, उसे आप बिना किसी और की मदद के आसानी से कर लेते हैं
3. जो काम आपको दिया गया है, उसे ठीक से करने के लिये आपको और प्रशिक्षण की आवश्यकता है
4. आप उतना काम नहीं कर पाते हैं, जितना आपके अन्य साथी कर लेते हैं

### Personal Values

Six personal values, i.e. aram, dependence proneness preference for personal relations, team-orientation, commitment and showing off were measured respectively with six following items:-

व्यक्ति कई तरह से जिन्दगी जी सकता है। प्रत्येक व्यक्ति अलग अलग तरह से जिन्दगी जीने को अलग-अलग महत्व देता है। नीचे जो कथन दिये गये हैं उनका उददेश्य यह जानना है कि कौन व्यक्ति किस तरह की जिन्दगी को कितना महत्व देता है? आप प्रत्येक कथन को ध्यानपूर्वक पढ़ें तथा बतायें कि आप स्वयं उस तरह की जिन्दगी को कितना महत्व देते हैं?

1. मजेदार, आराम और शान्ति की जिन्दगी
2. ऐसी जिन्दगी, जिसमें आप ऐसे बहुत से लोगों से परिचित हों, जिनसे आप अपने किसी काम में मदद ले सकते हैं, सलाह मशविरा कर सकते हैं तथा जो आपके दुख दर्द में हाथ बैटाने के लिए सदा तैयार रहें।
3. एक तरह से सम्पन्न जिन्दगी, जिसमें आपके बहुत से प्रभावशाली दोस्त तथा पहचान वाले हों।
4. एक ऐसी जिन्दगी, जिसमें व्यक्ति स्वतंत्र रूप से अकेले कार्य कर सके। उसे दूसरे लोगों के साथ मिलकर काम न करना पड़े, जिसमें "वाह वाही" वे लोग भी ले जाते हैं जो काम नहीं करते।
5. एक स्वच्छन्द जिन्दगी, जिसमें किसी प्रकार की अनावश्यक जिम्मेदारी न हो।
6. ऐसी जिन्दगी, जो प्रभावशाली (असरदार) हो। जिसकी एक खास छाँबि, प्रतिष्ठाएवं ख्याति हो जिनको हर हालत में बनाये रखा जाये। ऐसी जिन्दगी, जिससे लोग ईर्ष्या करें।

### Personal Background

1. आयु ..... वर्ष ..... माह
2. शिक्षा .....
3. जाति .....
4. आपके परिवार कीकुल वार्षिक आय .....

### Organizational Background

1. पद का नाम .....
2. आपका मासिक वेतन .....
3. आपने इस प्रतिष्ठान में कब से काम शुरू किया ?  
..... वर्ष ..... माह ..... दिन
4. आपने इस प्रतिष्ठान में किन-किन पदों पर काम किया। विवरण दें।

|           |             |
|-----------|-------------|
| पद का नाम | कब से कब तक |
| 1. ....   | .....       |
| 2. ....   | .....       |
| 3. ....   | .....       |
| 4. ....   | .....       |
| 5. ....   | .....       |
5. आपका कुल कार्य अनुभव कितना है। द्व्यवर्षीय तथा माह में लिखिये १

### Interpersonal Relations

Items measuring two interpersonal variables, namely, attraction and trust between superior and subordinate were answered on 5-point Likert type scales, given below:-

|         |    |             |      |           |
|---------|----|-------------|------|-----------|
| बहुत कम | कम | न कम न अधिक | अधिक | बहुत अधिक |
| 1       | 2  | 3           | 4    | 5         |

### Attraction (Coefficient Alpha, .84)

1. आप अपने सुपरवाइजर को कितना पसन्द करते हैं ?
2. आपको अपने सुपरवाइजर के साथ काम करने में कहाँ तक अच्छा लगता है ?

### Trust (Coefficient Alphas, .82)

आप अपने सुपरवाइजर (Immediate Boss) से कहाँ तक ऐसी आशा रखते हैं कि -

1. यदि आपको अपने काम में कोई कठिनाई आयेगी तो वे उसे दूर करने में आपकी पूरी मदद करेंगे ?
2. वे आपके साथ कोई अन्याय नहीं करेंगे ?
3. यदि आप उनसे कोई बात कहेंगे तो वे आपकी बात पर अवश्य ध्यान देंगे ?
4. यदि आप उनसे कोई अपना व्यक्तिगत काम करने के लिए कहते हैं तो वे उसे करने की पूरी कोशिश करेंगे ?
5. यदि आपसे अपने काम में कोई गलती हो जाती है तो वे उसकी चर्चा दूसरों के सामने नहीं करेंगे ?
6. वे जान बूझकर आपकी भावनाओं को चोट नहीं पहुँचायेंगे ?
7. जब भी आपको झरत पड़ेगी वे आपका समर्थन करेंगे ?
8. यदि वे आपसे कोई वादा करते हैं तो उसे अवश्य पूरा करेंगे ?
9. वे जो कहेंगे वही करेंगे ?
10. यदि वे आपके किसी काम को न कर सकने के सम्बन्ध में कोई स्पष्टीकरण देते हैं तो उनका स्पष्टीकरण सही होगा ?

### Organizational Processes

The questionnaire items of measures of organizational processes were rated on 5-point rating scales, having following response alternatives:-

| बहुत कम | कम | न कम न अधिक | अधिक | बहुत अधिक |
|---------|----|-------------|------|-----------|
| 1       | 2  | 3           | 4    | 5         |

### Supervisory Leadership (Coefficient Alpha, .90)

1. इस विभाग में अपने अधिकारी से मिलना आपके लिए कितना सहज तथा आसान है ?
2. जब आप अपने अधिकारी से बात करते हैं, तो वे आपकी बातों पर कहाँ तक ध्यान देते हैं ?

3. आपके अधिकारी आपकी समस्याओं को कितने ध्यान से सुनते हैं ?
4. आपके अधिकारी लोगों को अपने कार्य में पूरा प्रयास करने के लिए कितना उत्साहित करते हैं ?
5. किस सीमा तक आपके अधिकारी कार्य स्तर के ऊपर मानक निर्धारित करते हैं ?
6. किस सीमा तक आपके अधिकारी स्वयं कठोर परिश्रम करके कर्मचारियों के लिए उदाहरण प्रस्तुत करते हैं ?
7. किस सीमा तक आपके अधिकारी आपको कार्य सुधारने की विधियों को बताते हैं ?
8. किस सीमा तक आपके अधिकारी निर्धारित समय के भीतर कार्य करने हेतु आपको आवश्यक सहयोग देते हैं ?
9. किस सीमा तक आपके अधिकारी आपके कार्य से सम्बन्धित समस्याओं को सुलझाने हेतु नये सुझाव देते हैं ?
10. किस सीमा तक आपके अधिकारी विस्तृत समीक्षा तथा अपने अनुमोदन की प्रतीक्षा किये बिना, कार्यवाही करने के लिये, अपने अधीनस्थ लोगों को बढ़ावा देते हैं ?
11. आपके अधिकारी अपने अधीनस्थ लोगों को एक टीम के रूप में कार्य करने के लिए किस सीमा तक उत्साहित करते हैं ?
12. आपके अधिकारी अपने अधीनस्थ लोगों के बीच किस सीमा तक विचारों स्वं सुझावों के आदान प्रदान को बढ़ावा देते हैं ?
13. आपके अधिकारी किस सीमा तक अधीनस्थ लोगों के साथ बैठकर विभिन्न विषयों पर खुलकर विचार करने के लिये अक्सर मीटिंग बुलाते हैं ?

Peer-Leadership (Coefficient Alpha, .84)

1. आपके विभाग में साथी कर्मचारी आपसे में कितना मिलते रहते हैं ?
2. जब आप अपने साथी कर्मचारी से बात करते हैं तो वे आपकी बात पर कितना ध्यान देते हैं ?
3. आपके साथी कर्मचारी आपकी समस्याओं को समझने में कितनी रुचि रखते हैं ?
4. आपके साथी कर्मचारी एक दूसरे को अपने काम में पूरा प्रयास करने के लिये कितना उत्साहित करते हैं ?

5. आपके विभाग में साथी कर्मचारी किस सीमा तक कार्य करने के ऊंचे स्तरों को बनाये रखते हैं ?
6. आप अपने कार्य को और भी बेहतर ढूँग से कर सकें, इसके लिए विभाग के लोग आपकी कितनी मदद करते हैं ?
7. आपने कार्य को ठीक तरह से करने के लिए आप विभाग के लोगों से जितने सहयोग की आशा करते हैं, वह किस सीमा तक आपको यहाँ मिलता है ?
8. इस विभाग में आपके साथी कर्मचारी कार्य से सम्बन्धित समस्याओं को हल करने के लिए एक दूसरे को किस सीमा तक नये सुझाव देते हैं ?
9. इस विभाग में आपके साथी कर्मचारी एक दूसरे को एक टीम के रूप में कार्य करने के लिए कितना बढ़ावा देते हैं ?
10. आपके साथी कर्मचारी सामूहिक उद्देश्य को कितना महत्व देते हैं ?
11. आपके साथ काम करने वाले लोग एक दूसरे से विचारों तथा सुझावों का आदान प्रदान किस सीमा तक करते हैं ?

#### Organizational Climate (Coefficient Alpha, .85)

Items measuring organizational climate belonged to five dimensions, namely, technological readiness, human resource primacy, communication flow, decision making practices and motivational conditions.

#### Technological Readiness (Coefficient Alpha, .45 )

1. सामान्यतः कहाँ तक यह विभाग कार्य करने की विधियों को अपनाने के लिए तैयार रहता है ?
2. जिन मशीनों या विधियों का उपयोग आप अपने काम में करते हैं, वे कहाँ तक उस कार्य के लिये ठीक हैं ?

Human Resource Primacy (Coefficient Alpha, .72)

1. कर्मचारियों की भलाई में आपका विभाग कितनी रुचि रखता है ?
2. काम की दशाओं को सुधारने के लिए आपका विभाग कितना प्रयास करता है ?
3. विभागीय क्रियाओं का संगठन (Coordination) कहाँ तक सुनियोजित (Well Planned) है ?

Communication Flow (Coefficient Alpha, .70 )

1. आपके उच्च अधिकारी आपके विचारों तथा सुझावों को स्वीकार करने के लिए कितने तैयार रहते हैं ?
2. आपको अपने कार्य को बेहतर ढंग से करने के लिए जिन सूचनाओं की ज़रूरत है, वे किस सीमा तक आपको मिल जाती हैं ?
3. आपके विभाग में कहाँ तक लोग एक दूसरे को महत्वपूर्ण घटनाओं तथा विरास्थितियों के बारे में जानकारी देते रहते हैं ?

Decision Making Practices (Coefficient Alpha,.65 )

1. इस विभाग में किस सीमा तक निर्णय उन लोगों द्वारा लिए जाते हैं, जिनको सबसे अधिक सही सूचनायें उपलब्ध रहती हैं ?
2. इस विभाग में जब कोई निर्णय लिया जाता है, तब कहाँ तक उससे प्रभावित होने वाले व्यक्तियों को अपनी राय देने को कहा जाता है ?
3. इस विभाग में किस सीमा तक लोग आवश्यक सूचनायें उन लोगों को देते रहते हैं जो कि निर्णय लेते हैं ?

Motivational Conditions (Coefficient Alpha, .44 )

1. इस विभाग में दो व्यक्तियों के बीच विरोध अथवा असहमति को कैसे हल किया जाता है ? किती एक पर गोला खीचें ।
1. असहमति की हमेशा उपेक्षा की जाती है या हर हालत में दबा दिया जाता है ।
2. असहमति को अक्सर टाल दिया जाता है या दबा दिया जाता है ।
3. असहमतियों को कभी कभी स्वीकार किया जाता है और उनका हल ढूँढ़ा जाता है पर कभी कभी उनकी उपेक्षा की जाती है और दबा दिया जाता है ।

4. असहमति होने पर दृमेशा सबकी सुनी जाती है और समर्था का ऐसा हल निकाला जाता है जो अधिकतर लोगों को मान्य हो ।

5. असहमतियों को अक्सर आवश्यक समझकर ही उनको हता किया जाता है ।

इस विभाग में लोग कठिन परिश्रम क्यों करते हैं ? किसी एक पर गोला खींचो ।

1. अपनी नौकरी बनाये रखने के लिए ।

2. अपनी नौकरी बनाये रखने तथा अधिक पैसा पाने के लिए ।

3. अपनी नौकरी बनाये रखने, अधिक पैसा पाने तथा पदोन्नति के लिए ।

4. अपनी नौकरी बनाये रखने, अधिक पैसा पाने, पदोन्नति पाने तथा अच्छी तरह काम करके आत्म संतुष्टि प्राप्त करने के लिए ।

5. अपनी नौकरी बनाये रखने, पैसा पाने, पदोन्नति पाने, आत्म संतुष्टि प्राप्त करने तथा इसलिए क्योंकि साथी कर्मचारी उससे इसकी आशा करते हैं ।

#### Performance Basis of Rewards (Coefficient Alpha, .82)

इस विभाग में उत्पादन द्वया कामँ के जिस स्तर की आशा आपसे की जाती है यदि उसे आप प्राप्त कर लेते हैं तो इस बात की कितनी सम्मावना है कि आपको -

1. अच्छे काम के लिए मान्यता दी जायेगी और तारीफ होगी।

2. प्रमोशन से सहायता मिलेगी

3. वेतन वृद्धि मिलेगी

4. अन्य लाभ मिलेंगे और बाहर प्रशिक्षण के लिये भेजा जायेगा।

5. कोई ध्यान भी नहीं देगा ।

#### Performance Basis of Punishments (Coefficient Alpha, .55)

इस विभाग में उत्पादन द्वया कामँ के जिस स्तर की आशा आप से की जाती है यदि उसे आप प्राप्त नहीं कर सकते हैं तो इस बात की कितनी सम्मावना है कि आपको -

1. काम सुधारने को कहा जायेगा

2. डॉट पड़ेगी

3. पदोन्नति से वंचित कर दिया जायेगा

4. पदावनति (demotion) कर दी जायेगी

5. कोई ध्यान भी नहीं देगा

Political Basis of Rewards (Coefficient Alpha, .81)

इसकी कहाँतक सम्मावना है कि आपके विभाग में जिन व्यक्तियों को पुरस्कार दिये जाते हैं, वे -

1. अधिकारी की हों में हों मिलाते हैं

2. नेता हैं

3. राजनैतिक प्रभाव रखते हैं

4. अधिकारियों को शारीरिक क्षति पहुँचा सकते हैं या परेशान कर सकते हैं

5. उनके निकट सम्बन्धी उसी संस्थान में प्रभावशाली स्थान पर हैं

Political Basis of Punishments (Coefficient Alpha, .86)

आपके विभाग में किसी कर्मचारी को अपना काम ठीक ले न करने पर या अवांछनीय व्यवहार करने के लिये दण्ड देने के पूर्व इस बात पर कितना ध्यान दिया जाता है कि वह -

1. अधिकारी की हों में हों मिलाता है

2. यूनियन में प्रभाव रखता है

3. राजनैतिक प्रभाव रखता है

4. अधिकारियों को शारीरिक क्षति पहुँचा सकता है, या परेशान कर सकता है

5. उसका निकट सम्बन्धी उसी कारबाहेर में उच्चाधिकारी है

Union-Management Relations (Coefficient Alpha, .57)

आपके विचार से नीचे दिये गये कथन आपके संगठन के सम्बन्ध में कहों तक सत्य अथवा असत्य हैं ।

| पूर्णतः असत्य | असत्य | न असत्य न सत्य | सत्य | पूर्णतः सत्य |
|---------------|-------|----------------|------|--------------|
| 1             | 2     | 3              | 4    | 5            |

1. कर्मचारी यूनियन तथा प्रबन्धक हर तरह से एक दूसरे को कमज़ोर करने की कोशिश करते हैं

2. कर्मचारी यूनियन तथा प्रबन्धक मिलकर शिकायतों का सही समाधान खोजने की कोशिश करते हैं।
3. सामान्यतया, कर्मचारी यूनियन प्रबन्धकों के प्रति अच्छा दृष्टिकोण रखती है
4. सामान्यतया, जब कभी प्रबन्धक समस्याओं का सही समाधान करने की कोशिश करते हैं तो कर्मचारी यूनियन उसमें बाधा उत्पन्न करती है

#### Organizational Structure

Items related to organizational structure variables, namely, decentralization of decision making, centralization of work operations and formalization were answered on 5-point scales given below:-

|               |       |                |      |              |
|---------------|-------|----------------|------|--------------|
| पूर्णतः असत्य | असत्य | न असत्य न सत्य | सत्य | पूर्णतः सत्य |
| 1             | 2     | 3              | 4    | 5            |

#### Decentralization of Decision Making (Coefficient Alpha, .73)

1. यदि इस विभाग में कोई नयी नीतियाँ लागू होनी हों तो उनके निर्णय में विभागीय कर्मचारी भाग लेते हैं
2. यदि इस विभाग में नये स्टाफ के भर्ती किये जाने के बारे में कोई निर्णय करना हो तो विभागीय कर्मचारियों से पूछा जाता है
3. विभागीय विवादों को निपटाने के बारे में लिये गये निर्णयों में हमलोग भाग लेते हैं
4. यदि इस विभाग में किसी भी प्रकार के स्टाफ की पदोन्नति के बारे में कोई निर्णय लेना हो तो हमसे पूछा जाता है

#### Centralization of work operations (Coefficient Alpha, .66)

1. इस विभाग में तब तक कोई नया काम नहीं किया जा सकता है, जब तक कि उससे सम्बन्धित निर्णय की स्वीकृति किसी अधिकारी से न प्राप्त हो जाये
2. कोई व्यक्ति यदि स्वतंत्र रूप से निर्णय लेना चाहता है तो उसे यहाँ तुरन्त दृतोत्तराद्वित कर दिया जाता है

3. इस विभाग में छोटी-छोटी बातों के लिए भी वरिष्ठ अधिकारी पर निर्भर रहना पड़ता है।
4. मैं कोई भी निर्णय लेता हूँ तो अधिकारी द्वारा उसकी पुष्टि आवश्यक है
5. यहाँ कोई भी कार्य करने के पूर्व मुझे अधिकारी से पूछना पड़ता है

#### Formalization (Coefficient Alpha, .67)

1. इस विभाग में लोग अपने काम से सम्बन्धित बहुत सी बातों में अपने को स्वतंत्र अनुभव करते हैं
2. यहाँ ज्यादातर लोग कायदे कानून के अनुसार ही काम करते हैं
3. काम किस प्रकार करना है, इसका निर्णय यहाँ काम करने वालों के ऊपर छोड़ दिया जाता है
4. यहाँ निर्णय लेने के लिये किसी दूसरे की स्वीकृति या सलाह की आवश्यकता नहीं होती
5. नियमों के उल्लंघन के लिए यहाँ लोगों को दण्डित किया जाता है
6. यहाँ लोगों को लगता है कि उनके ऊपर सदा निगरानी रखी जा रही है
7. चाहे जैसी परिस्थिति उत्पन्न हो उससे निपटने के लिये इस विभाग में निश्चित तरीके बने हुये हैं
8. इस विभाग में हर व्यक्ति के लिये एक निश्चित कार्य बैटा है
9. इस विभाग में हर कार्य के लिये अपने उच्च अधिकारी के माध्यम से ही काम करने पर सदा जोर दिया जाता है
10. यहाँ पर प्रत्येक कर्मचारी के कार्य उत्पादन का लिखित ब्योरा रखा जाता है
11. यहाँ जब कभी कोई समस्या आती है तो हम लोगों को किसी ऊंचे अधिकारी से राय लेनी होती है

#### Distribution of control

इस विभाग में जो कुछ भी होता है उसमें निम्नलिखित व्यक्तियों या समूहों का कितना प्रभाव है ?

|                                 | क्रम<br>बहुत,<br>कम | क्रम<br>ना कम न अधिक | अधिक | बहुत अधिक |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------|-----------|
| 1. विभाग के सर्वोच्च अधिकारी का | 1                   | 2                    | 3    | 4         |
| 2. बीच के अधिकारियों का         | 1                   | 2                    | 3    | 4         |
| 3. सुपरवाइजर का                 | 1                   | 2                    | 3    | 4         |
| 4. श्रमिक समूह का               | 1                   | 2                    | 3    | 4         |
| 5. कर्मचारी धूनियन का           | 1                   | 2                    | 3    | 4         |

#### Bases of Power

The statements for bases of power were rated on the 5-point rating scales, as given below:-

|               |       |                |      |              |
|---------------|-------|----------------|------|--------------|
| पूर्णतः असत्य | असत्य | न असत्य न सत्य | सत्य | पूर्णतः सत्य |
| 1             | 2     | 3              | 4    | 5            |

इस विभाग में आपका अधिकारी आपसे जो कुछ भी करने के लिए कहता है, वह आप इसलिए करते हैं क्योंकि -

1. आप अधिकारी की योग्यता तथा निर्णयों की इज्जत करते हैं
2. अधिकारी आपको फायदा दे सकता है
3. अधिकारी आपको दण्ड दे सकता है या किसी तरह आपका नुकसान कर सकता है
4. अधिकारी बहुत अच्छा आदमी है
5. अधिकारी का कहना मानना आपकी इच्छी है

#### Upward Influence Tactics

The use and expectancy of success of eight upward influence tactics, namely, persuasion, ingratiation, threat, work obstruction, informal exchange, pressure, whistle blowing and upward appeal, given item number 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8 were measured in the following manner:-

आपके विभाग में कुछ पदोन्नतियाँ होने वाली हैं। इस सिलसिले में आपके सुपरवाइजर से उनके नीचे काम करने वाले कर्मचारियों की गोपनीय रिपोर्ट मर्गी गयी है। आपका एक साथी विनोद भी पदोन्नति के लिए उम्मीदवार है। विनोद जानता है कि जब तक सुपरवाइजर उसकी अच्छी रिपोर्ट नहीं देंगे, तब तक उसके पदोन्नति की सम्भावना बहुत कम है। वह यह भी महसूस करता है कि बिना कुछ किये सुपरवाइजर अपने से अच्छी रिपोर्ट नहीं भेजेंगे। परन्तु वह चाहता है कि सुपरवाइजर उसकी अच्छी रिपोर्ट भेज दे। इसलिए अपनी अच्छी रिपोर्ट भिजवाने के लिए -

१. विनोद अपने सुपरवाइजर से मिलता है और कहता है कि, "मैं, विभाग में जो पदोन्नतियाँ होने वाली हैं, उनके बारे में बात करना चाहता हूँ। आप जानते ही हैं कि मेरा काम कैसा रहा है। मैंने कभी आपको शिकायत का मौका नहीं दिया। दूसरों की अपेक्षा मेरा काम बेहतर ही रहा है, यह आप भी महसूस करते होंगे। जहाँ तक होता है मैंछुटी नहीं लेता हूँ। अतः आशा है कि आप प्रमोशन के लिये मेरी अच्छी रिपोर्ट ही भेजेंगे।"

विनोद आपके सुपरवाइजर को इस तरह समझाकर अपना काम करवाने में इसी तरह के लिए कि उदाहरण के लिये कुछ तरीके ऊपर दिये गये हैं और भी तरीके इस्तेमाल कर सकता है। कृपया आप ऐसे सभी तरीकों को ध्यान में रखकर बतायें कि -

अ१ कहाँ तक यह सम्भावना है कि विनोद इस तरीके द्वारा अर्थात् समझा बुझाकर, आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपनी अच्छी रिपोर्ट भिजवाने में सफल होगा?

| 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       | 5       | 6       |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 0%      | 20%     | 40%     | 60%     | 80%     | 100%    |
| संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना |

ब१ आपके दूसरे साथी, आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपना काम करवाने के लिए इस तरीके का इस्तेमाल कहाँ तक करेंगे।

| 1               | 2          | 3  | 4              | 5    | 6            | 7     |
|-----------------|------------|----|----------------|------|--------------|-------|
| बिल्कुल<br>नहीं | बहुत<br>कम | कम | न कम<br>न अधिक | अधिक | बहुत<br>अधिक | हमेशा |

2. विनोद सुपरवाइजर को खुश करने की कोशिश करता है। वह सुपरवाइजर के घर जाना शुरू कर देता है। उन्हें उपहार भेट करता है। सुपरवाइजर से आवश्यकता से अधिक नमूना एवं आदरपूर्वक बात करता है। उनकी हर बात में हाँ में हाँ मिलाता है। दूसरों के सामने उनकी और उनके काम को बढ़ा चढ़ाकर प्रशंसा करता है। समय-समय पर यह भी प्रदर्शित करता रहता है कि अपने काम के लिये वह उनके ही ऊपर पूरी तरह आभिन्न है।

विनोद आपके सुपरवाइजर को इस तरह खुश करके अपना काम करवाने में इसी तरह के ऐसे कि उदाहरण के लिए कुछ तरीके ऊपर दिये गये हैं और भी तरीके इस्तेमाल कर सकता है। कृपया आप ऐसे सभी तरीकों को ध्यान में रखकर बतायें कि -

अ० कहाँ तक यह सम्भावना है कि विनोद इस तरीके द्वारा अर्थात् खुश करके, आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपनी अच्छी रिपोर्ट भिजवाने में सफल होगा ?

| 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       | 5       | 6       |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| ०%      | 20%     | 40%     | 60%     | 80%     | 100%    |
| संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना |

ब० आपके दूसरे साथी, आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपना काम करवाने के लिए, इस तरीके का इस्तेमाल कहाँ तक करेंगे ?

| 1               | 2          | 3  | 4              | 5    | 6            | 7     |
|-----------------|------------|----|----------------|------|--------------|-------|
| बिल्कुल<br>नहीं | बहुत<br>कम | कम | न कम<br>न अधिक | अधिक | बहुत<br>अधिक | हमेशा |

3. विनोद सुपरवाइजर से मिलता है और कहता है कि "मैं आपसे यह कहने आया हूँ आप मेरी अच्छी रिपोर्ट भेद दें। यदि आपने मेरी रिपोर्ट अच्छी नहीं दी तो अच्छा नहीं होगा।" दूसरे दिन विनोद सुपरवाइजर को कुछ साथियों के साथ सड़क पर रोकता है। उनमें से एक "दादा" उनको धमकी देता है कि "इनका अर्थात् विनोद काम होना चाहिए, नहीं तो हम आपको देख लेंगे"।

विनोद आपके सुपरवाइजर को डरा धमकाकर अपना काम करवाने में इसी तरह के ऐसे कि उदाहरण के लिए कुछ तरीके ऊपर दिये गये हैं और भी तरीके इस्तेमाल कर सकता है। कृपया आप ऐसे सभी तरीकों को ध्यान में रखकर बतायें कि -

॥अ॥ कहौं तक यह सम्भावना है कि विनोद इस तरीके द्वारा ॥अर्थात् डरा धमका कर ॥ आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपनी अच्छी रिपोर्ट मिजवाने में सफल होगा ।

|         |         |         |         |         |         |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       | 5       | 6       |
| 0%      | 20%     | 40%     | 60%     | 80%     | 100%    |
| संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना |

॥ब॥ आपके दूसरे साथी आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपना काम करवाने के लिए, इस तरीके का इस्तेमाल कहौं तक करेगे ।

|         |      |    |        |      |      |       |
|---------|------|----|--------|------|------|-------|
| 1       | 2    | 3  | 4      | 5    | 6    | 7     |
| बिल्कुल | बहुत | कम | न कम   | अधिक | बहुत | हमेशा |
| नहीं    | कम   |    | न अधिक |      | अधिक |       |

4. विनोद अपने साथियों के साथ मिलकर विभागीय कार्यों में रुकावटें पैदा करके सुपरवाइजर को परेशान करना शुरू कर देता है । वे लोग विभागीय कार्य सम्बन्धी आवश्यक सूचनायें सुपरवाइजर को नहीं देते हैं । कोई भी काम समय के अन्दर पूरा नहीं करते हैं । विनोद और उसके साथी जानबूझकर गलितयों करते हैं और काम न करने के नये-नये बहाने ढूँढ़ते हैं । हर तरह से यही कोशिश करते हैं कि सुपरवाइजर को नीचा देखना पड़े और उसकी अपनी पदोन्नति खतरे में पड़ जाये ।

विनोद विभागीय कार्यों में रुकावटें पैदा करके आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपना काम करवाने में इसी तरह के ॥जैसे कि उदाहरण के लिये कुछ तरीके ऊपर दिये गये हैं ॥ और भीतरीके इस्तेमाल कर सकता है । कृपया आप ऐसे सभी तरीकों को ध्यान में रखकर बतायें कि -

॥अ॥ कहौं तक यह संभावना है कि विनोद इस तरीके द्वारा ॥अर्थात् विभागीय कार्यों में रुकावटें पैदा करके ॥आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपनी अच्छी रिपोर्ट मिजवाने में सफल होगा ।

|         |         |         |         |         |         |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       | 5       | 6       |
| 0%      | 20%     | 40%     | 60%     | 80%     | 100%    |
| संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना |

४ब० आपके दूसरे साथी, आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपना काम करवाने के लिए, इस तरीके का इस्तेमाल कहर्त तक करेंगे ।

| 1               | 2          | 3  | 4              | 5    | 6            | 7     |
|-----------------|------------|----|----------------|------|--------------|-------|
| बिल्कुल<br>नहीं | बहुत<br>कम | कम | न कम<br>न अधिक | अधिक | बहुत<br>अधिक | हमेशा |
|                 |            |    |                |      |              |       |

5. विनोद सुपरवाइजर से मिलता है और उन्हें याद दिलाता है कि उसने उनके लिए क्या किया है । वह सुपरवाइजर से कहता है कि "सर, मैंने हमेशा आपकी सेवा की है । आपको याद होगा कि जब आपके खिलाफ कर्मचारियों ने प्रदर्शन किये थे तो मैंने ही यूनियन के पदाधिकारियों से कहकर आपके खिलाफ प्रदर्शन रुकवाये थे । यहर्त तक कि आपके लिए दूसरे कर्मचारियों से झगड़ा मोल लिया । जब भी किसी काम के लिये आपने कहा, मैंने तुरन्त किया, चाहे यह काम बच्चों के स्कूल में प्रवेश से सम्बन्धित रहा हो या विभागीयकार्य से । अब मेरी जरूरत है । यह सब ध्यान में रखते हुये, आप कम से कम मेरा इतना सा काम ४अच्छी रिपोर्ट ४ अवश्य कर दें ।"

विनोद आपके सुपरवाइजर को इस तरह अपने अहसानों की याद दिलाकर अपना काम करवाने में इसी तरह के ४जैसे कि उदाहरण के लिए कुछ तरीके ऊर दिये गये हैं । और भी तरीके इस्तेमाल कर लकता है । कृपया आप ऐसे सभी तरीकों को ध्यान में रखकर बतायें कि -

४अ० कहर्त यह सम्भावना है कि विनोद इस तरीके द्वारा ४अहसानों की याद दिलाकर ४ आपके सुपरवाइजर से अच्छी रिपोर्ट मिजवाने में सफल होगा ।

| 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       | 5       | 6       | 7 |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---|
| 0%      | 20%     | 40%     | 60%     | 80%     | 100%    |   |
| संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना |   |

४ब० आपके दूसरे साथी, आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपना काम करवाने के लिए, इस तरीके का इस्तेमाल कहर्त तक करेंगे ।

| 1               | 2          | 3  | 4              | 5    | 6            | 7     |
|-----------------|------------|----|----------------|------|--------------|-------|
| बिल्कुल<br>नहीं | बहुत<br>कम | कम | न कम<br>न अधिक | अधिक | बहुत<br>अधिक | हमेशा |
|                 |            |    |                |      |              |       |

6. विनोद सुपरवाइजर के ऊपर दबाव डलवाने की कोशिश करता है। वह परिचित राजनैतिक व्यक्तियों के साथ सुपरवाइजर से मिलता है और अपनी अच्छी रिपोर्ट भेजने के लिये कहलवाता है। वह पता लगाता है कि संगठन के अन्दर और संगठन के बाहर ऐसे कौन लोग हैं जिनकी बात सुपरवाइजर नहीं टाल सकता है। पता लगाकर ऐसे व्यक्तियों से परिचय निकालता है और उनको लेकर सुपरवाइजर से मिलता है और अपनी अच्छी रिपोर्ट भेजने के लिए कहलवाता है।

विनोद आपके सुपरवाइजर के ऊपर इस तरह दूसरों से दबाव डालकर अपना काम करवाने के लिये, इसी तरह के लिए कि उदाहरण के लिए कुछ तरीके ऊपर दिये गये हैं और भी तरीके इत्तेमाल कर सकता है। कृपया आप ऐसे सभी तरीकों को ध्यान में रखकर बतायें कि -

अ० कहाँ तक यह सम्भावना है कि विनोद इस तरीके द्वारा अर्थात् दूसरों से दबाव डलवाकर०, आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपनी अच्छी रिपोर्ट भिजवाने में सफल होगा ?

| 1<br>0/<br>संभावना | 2<br>20/<br>संभावना | 3<br>40/<br>संभावना | 4<br>60/<br>संभावना | 5<br>80/<br>संभावना | 6<br>100/<br>संभावना |
|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|

ब० आपके दूसरे साथी, आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपना काम करवाने के लिये, इस तरीके का इत्तेमाल कहाँ तक करेंगे ?

| 1<br>बिलकुल<br>नहीं | 2<br>बहुत<br>कम | 3<br>कम | 4<br>न कम<br>न अधिक | 5<br>अधिक | 6<br>बहुत | 7<br>हमेशा<br>अधिक |
|---------------------|-----------------|---------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|--------------------|
|---------------------|-----------------|---------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|--------------------|

7. विनोद सुपरवाइजर के खिलाफ प्रचार करवाता है। समाचार संवाददाताओं से मिलता है और उन्हें कुछ ऐसी सूचनायें प्रकाशनार्थ देता है जो कि सुपरवाइजर के हित में नहीं है। यूनियन के पंदाधिकारियों एवं उच्चाधिकारियों तक उनकी तरह तरह से शिकायत करवाता है। उनके खिलाफ प्रदर्शन करवाता है। गलत सही आक्षेप लगवाता है स्था जगह जगह पोस्टर चिपकवाता है।

विनोद आपके सुपरवाइजर के खिलाफ प्रचार करके अपना काम करवाने के लिये, इसी तरह के ऐसे कि उदाहरण के लिए कुछ तरीके ऊपर दिये गये हैं और भी तरीके इस्तेमाल कर सकता है। कृपया आप ऐसे सभी तरीकों को ध्यान में रखकर बतायें कि -

अब कहाँ तक यह सम्भावना है कि विनोद इस तरीके द्वारा अर्थात् सुपरवाइजर के खिलाफ प्रचार करके, आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपनी अच्छी रिपोर्ट मिजवाने में सफल होगा ?

|         |         |         |         |         |         |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 1       | 2       | 3       | 4       | 5       | 6       |
| 0%      | 20%     | 40%     | 60%     | 80%     | 100%    |
| संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना | संभावना |

बूबू आपके दूसरे साथी, आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपना काम करवाने के लिये, इस तरीके का इस्तेमाल कहाँ तक करेंगे ?

|                |            |    |                |      |              |       |
|----------------|------------|----|----------------|------|--------------|-------|
| 1              | 2          | 3  | 4              | 5    | 6            | 7     |
| बिलकुल<br>नहीं | बहुत<br>कम | कम | न कम<br>न अधिक | अधिक | बहुत<br>अधिक | हमेशा |
|                |            |    |                |      |              |       |

3. विनोद सुपरवाइजर से ऊपर के अधिकारियों भेमितता है और कहता है कि "प्रश्नोषण के सम्बन्ध में सुपरवाइजर से जो रिपोर्ट माँगी गयी है उसके बारे में मैं आपसे बात करने आया हूँ। मुझे पता चला है कि मेरे सुपरवाइजर रिपोर्ट भेजने में भैंसभाव बरत सकते हैं। मुझे डर है कि क्यैं मेरी रिपोर्ट अच्छी नहीं भेजेंगे, यद्यपि मेरा काम दूसरों से बेहतर ही है। अतः मेरा निवेदन है कि आप इस मामले में हस्तक्षेप करें, जिससे मेरे साथ अन्याय न हो।"

विनोद उच्चाधिकारियों को अपना केस प्रस्तुत करके आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपना काम करवाने में इसी तरह के ऐसे कि उदाहरण के लिए कुछ तरीके ऊपर दिये गये हैं और भी तरीके इस्तेमाल कर सकता है। कृपया आप ऐसे सभी तरीकों को ध्यान में रखकर बतायें कि -

अब कहाँ तक यह सम्भावना है कि विनोद इस तरीके द्वारा अर्थात् उच्चाधिकारियों को अपना केस प्रस्तुत करके आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपनी

अच्छी रिपोर्ट मिजवाने में सफल होगा।

|         |          |          |          |          |           |
|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| 1<br>0% | 2<br>20% | 3<br>40% | 4<br>60% | 5<br>80% | 6<br>100% |
| संभावना | संभावना  | संभावना  | संभावना  | संभावना  | संभावना   |

बैबौद्धी आपके दूसरे साथी, आपके सुपरवाइजर से अपना काम करवाने के लिए,  
इस तरीके का इस्तेमाल कहाँ तक करेगे ?

|                     |                 |         |                     |           |                   |            |
|---------------------|-----------------|---------|---------------------|-----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1<br>बिलकुल<br>नहीं | 2<br>बहुत<br>कम | 3<br>कम | 4<br>न कम<br>न अधिक | 5<br>अधिक | 6<br>बहुत<br>अधिक | 7<br>हमेशा |
|---------------------|-----------------|---------|---------------------|-----------|-------------------|------------|

APPENDIX - B

Inter correlations among Organizational Climate Variables, N = 344

|                              | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      | 5    |
|------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------|
| 1. Technological Readiness   | 1.00   |        |        |        |      |
| 2. Human Resource Primacy    | .51 ** | 1.00   |        |        |      |
| 3. Communication flow        | .42 ** | .59 ** | 1.00   |        |      |
| 4. Decision Making Practices | .40 ** | .47 ** | .58 ** | 1.00   |      |
| 5. Motivational conditions.  | .21 ** | .25 ** | .18 ** | .20 ** | 1.00 |

\*\*P < .01

APPENDIX - C (i)

Comparison Between Workers and Managers on Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables

| VARIABLES                         | Mean (SDs)<br>Workers<br>(n = 196) | Mean (SDs)<br>Managers<br>(n = 117) | t         |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------|
| <u>Individual Characteristics</u> |                                    |                                     |           |
| <u>Power and Self-esteem</u>      |                                    |                                     |           |
| Self perception of power          | 7.56 (2.87)                        | 8.60 (2.73)                         | 3.25 **   |
| Relative Power                    | - 2.79 (3.49)                      | - 1.78 (3.18)                       | 2.85 **   |
| Need for Power                    | 19.71 (5.97)                       | 24.01 (4.71)                        | 7.00 ***  |
| Global Self-esteem                | 13.82 (3.23)                       | 15.38 (2.84)                        | 4.46 **   |
| Occupational Self-esteem          | 15.07 (2.83)                       | 15.20 (2.50)                        | ns        |
| <u>Personal Values</u>            |                                    |                                     |           |
| Aram                              | 3.65 (1.22)                        | 3.27 (1.28)                         | 2.53 *    |
| Dependence Proneness              | 3.90 (1.13)                        | 3.77 (1.05)                         | ns        |
| Preference for P.Relations        | 3.35 (1.16)                        | 3.39 (1.03)                         | ns        |
| Team Orientation                  | 3.17 (1.34)                        | 3.19 (1.30)                         | ns        |
| Commitment                        | 3.08 (1.39)                        | 3.38 (1.35)                         | ns        |
| Showing Off                       | 2.92 (1.46)                        | 3.16 (1.37)                         | ns        |
| <u>Personal Background</u>        |                                    |                                     |           |
| Age                               | 1.53 ( .61)                        | 2.02 ( .72)                         | 6.12 **   |
| Education                         | 2.31 (1.00)                        | 3.15 ( .61)                         | 9.23 ***  |
| Caste                             | 5.12 (2.60)                        | 4.70 (2.69)                         | ns        |
| Family Income                     | 1.84 ( .67)                        | 2.63 ( .54)                         | 11.62 **  |
| <u>Organizational Background</u>  |                                    |                                     |           |
| Job level                         | 3.86 (1.35)                        | 10.20 (1.06)                        | 46.27 *** |
| Monthly Salary                    | 1.32 ( .48)                        | 2.37 ( .68)                         | 14.58 **  |
| Stay in Organization              | 1.32 ( .52)                        | 1.49 ( .64)                         | 2.43 *    |
| No. of Promotions                 | 1.81 ( .93)                        | 2.32 (1.24)                         | 3.92 **   |
| Experience                        | 1.38 ( .50)                        | 1.65 ( .55)                         | 4.35 ***  |

(Appendix - C (i) contd...)

Interpersonal Variables

|                          |              |              |    |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|----|
| Interpersonal Trust      | 30.24 (7.54) | 31.82 (7.55) | ns |
| Interpersonal Attraction | 7.17 (2.04)  | 7.20 (2.14)  | ns |

Organizational Processes

|                              |               |               |         |
|------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------|
| Supervisory Leadership       | 38.43 (11.19) | 42.97 (10.46) | 3.79 ** |
| Peer Leadership              | 35.38 (8.47)  | 35.85 (8.07)  | ns      |
| Organizational Climate       | 39.17 (9.24)  | 41.89 (9.17)  | 2.54 *  |
| Performance based Rewards    | 11.93 (5.36)  | 13.61 (5.11)  | 2.75 ** |
| Politics based Rewards       | 14.86 (5.36)  | 13.52 (5.72)  | 2.19 *  |
| Performance based punishment | 15.65 (3.87)  | 15.85 (3.61)  | ns      |
| Politics based punishment    | 15.98 (5.48)  | 14.69 (6.09)  | ns      |
| Union-Management relations   | 12.18 (2.92)  | 11.89 (3.66)  | ns      |

Organizational Structure

|                         |              |              |         |
|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------|
| Decentralization of DM  | 8.76 (3.26)  | 10.92 (3.94) | 5.00 ** |
| Centralization of W.O.  | 19.35 (3.36) | 17.33 (4.03) | 4.59 ** |
| Formalization           | 38.20 (5.40) | 36.55 (4.98) | 2.75 ** |
| Total Amount of Control | 13.03 (2.71) | 13.40 (2.52) | ns      |
| Slope of Control        | 1.23 (1.78)  | 1.02 (1.54)  | ns      |
| Control of Unions       | 3.06 (1.33)  | 3.14 (1.31)  | ns      |

Bases of Power

|                  |             |             |         |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|---------|
| Expert Power     | 3.96 (1.02) | 3.93 (.92)  | ns      |
| Reward Power     | 2.93 (1.19) | 3.03 (1.17) | ns      |
| Coercive Power   | 3.27 (1.28) | 3.11 (1.25) | ns      |
| Referent Power   | 3.02 (1.23) | 3.43 (1.17) | 2.93 ** |
| Legitimate Power | 4.32 (.94)  | 4.14 (.93)  | ns      |

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\*P < .05; \*\*P < .01; ns = difference not found significant

APPENDIX - C (ii)

Comparison Between Workers and Supervisors on Individual, Interperson and Organizational Variables

| VARIABLES                         | Means (SDs)<br>Workers<br>(n = 196) | Means (SDs)<br>Supervisors<br>(n = 31) | t        |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|----------|
| <u>Individual Characteristics</u> |                                     |  |          |
| <u>Power and Self-esteem</u>      |                                     |  |          |
| Self Perception of Power          | 7.56 (2.87)                         | 8.19 (2.56)                            | ns       |
| Relative Power                    | - 2.79 (3.49)                       | - 1.52 (2.72)                          | 2.31*    |
| Need for Power                    | 19.71 (5.97)                        | 19.64 (4.79)                           | ns       |
| Global Self-Esteem                | 13.82 (3.23)                        | 13.97 (3.48)                           | ns       |
| Occupational self-esteem          | 15.07 (2.83)                        | 15.55 (2.16)                           | ns       |
| <u>Personal Values</u>            |                                     |  |          |
| Aram                              | 3.65 (1.22)                         | 3.73 (1.11)                            | ns       |
| Dependence Proneness              | 3.90 (1.13)                         | 3.87 (1.04)                            | ns       |
| Preference for P.Relations        | 3.35 (1.16)                         | 3.17 (1.14)                            | ns       |
| Team Orientation                  | 3.17 (1.34)                         | 2.93 (1.28)                            | ns       |
| Commitment                        | 3.08 (1.39)                         | 2.71 (1.37)                            | ns       |
| Showing Off                       | 2.92 (1.46)                         | 3.23 (1.30)                            | ns       |
| <u>Personal Background</u>        |                                     |  |          |
| Age                               | 1.53 (.61)                          | 2.00 (.77)                             | 3.91***  |
| Education                         | 2.31 (1.00)                         | 2.61 (.88)                             | ns       |
| Caste                             | 5.12 (2.60)                         | 4.29 (2.71)                            | ns       |
| Family Income                     | 1.84 (.67)                          | 2.22 (.70)                             | 2.83**   |
| <u>Organizational Background</u>  |                                     |  |          |
| Job level                         | 3.86 (1.35)                         | 7.48 (.50)                             | 27.85*** |
| Monthly Salary                    | 1.32 (.48)                          | 1.55 (.50)                             | 2.39*    |
| Stay in Organization              | 1.32 (.52)                          | 1.68 (.65)                             | 3.00**   |
| No. of Promotions                 | 1.81 (.93)                          | 2.64 (1.11)                            | 3.95***  |
| Experience                        | 1.38 (.50)                          | 1.64 (.49)                             | 2.70**   |

(Appendix - C (ii) contd...)

Interpersonal Variables

|                          |              |              |         |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------|
| Interpersonal Trust      | 30.24 (7.54) | 33.90 (6.79) | <.75 ** |
| Interpersonal Attraction | 7.17 (2.04)  | 7.71 (1.77)  | ns      |

Organizational Processes

|                              |               |               |    |
|------------------------------|---------------|---------------|----|
| Supervisory Leadership       | 38.43 (11.19) | 42.29 (11.17) | ns |
| Peer Leadership              | 35.38 (8.47)  | 36.90 (7.87)  | ns |
| Organizational Climate       | 39.17 (9.24)  | 40.93 (9.76)  | ns |
| Performance based Rewards    | 11.93 (5.36)  | 12.71 (5.35)  | ns |
| Politics based Rewards       | 14.86 (5.36)  | 13.51 (6.32)  | ns |
| Performance based Punishment | 15.65 (3.87)  | 15.29 (4.16)  | ns |
| Politics based Punishment    | 15.98 (5.48)  | 14.90 (6.38)  | ns |
| Union-Management Relations   | 12.18 (2.92)  | 12.42 (3.57)  | ns |

Organizational Structure

|                         |              |              |    |
|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|----|
| Decentralization of DM  | 8.76 (3.26)  | 9.19 (2.99)  | ns |
| Centralization of W.O.  | 19.35 (3.36) | 19.58 (3.39) | ns |
| Formalization           | 38.20 (5.40) | 39.71 (5.21) | ns |
| Total Amount of Control | 13.03 (2.71) | 13.48 (1.96) | ns |
| Slope of Control        | 1.23 (1.78)  | 1.23 (1.36)  | ns |
| Control of Unions       | 3.06 (1.33)  | 3.32 (1.33)  | ns |

Bases of Power

|                  |             |             |        |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|--------|
| Expert Power     | 3.96 (1.02) | 4.00 (1.12) | ns     |
| Reward Power     | 2.93 (1.19) | 2.81 (1.28) | ns     |
| Coercive Power   | 3.27 (1.28) | 2.77 (1.31) | 2.00 * |
| Referent Power   | 3.02 (1.23) | 2.80 (1.35) | ns     |
| Legitimate Power | 4.32 (.94)  | 4.48 (.68)  | ns     |

\*P < .05; \*\*P < .01; ns = difference not found significant.

APPENDIX - C (iii)

Comparison Between Supervisors and Managers on Individual, Interperson and Organizational Variables

| VARIABLES                         | Means (SDs)<br>Supervisors<br>(n = 31) | Means (SDs)<br>Managers<br>(n = 117) | t        |
|-----------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|----------|
| <u>Individual Characteristics</u> |  |                                      |          |
| <u>Power and Self-esteem</u>      |  |                                      |          |
| Self Perception of Power          | 8.19 (2.56)                            | 8.60 (2.73)                          | ns       |
| Relative Power                    | - 1.52 (2.72)                          | - 1.78 (3.12)                        | ns       |
| Need for Power                    | 19.64 (4.79)                           | 24.01 (4.71)                         | 4.55 **  |
| Global Self-esteem                | 13.97 (3.48)                           | 15.38 (2.84)                         | 2.17 *   |
| Occupational self-esteem          | 15.55 (2.16)                           | 15.20 (2.50)                         | ns       |
| <u>Personal Values</u>            |  |                                      |          |
| Aram                              | 3.73 (1.11)                            | 3.27 (1.28)                          | 2.09 *   |
| Dependence Proneness              | 3.87 (1.04)                            | 3.77 (1.05)                          | ns       |
| Preference for P.Relations        | 3.17 (1.14)                            | 3.39 (1.03)                          | ns       |
| Team Orientation                  | 2.93 (1.28)                            | 3.19 (1.30)                          | ns       |
| Commitment                        | 2.71 (1.37)                            | 3.38 (1.35)                          | ns       |
| Showing Off                       | 3.23 (1.30)                            | 3.16 (1.37)                          | ns       |
| <u>Personal Background</u>        |  |                                      |          |
| Age                               | 2.00 (.77)                             | 2.02 (.72)                           | ns       |
| Education                         | 2.61 (.88)                             | 3.15 (.61)                           | 3.37 **  |
| Caste                             | 4.29 (2.71)                            | 4.70 (2.69)                          | ns       |
| Family Income                     | 2.22 (.70)                             | 2.63 (.54)                           | 3.10 **  |
| <u>Organizational Background</u>  |  |                                      |          |
| Job level                         | 7.48 (.50)                             | 10.20 (1.06)                         | 23.05 ** |
| Monthly Salary                    | 1.55 (.50)                             | 2.37 (.68)                           | 8.20 **  |
| Stay in Organization              | 1.68 (.65)                             | 1.49 (.64)                           | ns       |
| No. of Promotions                 | 2.64 (1.11)                            | 2.32 (1.24)                          | ns       |
| Experience                        | 1.64 (.49)                             | 1.65 (.55)                           | ns       |

(Appendix - C (iii) contd..)

Interpersonal Variables

|                          |              |              |    |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|----|
| Interpersonal Trust      | 33.90 (6.79) | 31.82 (7.55) | ns |
| Interpersonal Attraction | 7.71 (1.77)  | 7.20 (2.14)  | ns |

Organizational Processes

|                              |               |               |    |
|------------------------------|---------------|---------------|----|
| Supervisory Leadership       | 42.29 (11.17) | 42.97 (10.46) | ns |
| Peer Leadership              | 36.90 (7.87)  | 35.85 (8.07)  | ns |
| Organizational Climate       | 40.93 (9.76)  | 41.89 (9.17)  | ns |
| Performance based Rewards    | 12.71 (5.35)  | 13.61 (5.11)  | ns |
| Politics based Rewards       | 13.51 (6.32)  | 13.52 (5.72)  | ns |
| Performance based punishment | 15.29 (4.16)  | 15.85 (3.61)  | ns |
| Politics based punishments   | 14.90 (6.38)  | 14.69 (6.09)  | ns |
| Union-Management Relations   | 12.42 (3.57)  | 11.89 (3.66)  | ns |

Organizational Structure

|                         |              |              |        |
|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------|
| Decentralization of DM  | 9.19 (2.99)  | 10.92 (3.94) | 2.88** |
| Centralization of W.O.  | 19.58 (3.39) | 17.33 (4.03) | 3.36** |
| Formalization           | 39.71 (5.21) | 36.55 (4.98) | 3.16** |
| Total Amount of Control | 13.48 (1.96) | 13.40 (2.32) | ns     |
| Slope of Control        | 1.23 (1.36)  | 1.02 (1.54)  | ns     |
| Control of Unions       | 3.32 (1.33)  | 3.14 (1.31)  | ns     |

Bases of Power

|                  |             |             |       |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------|
| Expert Power     | 4.00 (1.12) | 3.93 (.92)  | ns    |
| Reward Power     | 2.81 (1.28) | 3.03 (1.17) | ns    |
| Coercive Power   | 2.77 (1.31) | 3.11 (1.25) | ns    |
| Referent Power   | 2.80 (1.35) | 3.43 (1.17) | ns    |
| Legitimate Power | 4.48 (.68)  | 4.14 (.92)  | 2.42* |

\*P < .05; \*\*P < .01; ns = difference not found significant

APPENDIX - D (i)

Comparison Between Engineering and Textile Organizations on Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables

| VARIABLES                         | Means (SDs)<br>Engineering<br>(n = 188) | Means (SDs)<br>Textile<br>(n = 156) | t        |
|-----------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|----------|
| <u>Individual Characteristics</u> |   |                                     |          |
| <u>Power and Self-esteem</u>      |   |                                     |          |
| Self Perception of Power          | 7.94 (2.60)                             | 7.91 (2.99)                         | ns       |
| Relative Power                    | - 2.44 (3.32)                           | - 2.72 (3.59)                       | ns       |
| Need for Power                    | 21.76 (5.57)                            | 21.42 (5.88)                        | ns       |
| Global Self-esteem                | 14.57 (3.19)                            | 14.01 (3.03)                        | ns       |
| Occupational Self-esteem          | 15.91 (2.50)                            | 14.78 (2.80)                        | 3.89 **  |
| <u>Personal Values</u>            |   |                                     |          |
| Aram                              | 3.47 (1.19)                             | 3.50 (1.39)                         | ns       |
| Dependence Proneness              | 3.85 (.96)                              | 3.84 (1.18)                         | ns       |
| Preference for P.Relations        | 3.34 (1.02)                             | 3.40 (1.17)                         | ns       |
| Team Orientation                  | 3.47 (1.25)                             | 3.06 (1.46)                         | 2.73 **  |
| Commitment                        | 3.33 (1.38)                             | 3.03 (1.40)                         | 2.00 **  |
| Showing Off                       | 3.17 (1.32)                             | 2.81 (1.45)                         | 2.42 *   |
| <u>Personal Background</u>        |   |                                     |          |
| Age                               | 2.08 (.71)                              | 1.56 (.63)                          | 7.22 **  |
| Education                         | 2.71 (.93)                              | 2.55 (.99)                          | ns       |
| Caste                             | 3.28 (2.67)                             | 5.42 (2.43)                         | 7.92 **  |
| Family Income                     | 2.45 (.66)                              | 1.86 (.77)                          | 7.56 **  |
| <u>Organizational Background</u>  |   |                                     |          |
| Job level                         | 2.00 (.89)                              | 1.67 (.93)                          | 3.33 **  |
| Monthly Salary                    | 2.01 (.81)                              | 1.35 (.61)                          | 4.41 **  |
| Stay in Organization              | 1.80 (.52)                              | 1.22 (.49)                          | 11.60 ** |
| No.of Promotions                  | 2.83 (1.01)                             | 1.61 (.90)                          | 12.20 ** |
| Experience                        | 1.79 (.44)                              | 1.35 (.52)                          | 8.80 **  |

( Appendix - D(i) contd...)

Interpersonal Variables

|                          |              |              |        |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------|
| Interpersonal Trust      | 32.05 (7.35) | 30.52 (7.35) | ns     |
| Interpersonal Attraction | 7.80 (1.72)  | 7.16 (2.12)  | 3.05** |

Organizational Processes

|                              |              |               |        |
|------------------------------|--------------|---------------|--------|
| Supervisory Leadership       | 43.35 (9.67) | 39.79 (12.17) | 2.95** |
| Peer Leadership              | 36.14 (7.38) | 35.79 (9.23)  | ns     |
| Organizational Climate       | 41.51 (8.88) | 40.75 (9.64)  | ns     |
| Performance based Rewards    | 13.14 (5.11) | 12.36 (4.87)  | ns     |
| Politics based Rewards       | 13.99 (5.65) | 14.49 (5.53)  | ns     |
| Performance based punishment | 15.08 (3.48) | 16.36 (3.98)  | 3.12** |
| Politics based punishment    | 14.83 (5.76) | 15.22 (5.87)  | ns     |
| Union-Management relations   | 13.18 (3.52) | 11.83 (3.24)  | 3.75** |

Organizational Structure

|                         |              |              |        |
|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------|
| Decentralization of DM  | 9.62 (3.18)  | 10.04 (3.91) | ns     |
| Centralization of W.O.  | 18.21 (3.83) | 19.25 (3.48) | 2.66** |
| Formalization           | 36.86 (4.74) | 39.24 (5.55) | 4.25** |
| Total Amount of Control | 13.21 (2.16) | 13.18 (2.60) | ns     |
| Slope of Control        | .68 (1.56)   | 1.29 (1.72)  | 3.42** |
| Control of Unions       | 3.25 (1.22)  | 2.97 (1.32)  | ns     |

Bases of Power

|                  |             |             |        |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|--------|
| Expert Power     | 4.26 (.82)  | 3.88 (1.00) | 3.80** |
| Reward Power     | 2.92 (1.16) | 3.06 (1.25) | ns     |
| Coercive Power   | 3.32 (1.26) | 3.22 (1.36) | ns     |
| Referent Power   | 3.44 (1.11) | 3.09 (1.30) | 2.69** |
| Legitimate Power | 4.47 (.75)  | 4.29 (.92)  | 2.00*  |

\*P < .05; \*\*P < .01; ns = difference not found significant

APPENDIX - D (ii)

Comparison Between Public Sector and Private Sector Organizations on Individual, Interpersonal and Organizational Variables

| VARIABLES                         | Means (SDs)<br>Public<br>(n = 278) | Means (SDs)<br>Private<br>(n = 65) | t      |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------|
| <u>Individual Characteristics</u> |                                    |                                    |        |
| <u>Power and Self-esteem</u>      |                                    |                                    |        |
| Self Perception of Power          | 7.99 (2.79)                        | 7.88 (2.98)                        | ns     |
| Relative Power                    | - 2.31 (3.37)                      | - 2.38 (3.34)                      | ns     |
| Need for Power                    | 21.11 (5.67)                       | 21.41 (6.49)                       | ns     |
| Global Self-esteem                | 14.35 (3.07)                       | 14.42 (3.74)                       | ns     |
| Occupational Self-esteem          | 15.01 (2.65)                       | 15.77 (2.66)                       | 2.11*  |
| <u>Personal Values</u>            |                                    |                                    |        |
| Aram                              | 3.51 (1.27)                        | 3.59 (1.12)                        | ns     |
| Dependence Proneness              | 3.86 (1.11)                        | 3.82 (1.05)                        | ns     |
| Preference for P.Relations        | 3.33 (1.12)                        | 3.41 (1.10)                        | ns     |
| Team Orientation                  | 3.09 (1.35)                        | 3.45 (1.28)                        | 2.03*  |
| Commitment                        | 3.10 (1.40)                        | 3.33 (1.33)                        | ns     |
| Showing Off                       | 2.94 (1.42)                        | 3.40 (1.33)                        | 2.55*  |
| <u>Personal Background</u>        |                                    |                                    |        |
| Age                               | 1.66 ( .69)                        | 2.05 ( .69)                        | 4.33** |
| Education                         | 2.66 ( .94)                        | 2.48 (1.01)                        | ns     |
| Caste                             | 5.21 (2.50)                        | 3.64 (2.89)                        | 4.13** |
| Family Income                     | 2.13 ( .73)                        | 2.21 ( .73)                        | ns     |
| <u>Organizational Background</u>  |                                    |                                    |        |
| Job level                         | 1.74 ( .93)                        | 1.89 ( .91)                        | ns     |
| Monthly Salary                    | 1.68 ( .73)                        | 1.76 ( .79)                        | ns     |
| Stay in Organization              | 1.28 ( .49)                        | 1.95 ( .64)                        | 7.98** |
| No. of Promotions                 | 1.90 (1.05)                        | 2.76 (1.04)                        | 6.14** |
| Experience                        | 1.42 ( .52)                        | 1.80 ( .44)                        | 6.33** |

( Appendix - D(ii) contd..)

Interpersonal Variables

Interpersonal Trust 31.01 (7.45) 31.53 (8.00) ns

Interpersonal Attraction 7.30 (1.96) 6.92 (2.39) ns

Organizational Processes

Supervisory Leadership 39.91 (11.28) 42.04 (10.37) ns

Peer Leadership 35.54 (8.40) 36.27 (7.74) ns

Organizational Climate 40.29 (9.56) 40.12 (8.34) ns

Performance based Rewards 12.39 (4.77) 13.70 (5.05) ns

Politics based Rewards 14.55 (5.56) 13.15 (5.66) ns

Performance based punishment 15.64 (3.84) 15.91 (3.67) ns

Politics based punishments 15.96 (5.74) 13.30 (5.57) **3.45\*\***

Union-Management Relations 11.86 (3.23) 13.12 (3.10) **2.93\*\***

Organizational Structure

Decentralization of DM 9.54 (3.68) 9.53 (3.39) ns

Centralization of W.O. 18.65 (3.72) 18.85 (3.77) ns

Formalization 37.66 (5.44) 38.27 (4.78) ns

Total Amount of Control 13.19 (2.55) 13.21 (2.41) ns

Slope of Control 1.16 (1.70) 1.14 (1.56) ns

Control of Unions 3.09 (1.31) 3.20 (1.38) ns

Bases of Power

Expert Power 3.88 (1.01) 4.26 (.86) **3.47\*\***

Reward Power 2.92 (1.18) 3.09 (1.25) ns

Coercive Power 3.13 (1.29) 3.38 (1.21) ns

Referent Power 3.11 (1.27) 3.27 (1.09) ns

Legitimate Power 4.24 (.94) 4.42 (.80) ns

\*P < .05; \*\*P < .01; ns = difference not found significant.